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Transmedia storytelling scholarship has been progressing rapidly over recent decades.          
Yet, a question that remains open is the lack of analysis of political transmedia              
campaigns. This political communication thesis contributes to filling that gap. Its goal is             
to develop a flexible and locally-specific approach to analysing transmedia political           
campaigning. To understand the context that affects the destinies of transmedia           
grassroots campaigns, the study turns to social movement and grassroots activism           
scholarships. In particular, it employs the idea of political opportunity structures to            
conceptualise those external opportunities and threats that affects transmedia campaigns          
in politics. To mitigate the negative aspects of a political climate, reduce the costs of               
political participation for active citizens and make their political change efforts more            
efficient, political organisers can mobilise valuable resources through transmedia         
campaigning, the thesis argues. Thus, the thesis incorporates the analysis of opportunity            
structures and mobilising resources to propose a new analytical approach to the study of              
political transmedia campaigns. Because this analytical approach reinterprets transmedia         
strategies through the lens of opportunity structures and resource mobilisation, I will            
refer to it in the thesis as the opportunity structures and mobilising resources (OSMR)              
analytical approach. The thesis tests it with the case study of Alexey Navalny's 2013              
mayoral campaign for Moscow. The case study outlines the opportunity structures of            
modern Russia and discusses the transmedia strategies Navalny’s campaign used to           
overcome some of their negative aspects. In doing so, the thesis enriches transmedia             
storytelling scholarship with insights from other disciplines and offers a flexible and            
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Problem statement 
Transmedia storytelling is the art of building a storyworld which ‘unfolds across            
multiple media platforms with each new text making a distinctive and valuable            
contribution to the whole’ (Jenkins, 2006, pp.95-96). Transmedia projects make use of            
multiple online and offline means of communication offering a great deal of            
participation opportunities to the audience. This allows transmedia producers to improve           
the levels of engagement and stay connected with the audience over time. Because             
transmedia projects are multiplatform and participation-friendly, it made them popular          
in the entertainment industry, marketing and indeed politics. 
The theory of transmedia storytelling is a relatively new but timely discipline            
which has been progressing rapidly over recent decades. The theoretical interpretations           
of the transmedia phenomenon include many classifications pertaining to different          
aspects of transmedia projects and campaigns. For instance, Jenkins (2010) proposed           
seven core concepts which could help examine transmedia projects. He highlighted such            
aspects of transmedia storytelling as spreadability vs. drillability, continuity vs.          
multiplicity, immersion vs. extractability, worldbuilding, seriality and performance. In         
her study, Iva Nedelcheva (2016, pp.3691-3692) uses Jenkins’ characteristics of          
transmedia projects to examine the transmedia experience of ​Pokémon GO ​mobile game,            
for instance.  
There are other insightful classifications that make it easier to interpret           
transmedia projects. The taxonomies of transmedia users by Robert Pratten (2015) and            
Janet Murray (1997) are based on users’ psychographics and consumption strategies and            
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are helpful to understand transmedia projects from the viewpoint of user experience. On             
the matter of participation levels, Darren Lilleker (2014, p.153) distinguishes          
involvement as ‘cognitive awareness and perceived personal relevance’, engagement as          
‘deeper cognition and so drawn to seek further information’ and participation as            
‘mobilisation as a result of information seeking’. Ross Mayfield (2006) has developed a             
classification of different types of participation depending on its intensity. From less to             
more intense, those types suggest that a media user would read, favorite, tag, comment,              
subscribe, share, network, write, refactor, collaborate, moderate or lead in the process of             
media consumption or creation. 
Arguably the most thorough analytical approach to interpret transmedia projects          
to date is Renira Gambarato’s analytical model (Gambarato, 2013). The author of this             
thesis has published a book chapter analysing Alexey Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign            
for Moscow with the model. In the piece, the campaign is discussed from a wide range                
of its aspects such as the campaign’s premise and purpose, narrative, worldbuilding,            
characters, extensions, media platforms and genres, audience and market, engagement,          
structure and aesthetics (Gambarato and Medvedev, 2015b). This analytical model is           
designed to give a very complete account of whatever transmedia campaign is under             
consideration. 
As the above examples illustrate, transmedia storytelling scholarship tends to          
prioritise the roles of media, users and participation practices in the interpretation of             
transmedia campaigns. Yet, it is still a question how to examine those transmedia             
campaigns that unfold in the realm of politics. The existing analytical models and             
classifications may overlook the complexity of the political realm transmedia campaigns           
interact with. They are exposed to many political risks and opportunities beyond the             
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media space. There are multiple political actors whose agency can alter the destinies of              
political change initiatives.  
The main research problem of this political communication thesis is to fill this             
gap in transmedia scholarship and develop an analytical approach to examining political            
transmedia campaigns as locally-specific. It will take local political contexts into           
account and reinterpret transmedia strategies as the means of addressing the negative            
and positive aspects of those contexts. 
The contention of this thesis is that transmedia grassroots campaigns in politics            
are context-dependent. To better understand the contextual factors that affect the           
progress of transmedia grassroots campaigns in politics, the thesis will develop an            
analytical approach which investigates the scholarship on political opportunity structures          
(POS) (Eisinger, 1973, p.25). In doing so, this analytical approach will be able to              
provide valuable insights about the external opportunities and threats that could make a             
difference for the campaign and acknowledge that political campaigns are          
context-dependent. Also this analytical approach will make use of the theory of resource             
mobilisation (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, p.1214). In particular, it will be reinterpreting            
transmedia strategies to see if they can morph into practical political resources, reduce             
the cost of political participation and react to the opportunities and threats of the local               
political space. The result will be a new analytical approach to studying transmedia             
grassroots campaigns, the opportunity structures and mobilising resources (OSMR)         
analytical approach, which will incorporate the analysis of the opportunity structures of            




1.2 Theoretical foundation 
The theoretical foundation of this political communication thesis is transmedia          
storytelling scholarship. The study will present a discussion on the key facets of             
transmedia storytelling and their relevance to the realm of political campaigning. In that             
discussion, the thesis will showcase and interpret key findings from transmedia           
storytelling scholars such as Henry Jenkins (2006; 2009; 2010), Carlos Scolari (2009;            
2014), Renira Gambarato (2013; 2020), Jeoffrey Long (2007), Cristy Dena (2009),           
Robert Pratten (2015), Marc Ruppel (2012), Lina Srivastava (2009) and Burghardt           
Tenderich (2014). 
Transmedia theory is a relatively new discipline and building connections with           
more fundamental and elaborated fields of academic knowledge would be beneficial for            
it. As part of the work to develop a locally-specific approach to analysing transmedia              
campaigns in politics, the thesis will draw on the theories of grassroots politics, political              
opportunity structures and resource mobilisation. Regarding the theory of grassroots          
movements and campaigning, there is a great deal of intersection between transmedia            
mode of messaging and grassroots politics based on the importance of civic participation             
to both of them. To discuss the facets of grassroots activism and ground game politics,               
the thesis will bring in the studies by Rasmus K. Nielsen (2012), Darren G. Lilleker               
(2006; 2014), Rachel K. Gibson (2009), Doug McAdam (1982), Tracy Osborn (2010),            
Seth Masket (2009), Betsy Sinclair (2013), Joshua P. Darr (2014) and others. In             
particular, the thesis will discuss practices related to grassroots politics: from protest            
manifestations to door-to-door canvassing to the facilitating role of big data.  
To conceptualise the local factors that can impact transmedia grassroots          
campaigns, the thesis will conduct the analysis of political opportunity structures. In its             
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discussion on POS, the study will draw upon the ideas by Peter Eisinger (1973), Sarah               
A. Soule and Susan Olzak (2004), Bart Cammaerts (2012), Lisa Vanhala (2012), David             
S. Meyer and Debra C. Minkoff (2004), Ellen A. Andersen (2009) and other researchers              
who studied the aspects of the mediation, legal and other types of opportunity structures.              
In doing so, the thesis will provide the analytical approach it is developing with              
important insights about those political contexts that political transmedia campaigns          
interact with. 
The thesis argues that transmedia storytelling is capable of mitigating some of            
the negative aspects of political opportunity structures in place. To draw insights about             
the mechanics of that process, the thesis will take stock of transmedia storytelling as a               
resource mobilisation tool. The resource mobilisation theory will be discussed in the            
thesis based on the key readings by Charles Tilly (2004; 2008), Jo Freeman (1975), John               
D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (1977), Sidney Tarrow (1994), Bob Edwards and John              
D. McCarthy (2007), and Michael Ganz (2009; 2011). Among other things, the analysis             
of political transmedia campaigns will include various taxonomies and classifications of           
mobilising resources outlined in those texts. 
Building connections between the theory of transmedia storytelling and the          
broader scholarship on political communication will serve to expand transmedia          
storytelling scholarship in general. In particular, this will equip the analytical approach            
this thesis is developing with the concepts helpful to take stock of political transmedia              
campaigns as locally-specific. The result will be the opportunity structures and           
mobilising resources (OSMR) analytical approach which will incorporate the analysis of           
opportunity structures and mobilising resources. 
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1.3 Case study 
This thesis will develop a new approach to studying political transmedia campaigns, the             
OSMR analytical approach, and test it with a case study. The case study will be to show                 
if this analytical approach can provide valuable insights about the case study subject,             
identify its strengths and possible deficiencies and instruct on how to apply it. For all of                
those purposes, the thesis will conduct a holistic single case study (Yin, 2014, p.55). Its               
subject will be the 2013 transmedia grassroots campaign of Alexey (Alexei) Navalny,            
the leader of Russia’s democratic opposition. 
Alexey Navalny is a Russian politician and the founder of the Anti-Corruption            
Foundation. A successful lawyer, his political career Alexey Navalny began in one of             
Russia’s liberal parties in 2001. This, he said, was an act of a protest against the                
authoritarian tendencies in the country (Gerasimenko, 2010). The young politician was           
active as a party activist, engaged with local communities and organised street protests             
against illegal construction in Moscow. In 2007, Navalny organised a series of public             
debates between the leaders of public opinion in Moscow cafes. Political debates in the              
informal setting of public spaces were a novelty to the Russian political culture and they               
gave Navalny more publicity (Gerasimenko, 2010). Soon Navalny started building his           
own platform and an independent political brand. 
The proliferation of the Internet in the country and the surging popularity of             
networking platforms were essential to the progress of Alexey Navalny’s political           
career. In 2010, he launched the anti-corruption website ​RosPil ​(‘RosPil’ is an acronym             
in Russian. It can be translated as ‘embezzlement in Russia’) and soon gained a              
reputation as an opposition blogger. In 2011, he created the Anti-Corruption Foundation            
which would eventually grow into one of the most politically influential NGOs in the              
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country. In his blog, on the website, and in social media, Navalny published             
well-documented investigations exposing corruption in the higher echelons of the          
Russian political elite and state-controlled corporations (“Alexey Navalny,” 2010). In          
particular, his foundation put the undeclared real estate and business assets of Vladimir             
Putin’s inner circle in Europe and the US into the public domain. As a result of the                 
investigations, Navalny’s referring to Putin’s ​United Russia party as the “party of crooks             
and thieves” went viral. 
Navalny’s reliance on online means of communication and his popularity among           
the protest movement of 2011-2012 in Moscow allowed him to run a grassroots election              
campaign in 2013 which was transmedia in its nature. The thesis will argue that the               
campaign originated from a greater protest movement of 2011-2012. It will also show             
there was a diffusion of political resources between the movement and the mayoral             
campaign of Alexey Navalny. With the analysis of the 2013 mayoral campaign of the              
opposition candidate, the study will illustrate the proposition that transmedia grassroots           
campaigns are context-dependent. The case study of this campaign will discuss Russian            
opportunity structures and will interpret Navalny's campaign through that local context           
to see how political opportunities and threats affected the transmedia practices of that             
grassroots campaign. In particular, the case study will bring in the discussion of such              
Russia’s opportunity structures as mediation and legal ones, the state of democratic            
institutions and grassroots traditions in the country and the role of the Russian capital              
where the 2013 campaign of Alexey Navalny took place.  
The case of Alexey Navalny’s mayoral campaign goes back to 2013 but stays             
highly relevant in the context of Russian politics. As disturbing as it was, the              
assassination attempt Alexey Navalny survived in 2020 only solidified his position as            
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the leader of Russian opposition and turned him into an internationally recognised            
politician. His return to Russia in 2021 and quick imprisonment added to his reputation              
of a brave advocate for political change in the county. The developments of 2020-2021              
made the 2013 campaign of Alexey Navalny an even more interesting case as it was the                
first grassroots campaign of such a magnitude in Russian history and it paved the way               
for Navalny and his team to become the driving force of Russian opposition movement. 
 
1.4 Historical significance of the case study subject 
The case of Alexey Navalny’s 2013 mayoral campaign in Moscow is historically            
important. Opportunity structures do not exist as snapshots. They do not arise            
spontaneously but are laid down over time. The transmedia strategies Alexey Navalny            
applied in his campaign opposed the deep patterns of Russian opportunity structures.            
The historical lack of accountability of Russian political elites as well as the poor              
tradition of political cooperation between people on the grassroots level have been the             
historical factors of the Russian political life and they manifested themselves in            
restrictive opportunity structures evident in modern Russia. They affected the political           
context of Navalny’s campaign and put a mark on the opposition candidate’s political             
platform and communication practices. 
As David Rowley of University of Wisconsin-Platteville notes, the Russian          
imperial state actively suppressed any intellectual influences that would imply that ‘the            
purpose of the autocracy might be to serve the interests of Russia – rather than the other                 
way around’ (Rowley, 2000, p.26). The noble people of the autocratic Russian Empire             
enjoyed a great deal of cultural and economic integration into Europe but the society at               
large stayed underdeveloped both economically and politically. According to ​Smith, the           
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ultimate reason for the fall of the Russian Empire in 1917 was its ‘failure to modernise’                
(​Smith, 2017​).  
After the Russian Revolution of 1917, the state stayed true to its imperialist             
tradition of focusing on international affairs at the expense of national interests. For             
instance, as Latynina notes (2015), great resources were spent on promoting socialist            
revolutions around the world and the militarisation of the economy. When the            
expansionist project of the world revolution ultimately failed, the soviet establishment           
barricaded themselves inside the socialist camp and created preferential treatment for           
themselves inside the Soviet planned economy.  
It adds to the discussion why Alexey Navalny’s message of political           
accountability and civic cooperation faced fierce resistance from the state and different            
parts of its elites. Akin to the Imperial period, the very same members of the elite who                 
spread anti-Western propaganda inside the country were happy to integrate themselves           
into the Western life. Alexey Navalny and his Foundation exposed their double lives             
with many notable investigations into Tuscany vineyards, Miami Beach real estate and            
the European citizenships of the Russian political and media establishment (“Alexey           
Navalny,” 2017).  
The sanctions imposed on prominent members of the Russian political class in            
2014 blocked their assets in the EU and the US. Some high-profile establishment figures              
were denied physical access to those countries (“Ukraine crisis,” 2014). Similar to the             
Soviet system, the elites were forced to seek refuge in their luxurious ghettos in Russia               
perpetuating the ‘besieged fortress’ ideology through state-controlled media (Lipman,         
2015).  
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Navalny’s platform challenged the imperial orientation of the Russian political          
elites. In 2013, Navalny’s campaign tried to bring the focus back on the domestic issues               
and restore the accountability of political elites through active citizenship by means of             
transmedia participation. Navalny campaigned for vesting the citizens with more control           
over the matters pertaining to their local communities, increasing the accountability of            
elites and putting the economic interests of the nation at the forefront of domestic and               
foreign politics.  
At the same time, Navalny’s transmedia tactics of active citizenship conflicted           
with the historical patterns of political escapism. There has been a historical lack of              
grassroots tradition of political cooperation, the poor tradition of public gatherings and            
overall political apathy in Russian society (Medvedev, 2018). It explains the difficulties            
the campaign faced when trying to run a transmedia grassroots campaign in the context              
of politically inert Russian society. Energising a lot of people around a common cause,              
making them believe that their collective actions could make a difference and engaging             
them with the campaign as volunteers by means of transmedia platforms were a very              
new thing for the Russian electoral tradition and required an innovative approach            
Navalny’s campaign tried to come up with. 
Historically complicated opportunity structures on the one hand and the lack of            
political participation experience among citizens on the other could promise a ‘perfect            
storm’ for any grassroots campaign. Yet, Navalny’s campaign of 2013 managed to            
achieve a lot with its transmedia campaign strategies. This makes this case highly             




1.5 Thesis structure 
This thesis contains seven chapters. It starts with an introductory chapter to tell the              
reader about the primary research problem of the thesis, its theoretical foundation and             
the case study as a way to try the new methodological approach to analysing political               
transmedia campaigns this thesis is developing. 
Chapter 2 will take stock of the theory of transmedia storytelling. To immerse             
the reader into the complex phenomenon of transmedia storytelling, the chapter will talk             
about the origins and definitions of the term, the role of a ‘canon’ in transmedia projects,                
participation and user generated content (UGC), transmedia economics, structures of          
transmedia projects, transmedia user classifications and transmedia storytelling in         
marketing, among other things. Importantly, the chapter will discuss the application of            
transmedia storytelling in politics, including transmedia activism and fandom, the role of            
storytelling in politics, the use of microtargeting and Big Data for canvassing,            
transmedia crowdfunding. 
Chapter 3 brings in the theories of grassroots politics and mobilisation that the             
thesis is going to make part of its context-dependent analysis of political transmedia             
campaigns. First, the chapter will discuss citizens’ political agency and the role political             
organisers play to empower grassroots enthusiasts with necessary political resources          
reducing costs of participation for them and making their political actions more efficient.             
The chapter will classify the types of political resources social movement organisations            
(SMOs) and political campaign organisers operate with, which will become part of a             
new approach to the analysis of transmedia campaigns in politics, the OSMR analytical             
approach. Aside from the discussion on resource mobilisation, the chapter will draw            
insights about the role of political decision makers and political opportunity structures            
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that can make life harder for grassroots initiatives, especially in the context of illiberal              
democracies like Russia. This chapter constitutes a theoretical basis for the OSMR            
analytical approach to the study of transmedia grassroots campaigns in politics. 
Chapter 4 is a methodological chapter. It will outline the chosen case study             
design and provide a rationale for making this choice. It will also introduce the subject               
of the case study and will explain why Navalny's campaign of 2013 is a highly relevant                
case to test the OSMR analytical approach. The matters of generalisation and            
contribution to knowledge will be brought up in this chapter. Another part of this              
chapter will be a discussion on the use and scrutiny of resources referenced in the case                
study. Importantly, the chapter will also give an account of possible limitations of this              
thesis. 
Chapter 5 will have the case study analysis of Alexey Navalny’s 2013 mayoral             
campaign for Moscow. In the case study, the OSMR analytical approach will be tried.              
Since the state of political space is essential for the analysis of transmedia grassroots              
campaigns, Chapter 5 will give a detailed account of Russian opportunity structures. In             
particular, the chapter will discuss such factors of political opportunity as the situation             
with the institutions of representative democracy, the traditions of grassroots politics in            
the country, the role of Moscow as a political and economic centre, the state of legal and                 
mediation opportunity structures. With this analysis, the chapter will outline the context            
of political opportunities Navalny’s grassroots campaign had to deal with trying to            
reduce the costs of participation for its supporters with the means of transmedia             
storytelling.  
The second part of the case study will examine the campaign’s message and the              
methods of resource mobilisation the campaign used to empower its supporters. On the             
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topic of storytelling, the chapter will talk about the consistency of the message which is               
essential to call a campaign transmedia. It will also show how the platform and              
communications of the campaign incorporated the message of active citizenship. Then           
the case study will examine the methods of resource mobilisation the campaign used to              
confront the political opportunity structures of modern Russia. Among other things,           
there will be a discussion on how the campaign recruited and empowered volunteers,             
dealt with the mediation opportunity structure, made use of its technical expertise,            
designed online platforms to make the campaign easy to navigate for its supporters,             
employed the elements of gamification and became the biggest crowdfunding          
phenomenon in the history of Russian politics among other aspects. 
The thesis culminates in Chapter 6 which will discuss the OSMR analytical            
approach apart from the case study of Alexey Navalny's campaign. In particular, the             
chapter will give theoretical instructions about how to apply this analytical approach. It             
will include multiple diagrams with taxonomies identified in previous chapters and           
schemas outlining essential elements of the OSMR analytical approach. Once more, the            
chapter will take stock of the key parts of the OSMR analytical approach, i.e. transmedia               
scholarship, resource mobilisations and opportunity structure theories, to highlight their          
role in the analysis of political transmedia campaigns. 
The conclusion chapter will be a place to reflect on the job done in this thesis. In                 
a succinct manner, it will articulate the primary findings of the study and how it               
contributes to the progress of transmedia scholarship in general. The chapter will also             
talk about possible further developments of this thesis which would be another step             
towards a better understanding of the transmedia phenomenon and its political           
implications.  
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Chapter 2. Transmedia Storytelling and Politics  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Transmedia storytelling is central to the theoretical framework of this political           
communication thesis. Developing a feasible analytical approach to studying political          
transmedia campaigns and applying it both require understanding the principles of           
transmedia storytelling. This chapter will discuss transmedia theory which the OSMR           
analytical approach is centred around. Starting with the definition, the chapter will            
introduce the reader to such ideas as transmedia canon, the role of participation in              
transmedia projects, transmedia audiences and economics, taxonomies and        
classifications which could find application in the analytical approach this thesis is            
developing, the usage of transmedia storytelling in marketing, entertainment and          
politics: from transmedia activism to the growing application of big data for            
microtargeting and more. In doing so, the chapter will lay the foundation of a new               
analytical approach to studying political transmedia campaigns this thesis is developing. 
 
2.2 Conceptualising transmedia storytelling 
2.2.1 Origins and definitions 
Transmedia storytelling is about telling different parts of a story across multiple online             
and offline extensions, for instance multimedia websites, YouTube videos, outdoor          
events, video games, and so on. This concept reflects on many of the most recent               
changes in the practices of media production and consumption. That includes the            
increasingly important role of the Internet, social media and mobile technologies in            
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everyday life, digitalisation in media production, multi-screen media consumption, and          
other media phenomena. 
Today the transmedia approach to messaging has become commonplace in the           
entertainment industry. Many popular fictional worlds seem to expand forever to keep            
the fans busy – like the ​Harry Potter franchise with its ​Pottermore ​online extensions and               
theme parks (Brummitt, 2016), or the iconic ​Why So Serious? transmedia campaign            
designed to promote Christopher Nolan’s ​The Dark Knight movie (Gambarato, 2013).           
Other talked-about transmedia projects are ​Hunger Games​, ​Prometheus​, ​Bachelorette​,         
Despicable Me 2​, ​Food, Inc.​, ​Breaking Bad​, ​House of Cards​, ​Downton Abbey​, ​Game of              
Thrones​, ​Top Chef​, ​Pokemon​, ​Biosphere Infinite​, ​Minecraft​, ​LEGO Marvel Super          
Heroes​, and ​Halo 4​ (Zeiser, 2015). 
The term ​transmedia ​was coined by Marsha Kinder in 1991 with regard to the              
things unrelated to political communication. In ​Playing with Power in Movies,           
Television, and Video Games: From Muppet Babies to Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles            
(1991)​, she took stock of how ​Muppet Babies and ​Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles             
projects went beyond TV and movie genres to other mediated forms as an example of               
transmediation. In the book, Kinder conceptualised ‘the intertextual relations across          
different narrative media’ (1991, p.2) and ‘​transmedia intertextuality among television,          
movies, and toys’ (1991, p.40) in the U.S. media production. 
Henry Jenkins (2006, pp.95-96) defined transmedia storytelling ​as the art of           
building a storyworld which ‘unfolds across multiple media platforms with each new            
text making a distinctive and valuable contribution to the whole’. The definition            
highlighted the importance of textual diversity and the cross-platform dissemination of           
content in transmedia projects. Von Stackelberg and Jones gave a similar definition to             
24 
transmedia storytelling. According to them, a transmedia project must include ‘one or            
more stories set in a single ‘storyworld’ and told using at least two different forms of                
media, with the story elements in each form of media making their own distinctive              
contributions to the audience’s understanding of the storyworld’ (von Stackelberg and           
Jones, 2014, p.61). The Producers Guild of America defines a transmedia project as ‘one              
that consists of three (or more) narrative storylines existing within the same fictional             
universe on any of the following platforms: Film, Television, Short Film, Broadband,            
Publishing, Comics, Animation, Mobile, Special Venues, DVD/Blu-ray/CD-ROM,       
Narrative Commercial and Marketing rollouts, and other technologies that may or may            
not currently exist’ (“PGA Board of Directors,” 2010). In a similar way, Jeff Gomez,              
CEO of Starlight Runner Entertainment that provided brands, such as ​Avatar​, ​Pirates of             
the Caribbean​, ​Sony and ​Coca-Cola, with transmedia services, defines transmedia          
storytelling as ‘the process of conveying messages, themes or story lines to a mass              
audience through the artful and well planned use of multiple media platforms. It is a               
philosophy of communications and brand extension that broadens the life cycle of            
creative content’ (JumpwireMedia, 2010).  
All the listed definitions share a similar idea that can be distilled down to a               
simple formula proposed by Carlos Scolari, Paolo Bertetti and Matthew Freeman:           
Narrative Expansion + Media Expansion = Transmedia Storytelling (Scolari et al., 2014,            
p.4). Broadly speaking, transmedia storytelling is a specific mode of messaging. The            
message is communicated to the audience through multiple online and offline platforms            





Platforms, stories, messages, projects, means of communication, engagement – there are           
many words we use to grasp the complex idea of transmedia storytelling. The story itself               
and opportunities for engagement are among the most important aspects of transmedia            
storytelling. Following this, Carlos Scolari (2009, p.587) defines transmedia storytelling          
as first of all a structured story, ‘a particular narrative structure that expands through              
both different languages (verbal, iconic, etc.) and media’. Engagement is part of the             
story as both the industry and the fandom contribute to the creation of a transmedia text                
(Scolari et al., 2014, p.3). Scolari, Bertetti and Freeman portray transmedia storytelling            
as a sum of ‘canon’ which is produced by both the media industry and the fandom under                 
collaborative culture. Carlos Scolari’s transtextual typology that includes both the canon           
and user generated content, plus the ‘grey zone’, reflects on this idea (Scolari, 2014).              
Thus, participation is integral to transmedia production. It is one of the means of text               
expansion in transmedia projects along with an official canon. 
The consistency of a canon is necessary to hold a transmedia storyworld together             
– giving the complexity of its narrative structure. Because different parts of a transmedia              
storyworld are distributed through different platforms, that threatens to break the           
storyworld into a number of unrelated textual ‘units’ (Dena, 2009, p.167). Narrative            
consistency becomes vital as a transmedia narrative accumulates a growing number of            
texts. Split into the units of content, a transmedia project must remain to represent a               
coherent storyworld, the universe of common places, aesthetics, characters, ideas and           
other elements that constitute it. With this regard, Jeoffrey Long notes that ‘an             
extension’s value is often directly proportionate to how well it adds to the story – the                
encyclopedia of the world – that audiences are building in their heads’ (2007, p.164). 
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2.2.3 Participation and UGC 
Aside from the canon, there is a space for user generated content and other forms of                
participation in transmedia projects. Robert Pratten (2015, p.2) highlights the importance           
of participation in his definition of transmedia storytelling as ‘telling a story across             
multiple platforms, preferably allowing audience participation, such that each successive          
platform heightens the audience’s enjoyment’.  
According to Scolari, Bertetti and Freeman, there is a hierarchy of transmedia            
users with regard to the depth of participation: the consumers of a ‘single media              
product’, the consumers of ‘different media products’, fans who share contents online            
and actively participate ‘in the conversations around the narrative world’, and ​prosumers            
on top of the hierarchy. A portmanteau, the term ​prosumer ​was coined from a              
combination of the words ​producer ​and ​consumer​. A prosumer is the fan ‘who produces              
new contents and expands the narrative world’ which represents ‘one of the highest             
levels of transmedia engagement’ (Scolari et al., 2014, p.3).  
The given hierarchy of transmedia use is akin to a ‘sales pipeline’ for transmedia              
campaigns and projects. In political campaigning, it is the job of political organisers to              
turn individuals with weak desire to get involved into those who are actively involved in               
the campaign. With that being said, it is important to keep in mind that not every user is                  
ready to invest a lot of their time, emotions and so on in any given campaign or project.                  
But the number of such ‘lazy’ users is always bigger than the number of dedicated fans.                
Therefore, there is always a trade-off between investing in a casual majority and a              
dedicated minority – as Alexey Navalny’s campaign manager Leonid Volkov (2013)           
stressed. 
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More opportunities to perform and self-actualise in the mediated context have           
turned the Internet into a massive creative market. The market encourages participation            
and creates a so-called participatory culture. According to Jenkins et al. (2006, p.7),             
participatory culture concerns to: 1. Relatively low barriers to artistic expression and            
civic engagement; 2. Strong support for creating and sharing creations with others; 3.             
Some type of informal mentorship whereby what is known by the most experienced is              
passed along to novices; 4. Members who believe that their contributions matter; 5.             
Members who feel some degree of social connection with one another. Participatory            
culture can be a factor of a political engagement as it mobilises users and encourages               
participation. 
The new mediated context in which the Internet could be a place for creativity,              
debate and learning, provoked a conversation on what we should call those who             
voluntarily produce content on the Internet as a part of their media consumption. The              
terms ​media consumer and ​user ​seem to overlook the activities those individuals carry             
out online. In 1980, Alvin Toffler (1980) came up with the word ​prosumer​. He              
envisioned a new era when companies will start producing highly customised goods.            
That would require collaboration with consumers, he believed. Today the term can serve             
to reflect on the ambivalent nature of online media activities people participate in, i.e.              
production and consumption. ​Produser​, a term coined by Axel Bruns (2008), is another             
way to describe an active Internet user of today. 
 
2.2.4 Transmedia economics 
People spend increasingly more time on online platforms and leave traces in the form of               
valuable content on Internet platforms. Many, perhaps most of those platforms are            
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commercial enterprises – like social media. The business models of those websites            
suggest that their revenues depend heavily on how actively their users like, post, share              
and comment there. The economics of online platforms favour participation because the            
depth of engagement and user participation are among their performance indicators: the            
more people react or make additions to a story, the more valuable the story becomes in a                 
utilitarian sense of selling advertisers access to their target audiences. Digital platforms            
therefore are interested in keeping consumers engaged. Concomitantly, the more people           
interact with a story the more visible it becomes in terms of other people’s ability to                
come across with it – because of the various algorithms that social media use like               
‘trends’ and ‘tops’, for instance. Interaction entails more interaction. Transmedia          
storytelling satisfies this need of online platforms as it keeps users busy interacting with              
a story and producing new content for a virtually boundless storyworld. 
At the same time, it is quite rare that an average user gets paid for the value he                  
produces – though popular users can monetise their presence on those platforms in many              
ways – from using built-in monetisation tools to getting paid by brands for product              
placement. Still the vast majority of users do not profit financially from their online              
activities. That made Tiziana Terranova (2000, p.36), for instance, say that ‘the            
provision of “free labor” (...) is a fundamental moment in the creation of value in the                
digital economies’.  
Aside from using online platforms for the purposes of direct advertising, online            
marketing efforts of a campaign are effective as long as they can attract what sometimes               
is referred to as free labour. The concept of free labour on the Internet suggests that                
users engage in different kinds of activities online that potentially bring profit to online              
platforms but do not get paid by the latter. Free labour as a form of human resource is                  
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important to transmedia campaigns. It saves another resource, money, brings in creative            
talents of enthusiasts from outside, and demonstrates public support for the campaign’s            
cause.  
At the same time, transmedia producers cannot afford thinking of the audience as             
free labour. Though most active users may not get paid money, the fact that they still                
find it meaningful to invest their time in online activities suggests that they do benefit               
from that in some other form. As per Uses and Gratifications theory, people satisfy              
practical and psychological needs with media consumption (Katz et al., 1973). In the             
interactive environment of online communication and especially fandoms active users          
are motivated by their self-actualisation in the process of voluntary creation of new             
content, by earning social capital in the scope of their online habitat, by the recognition               
they get from other members of the fandom, and so on. For instance, Axel Bruns (2016,                
p.3) notices that ‘produsage participants gain status within the community on the basis             
of their contributions’. A status within an online community can certainly have a value              
for many users. Thus, one could say that media ​usage ​is about ​consuming ​what is               
valuable to you, while ​produsage ​is about ​becoming ​valuable by creating something that             
is valued by others. It is a social practice that is capable of reproducing hierarchical               
structures in the mediated context. Your place in that hierarchy will depend on the level               
of your expertise, the exclusivity of the content you produce, what you do in real life,                
and so on. The job of transmedia producers is to make sure their projects can provide                
those intangible values to the users (Zeiser, 2015, p.82). 
Because users differ in their willingness to engage with transmedia projects, it            
affects transmedia business logic and how transmedia platforms unfold in time. One of             
the audience-centred transmedia business models by Robert Pratten (2015, p.154) relies           
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heavily on the opportunities the participatory culture created. Its first step is to attract as               
much of the audience as possible, therefore the opening part of the story must be free                
and the intensity of participation should be rather low. The goal is to introduce people to                
the story and get them interested first. Then the project must offer more advanced              
opportunities for participation and more interactive experience which is necessary to           
turn some of the users into fans. Fandom, in its turn, has a power to disseminate the                 
story and willingness to create their one user generated content. As the audience grows,              
monetisation becomes possible. 
The idea behind that model is similar to that of the purchase funnel in marketing               
and sales (Pratten, 2015, p.183): as the depth of participation gets greater and an average               
contribution of a single user grows, the overall audience may shrink and their combined              
contribution may even drop. It is a trade-off between the quantity and quality of              
participation. The same is valid for political participation: it also can vary from             
supporting a candidate, to voting for the candidate in an election, to occasionally             
volunteering for the candidate, to being ready to work for the campaign 24/7. 
 
2.2.5 Structure of transmedia projects 
Pratten’s example of a transmedia business model highlights the important role vertical            
mobility (from low to high engagement) plays in transmedia projects. But let us not              
forget about horizontal mobility. In practice, transmedia projects can be more like            
networks than linear vertical pipelines. Under those circumstances, smooth migration          
between platforms of a project becomes a major issue. The ​Fraction of Selection by              
Wilbur Schramm (1954, p.19) explains why people use one media outlet with higher             
frequency than another. It says that the frequency of use is positively associated with the               
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expected reward from the consumption of a product and negatively associated with the             
efforts required to get and consume it: ​Frequency of activity = ​Expectations of reward /               
Effort required​. Interestingly, the Pratten’s model is an unintended replica of the ​Return             
on Investment business formula: ​ROI = ​Return (Benefit) / ​Investment (Cost) ​(Pulliam            
Phillips and Phillips, 2005). 
User gains and pains depend on the structure of a transmedia project. To ensure              
there is a smooth movement of the audience through media platforms, transmedia            
projects can create ​negative capabilities (Long, 2007, pp.53-60) and ​migratory cues ​or            
links ​(Ruppel, 2012, p.47). The former is a gap in a story that leaves the audience in                 
anticipation. The latter is a signal towards another medium or ‘any sign in a transmedia               
fiction that assists an audience in making correspondences and connections between           
sites’ (Ruppel, 2012, p.62). Intrigued by a negative capability, the audience uses a             
migratory cue to find a way to another platform where the mystery is expected to be                
solved. That is why Ruppel (2012, p.67) calls such an end point platform a ‘completion               
point’. For instance, a letter in the ​Matrix franchise is an example of a migratory cue                
which is ‘used as a hint for viewers to look for more information on the letter in ​The                  
Animatrix​ and ​Enter the Matrix​’ (Bry, 2009): 
This letter, which tells of an upcoming attack by the machines on the             
human city of Zion, makes its debut in The Animatrix “The Final Flight             
of the Osiris”, in which “the protagonist, Jue, gives her life trying to get              
[the] message into the hands of the Nebuchadnezzar crew” (Jenkins 102).           
The letter then serves as what Alfred Hitchcock would call the key            
MacGuffin in the video game Enter The Matrix, which begins with a            
mission to fetch the letter from a guarded post office inside the Matrix.             
The Matrix Reloaded begins with the characters having received the          





On the opposite side, negative forces or ‘frictions’, such as ‘increased cost,            
additional keystrokes, diverted attention, low bandwidth’ (Pratten, 2015, p.152), are          
impediments to a smooth migration of users within a transmedia project. They tend to              
break a transmedia structure into discrete platforms and prevent users from experiencing            
the synergy effect of consuming the story as a whole. A paywall can be one of the                 
constraints, for instance. That is why it is important for transmedia producers to             
understand the segments of their audience, who are ready to pay and for what, to               
manage platforms and audiences in a smart way. 
Regarding connections between platforms inside transmedia campaigns, there        
are three types of transmedia project structures according to Robert Pratten (2015,            
pp.15-17). ​Transmedia franchise ​has multiple entry-points and does not require          
exploring all parts of a transmedia structure to have meaningful experience (Jenkins,            
2006, p.96). As Long (2007, p.15) notes on a transmedia franchise, ‘while each             
[extension] could be experienced separately and still be enjoyable, each component           
became part of a single unified storytelling experience’. Another type of transmedia            
structures is ​portmanteau​. A portmanteau project has a single story, a unique experience             
spread over multiple platforms. The third type, ​portmanteau franchise ​includes          
portmanteau ​structure as one of its extensions. 
 
2.2.6 User classifications 
It is possible to stratify the interactive society of Web 2.0 using other characteristics.              
Classifying users by their needs, Robert Pratten (2015) clustered transmedia users into            
the following four psychographic types: 1. Killers, 2. Achievers, 3. Socialisers, 4.            
Explorers. The first type gravitates towards such content as competitions, online games            
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and alternate reality games (ARGs ) as their primary motive is to prevail in competition              1
with others. Achievers enjoy levelling up and gaining points through solving puzzles            
and mysteries. Socializers make up a great portion of those who spend a considerable              
amount of time on online forums, comment or participate in cosplays which gives them              
an opportunity to hang out with others. Explorers like discovering new parts of the              
storyworld, learning more in spin-offs, uncovering hidden meanings within stories, and           
so on (Pratten, 2015, pp.78-79).  
There are other possible classifications of transmedia users. For instance, Murray           
(1997, pp.236-237) breaks a transmedia audience into the categories of ​real-time           
viewers who look for suspense and satisfaction in each single episode, reflective            
long-term audience who enjoy following coherent patterns in the story as a whole, and              
navigational viewers who take pleasure in following connections between different parts           
of the story. Demographics are also very much relevant for clustering transmedia users.             
Such characteristics as age or sex can give statistically significant information to predict             
the interests or behaviour of a user. 
 
2.2.7 Transmedia storytelling in marketing 
Marketing, particularly branding, makes use of transmedia storytelling quite extensively.          
This application of transmedia storytelling brings us closer to our core topic, namely             
political campaigning and political marketing. Branding is about cultivating a unique           
identity of a product as perceived by its target audience. To create a brand personality,               
marketing people vest a brand with distinctive human traits. Usually, successful brands            
can be described in terms of human personality traits they represent. For instance,             
1 ​ARG (alternate reality game) is a ‘form of narrative often involving multiple media and gaming 
elements to tell a story that might be affected by participants’ actions’ (Connolly et al., 2011, p.1389). 
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hundreds of advertising campaigns have been run to associate the ​Marlboro ​brand with             
the image of a cowboy, ‘an ideal symbol of rugged masculinity, freedom, escapism,             
adventure, independence, simple pleasures, and heroism’ (“The role of the media,”           
2008, p.67). 
A brand identity is elusive in the sense that it comes into existence only when               
communicated to the audience and more importantly – when believed by the audience.             
That is why people working in marketing make sure they channel a consistent             
personality of their brands through the means of communication available to them:            
corporate and package designs, retail spaces, PR, sponsorship initiatives, advertising          
campaigns, and so on. The result is that transmedia storytelling in branding becomes the              
art of constructing a ​brandworld ​with a number of stories personalizing a brand as their               
main character, rather than building a ​storyworld ​with a number of characters            
personalizing the story – like in entertainment, for instance. The process of creating a              
transmedia storyworld of a brand is the art of disseminating a ​solid brand identity              
through multiple online and offline platforms, rather than a single story. This key             
distinction is helpful in explaining why a transmedia ​brandworld ​can be designed            
without merging its building blocks into a solid narrative and still provide its audience              
with a solid experience (Medvedev, 2015). 
Brand is a protagonist of its transmedia world. Its consistent identity unites            
individual stories into a single storyworld portraying the brand and declaring what the             
brand stands for. As Carlos Scolari (2009, p.600) writes, in transmedia storytelling ‘the             
brand is expressed by the characters, topics, and aesthetic style of the fictional world.              
This set of distinctive attributes can be translated into different languages and media: It              
is a ‘moveable’ set of properties that can be applied to different forms of expression’. On                
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the same note, Tenderich (2014, p.28) argues that ‘individuals themselves can turn into             
transmedia brands, and arguably Barack Obama serves as [an] example’. 
Participation is a driving force of transmedia ‘brandtelling’. It makes the           
audience believe in a brand personality by turning the brand’s values into consumers’             
experience. Rather than bombarding audiences with unwanted and redundant brand          
messages, now brands try to engage audiences in compelling conversations.          
Participation can take different forms: aside from direct interaction with the brand,            
audiences can get involved in content creation, communicate with other audience           
members, or even become part of the story. As Bonnie Buckner and Pamela Rutledge              
(2011) put it, ‘a transmedia story model positions a brand as a co-participant and              
collaborator by inviting each member of the audience to participate personally in the             
story world. Connecting with a brand through story shifts consumer perception and            
allows consumers to create their own understanding of the brand’. 
To sum up key advantages of a transmedia approach to branding: 1. It opens a               
dialogue between consumers and brands; 2. Audience is active and can choose their own              
path of engagement; 3. Each media platform makes a unique contribution to brand             
identity and expands narrative; 4. Audiences do not simply consume the story, they             
collaborate in story development; 5. Audience participation expands the life cycle of            
advertising campaigns and event creates opportunities for monetization; 6. Participation          
reinforces brand identity and creates customer loyalty (Buckner and Rutledge, 2011). 
Developed by Simmons (2007), i-branding is a concept closely related to the            
idea of transmedia branding. According to Simmons, there are ‘four pillars’ of            
i-branding, i.e. understanding customers, content, marketing communication and        
interactivity (2007, p.545). As Ridge-Newman and Mitchell unfold it, the key           
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characteristics of i-branding include 1. ‘harvesting visitor data to understand target           
audiences online’, 2. ‘targeting online audiences with highly personalized messages’, 3.           
‘two-way and one-way interactions between and with the audience’ and 4. ‘producing            
engaging, shareable content’ (2016, p.100). Lilleker (2014, p.21) claims that the           
adoption of an i-branding approach to political marketing had ‘a positive impact upon             
electoral outcomes’ in the context of the UK party-politics. 
 
2.3 Transmedia storytelling in politics 
2.3.1 Background 
Transmedia storytelling is a specific way of messaging where multiple means of            
communication are brought together to serve one purpose. To provoke political           
mobilisation and collective action, transmedia campaigns use mobile applications, social          
media including targeted advertising on social media and search engines, websites of            
different functionalities, interactive maps, blogs, printed newspapers and leaflets, online          
petitions, offline rallies, hashtag campaigns, crowdfunding platforms and e-wallets,         
merchandise, door-to-door and phone canvassing, themed video games and TV          
advertising among other means. 
In 2011, a group of enthusiasts launched a campaign which became known as             
The Great British Property Scandal​. The campaign reflected on a long-standing housing            
crisis in the UK. One of the campaign leaders George Clarke estimated there were one               
million empty houses in the UK amidst a shortage of affordable offers on the market               
(“Channel 4,” n.d.). The project was designed to ‘force the issue on the government              
agenda, fighting for effective policy amendment and, consequently, promoting the          
revitalization of abandoned properties’ (Gambarato and Medvedev, 2017, p.35). The          
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campaign created a mobile application ​Empty Homes Spotter ​for the public to take             
photos of abandoned houses and report them to the authorities. It also launched an              
online petition to push the government to create a new loan fund that would help               
individuals renovate their abandoned real estate and bring it back to the market. Other              
extensions of the campaign included TV series on Channel 4, the official website, the              
Facebook and Twitter accounts, the YouTube channel with additional videos. By the end             
of the campaign, over 118,200 people signed the petition, 10,000 abandoned homes            
were reported and £17 million was allocated for the new low-cost loan fund in the UK                
(Gambarato and Medvedev, 2017, p.36). 
The Fish Fight ​of 2010-2013 was a campaign to draw public attention to the              
practice of the wasteful discarding of edible fish at sea under the EU fishing quotas and                
to amend the EU fishing policies. The campaign spread its message with more than a               
dozen extensions including television series, the website, YouTube videos, an          
educational online quiz about fish species, social media accounts and a mobile app. The              
mobile app for iOS encouraged users to consume sustainable fish by displaying statistics             
on the populations of different fish species, suggesting recipes with sustainable fish            
choices and mapping restaurants committed to sustainability (Gambarato and Medvedev,          
2015a, p.51). 
Barack Obama, the first US President of the social media era, was described by              
some, including Henry Jenkins, as a transmedia phenomenon. The Obama for President            
campaign of 2008, Jenkins argued, included both ‘radical intertextuality and          
multimodality’ (2011) and was ‘the biggest non-fiction success of transmedia          
storytelling’ (2009).  
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2.3.2 Storytelling in politics 
The use of transmedia storytelling in politics is close to that in branding. Storytelling in               
politics is a powerful way to convey meanings and connect with the people in a popular                
manner. However, on a larger scale, a political campaign constitutes itself a storyworld             
which is more complex than just stories that politicians tell to make a human case for                
their policies. The stories politicians tell, policies they propose, commentary they offer            
and the style of communication they practice are there to support their vision about the               
current state of politics. In Mark McKinnon’s words, ‘[w]inning campaigns create a            
narrative architecture that ties it all together into something meaningful and coherent’            
(McKinnon, 2016). In a similar way, Ernest Bormann’s symbolic convergence theory           
suggests that shared stories create a common cultural field for those who relate to them,               
‘shared emotions and motives’, ‘common heroes and villains’, and so on (Bormann,            
1982; Olufowote, 2006). In their turn, multiple platforms of transmedia projects equip            
users with opportunities for engagement and collective actions based on that ‘culture’. 
Stories give cohesion to shared beliefs (Polkinghorne, 1988, p.14) and allow           
citizens to reinforce their ‘general worldview’ (Mayer, 2014, p.71). A particular story            
may attract people of one opinion about social injustice and leave the others             
unconvinced and unimpressed. The reason for that is what Herman and Vervaeck (2013)             
call ‘ideology’ of a narrative which is ‘the frame of values’ in a text that reflects                
‘hierarchical relationships between pairs of oppositional terms such as real vs false,            
good vs bad and beautiful vs ugly’. Stories ‘moralize reality’ (Gudmundsdottir, 1995),            
interpret it from an ethical standpoint. Michael Ganz (2009, p.5) for instance praised             
Barack Obama’s ‘mastery of public narrative [which] energized his audience around           
core values...: equality, community, interdependence, and dignity’. Thus, stories convey          
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a peculiar perspective on the questions that are a matter of concern for political              
campaigns such as the origins of a social injustice or possible remedies for social              
grievances. Political organisers can use them to convey their answers to those questions. 
 
2.3.3 Transmedia activism and fandom 
Grassroots election campaigns and social movements employ such features of          
transmedia storytelling as an expanding storyworld, cross-platform messaging and         
participation. With the latter in mind, Srivastava came up with the term ​transmedia             
activism ​in 2009. Transmedia activism connects citizens to a cause by ‘exposing them to              
a variety of media properties over various distribution channels … and then working             
with the most creative and engaged audience segment to facilitate the creation of their              
own content that further explains the cause and inspires action around it’ (Srivastava,             
2009).  
Jenkins et al. (2013, p.168) draw attention to an intersection between fictional            
texts and civic discourse which ‘drives active community discussion and debate –            
conversations that might lead to community activism or social change’. In their study of              
fan activism, Kligler-Vilenchik et al. (2012) conclude that ‘shared media experiences, a            
sense of community, and the wish to help’ are the factors that unite a fandom and give                 
its members an aspiration for social and political change. For instance, a debate over              
racial politics intensified within the Harry Potter fandom when it was revealed that the              
character of Hermione Granger in ​Harry Potter And The Cursed Child stage play will be               
performed by an English actress Noma Dumezweni who happened to be black.  
In another instance of that intersection, the President of the Magical Congress of             
the United States was portrayed as a woman of colour in ​Fantastic Beasts and Where to                
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Find Them ​fantasy film of the Harry Potter storyworld (Medvedev and Pronkina, 2019,             
p.74-75). The movie hit the cinema screens across the US in November 2016, the month               
when the country held presidential elections. 
As collective behaviour theory suggests, shared grievances are an important but           
not sufficient factor for a political action to happen (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977, p.250). If               
mobilised, however, concerned citizens become one of the most valuable resources a            
social movement can have. To a great extent, the number of people who back a political                
campaign makes a difference with regard to how power holders react to their demands.              
Transmedia stories are instrumental in agglomerating the people of shared grievances           
and turning some of them into the active participants of a campaign. In 2016, the Harry                
Potter fandom reacted to the US Presidential election cycle with the           
#ReadyForHermione campaign. In an imaginary Presidential election, the all-witch         
(read as all-women) ticket of Hermione Granger and Luna Lovegood ran on a platform              
focused on better access to education, cooperation between magical and non-magical           
communities, environmental issues, and ending institutionalised discrimination against        
transgender and non-binary people. The official campaign slogan ‘I'm With Herm’           
clearly referred to Hillary Clinton’s ‘I'm With Her’ campaign slogan. As the campaign’s             
press release put it, ‘the two candidates solidified their feminist base and made headlines              
with their progressive policy proposals’. The Granger campaign said she wanted to show             
that ‘politics can serve a greater purpose beyond just the cultivation of political careers              
and consolidation of power among the well-monied and influential few’          
(“Granger/Lovegood,” 2016).  
The Trump campaign was portrayed through the ticket of the two adverse            
characters of the Harry Potter series Vincent Crabbe and Gregory Goyle. They had a              
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slogan ‘Make Hogwarts Great Again’ and a pledge to build a wall around Hogsmeade              
village to ensure that the last purely wizarding village remains muggle-free. According            
to the press release of the Granger/Lovegood campaign, ‘Vincent Crabbe and Gregory            
Goyle have captured the attention of the magical community’s remaining Voldemort           
apologists and blood purists’ (“Granger/Lovegood,” 2016).  
About 1,500 online users raised $52,000 for the get-out-the-vote effort of ​Wizard            
Rock the Vote 2016 campaign of the Harry Potter Alliance on a crowdfunding website              
(“Wizard Rock,” 2016). The Granger Leadership Academy hosted 150 Potter fans in            
October 2016 to teach them how to be leaders in fan activism. After the US Presidential                
election of 2016, the fandom launched ​#Nevillefightsback campaign in a bid to swing the              
Electoral College vote after Donald Trump’s victory (“Neville Fights Back,” n.d.). To            
sum up, transmedia campaigns with their many platforms and a focus on participation             
can be instrumental in agglomerating human resources. They unite people of shared            
perspectives on social injustice around a storyworld, use the people’s creative potential            
to promote the campaign and run a political change campaign on a variety of online and                
offline platforms so that citizens can contribute to the movement in the form most              
suitable to them: from canvassing around their neighbourhoods to posting hashtags on            
Twitter. 
 
2.3.4 Canvassing with Big Data 
On the technological side, big data starts to make a big difference for political              
campaigns. The ability to collect and crunch big data paves a way for more personalised,               
targeted and effective communication between campaigns and citizens. Campaigns         
analyse data and make predictions to their advantage both in the online sphere and in               
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their ground game politics. This underlines the cross-platform nature of modern           
technologies of social mobilisation. Machine learning algorithms gave birth to new           
forms of personalised political communication in the online sphere and also facilitated            
traditional door-to-door canvassing and phone banking based on data science. The ‘air            
game’ (the use of media) changed the ‘ground game’ (outdoor campaigning) because of             
the capability of online platforms to generate big data. Overall, these changes gave             
grassroots volunteers more opportunities for fruitful participation in political campaigns          
and made their work easier in many ways. For instance, with regard to grassroots              
operations of election campaigns, big data analytics brought the old practice of putting             
citizens into electoral boxes to a new level. Nielsen recalls the times when they used to                
sort ‘index cards’ with voter information, printed walk sheets for a canvass. It was not a                
match to modern days ‘detailed Web-accessible voter files, synchronize personal digital           
assistants, and print turf maps’ (Nielsen, 2012, p.6).  
In 2015 and 2018, the ICT department of Alexey Navalny's Foundation           
introduced new applications for more efficient data harvesting called ​Zhnets          
(‘Harvester’) and ​Zhnets-2018 respectively. The former was designed to help volunteers           
work in the field. For instance, the app broke down the city of Novosibirsk with the                
population of over 1,5 million into 250 routes for efficient canvassing, guided volunteers             
from door to door, counted all the collected data and crunched it using preselected              
parameters (Navalny, 2015). Zhnets-2018 was even more technologically sophisticated         
as it automatically verified scanned documents, was programmed to send SMS and            
email notifications to voters and served as a pipeline that provided the campaign and its               





Big data created new and better ways for transmedia projects to communicate with the              
audience. Developments in machine learning, and deep learning in particular, made it            
possible to predict voter preferences and behaviour with workable accuracy.          
Microtargeting is among the most important of the approaches based on the predictive             
power of machine learning. Political campaigns use microtargeting to better align the            
content they share with tastes of their target audiences. In 2016, Ted Cruz's Presidential              
campaign used microtargeting to boost the chances of the Republican senator from            
Texas. They took advantage of machine learning algorithms to predict likely Republican            
voters. To find probable Republican voters, the app analysed data from a broad range of               
sources. Naturally, it looked into previous political activities of the voters like            
participation in GOP caucuses. But it also used consumer data. On the last point, the               
campaign tried to find correlation between consumer habits and their political affiliation.            
For instance, it was found that those who buy rucola salad tend to vote Democrats while                
those who prefer iceberg lettuce are more likely to be Republicans. Similarly, those who              
drive pickups tend to be Republicans while Democrats prefer Volvo (Wilson and            
Polyansky, 2018). That saved time and money the campaign spent for its            
get-out-the-vote effort. 
That data was used for online promotion of the candidate. For instance, the             
campaign could use the microtargeting tools of social media to target the consumers of              
specific brands. The app allowed users to find likely Ted Cruz supporters among their              
friends on Facebook and send them a personalised message asking to support the             
candidate (Cohen and Duner, 2016). The feature was designed to promote the candidate             
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on social media with more efficiency since normally we trust our friends and the people               
we know personally more than the advertising on the media. Gamification was also part              
of how the Ted Cruz app encouraged volunteers to perform. There were daily quests for               
volunteers and a rank system was organised. The latter allowed volunteers to stand out              
among the other ‘ground fighters’. 
Also the Cruz campaign did personality modelling and created a set of different             
posts for different categories of users (Detrow, 2016). For instance, if the output of              
clustering algorithms said that a Facebook user is an extrovert, the campaign showed             
them ads in a more extraverted reddish colour, while those who demonstrated            
introverted behaviour on Facebook were targeted with ads of a more placid blue colour.              
Also the personality modelling predicted what issues different users care more about to             
target them with the messages most relevant to them.  
It is likely that Boris Johnson’s campaign of 2019 attempted to do the same with               
their Facebook advertising posts. Facebook Ads Library shows that in July 2019, the             
very next day Boris Johnson became Prime Minister, the Facebook page of the             
Conservative Party launched a campaign of dozens of very similar paid promotion posts             
that used the same range of pictures and slogans in different combinations, in colour and               
black and white (Bedingfield, 2019). 
Another common application of microtargeting is in the advertising tools of           
major social media platforms and search engines. ​Facebook Ads​, ​Google Search           
Network​, ​Google Display Network​, ​YouTube TrueView Ads​, ​Facebook Lead Ads are           
among the most popular advertising tools built upon microtargeting algorithms.          
Facebook equips campaigns with mechanics to target narrow audiences. That allows           
campaigns to broadcast different messages to different audiences and get maximum           
45 
response from different groups of voters (Barbu, 2014, pp.45-46). Microtargeting saves           
budgets because it makes sure a campaign does not pay to deliver messages to irrelevant               
users. It also makes it possible to create campaigns for different purposes. For instance,              
a campaign can target likely supporters with get-out-the-vote messages to increase voter            
turnout among them on an election day or mobilise people for a rally. They can also run                 
a voter suppression campaign to frustrate turnout among those who support other            
candidates.  
Moderates who are more likely to stay undecided can become the target of a              
persuasion campaign. The study by Liberini et al. (2020, p.25) shows that exposure to              
Facebook ads during the 2016 Presidential race in the United States had relatively high              
effect on moderate voters. That was of special importance because there are more             
undecided or moderate voters in so-called swing states that decide the outcome of             
elections in the US. 
Among the categories that a political campaigner can use for targeting, there are             
some basic parameters like age, sex, location, occupation and so on. Importantly, the             
instruments of microtargeting allows advertising campaigns to target specific groups of           
voters – depending on what pages, groups and communities they have liked on a social               
media platform. If one wanted to target likely Democratic voters, they would probably             
choose their ads to be shown to the readers of left-leaning media like The HuffPost​,               
CNN​, ​Washington Post​, or to those who liked pro-choice-related pages, for instance. The             
process of microtargeting is managed by keywords that a campaign manager has to             
suggest from their general knowledge about the people they want to communicate with.             
They can also use the data available on the market. There is also software developed               




The Internet made it easier to run crowdfunding campaigns. Crowdfunding is a specific             
instance of crowdsourcing. It is instrumental for collecting money from the public and             
depends on online promotion and how motivated potential supporters are (Brabham,           
2012). Since transmedia storytelling projects rely heavily on online platforms and their            
participatory capacities, it makes it easier for them to do crowdfunding. In            
Crowdfunding and Transmedia Storytelling​, Carlos Scolari and Antoni Roig Telo (2015)           
give examples of ​The Cosmonaut and Panzer Chocolate as transmedia initiatives that            
incorporated crowdfunding into their business strategies. In his ‘Getting Started with           
Transmedia Storytelling’ practical guide, Robert Pratten (2015, p.191) cites         
crowdfunding as one of the logical ways to finance transmedia projects. 
In December 2011, for the first time crowdfunding and online payment tools            
were used in Russia to organise a protest rally. For that purpose, Olga Romanova who is                
a renowned Russian journalist, a former editor-in-chief of Russian Forbes and now the             
head of ​Russia Behind Bars prisoner rights NGO, created an account on Yandex.Money             
electronic payment service. It became known then as ​Olga Romanova’s wallet​. Russian            
citizens donated an equivalent of $114,000 to the wallet to organize a protest             
manifestation on Sakharov Avenue (Smirnova and Surnacheva, 2012). 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the concept of transmedia storytelling which will be central             
to the analytical approach this thesis is developing. Transmedia mode of messaging            
implies multiple extensions hosting a single storyworld. Canon, or consistency of the            
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message, holds the storyworld of a transmedia project together. On the opposite side,             
negative forces or ‘frictions’, such as ‘increased cost, additional keystrokes, diverted           
attention, low bandwidth’ (Pratten, 2015, p.152) tend to break a transmedia structure            
into discrete extension and prevent users from experiencing the synergy effect of            
consuming the story as a whole. 
Participation is integral to transmedia campaigns. Transmedia projects often         
encourage their audience to generate content (UGC), apply crowdfunding strategies, add           
interactivity to their extensions and so on. The emergence of participatory culture            
(Jenkins et al., 2006, p.7) and ​produsers ​(Bruns, 2008) in particular made such strategies              
not only possible but desirable to many audiences. With that being said, there are users               
who are more inclined to participate than the others. Also, the higher the intensity of               
participation, the fewer people would go along (Clow, 2013). 
Politics is one of the areas where transmedia storytelling found application.           
Henry Jenkins called the first presidential campaign of Barack Obama ‘the biggest            
non-fiction success of transmedia storytelling’ (2009). Some other examples include ​The           
Fish Fight and ​The Great British Property Scandal social campaigns in the UK, Alexey              
Navalny’s 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow in Russia. Those campaigns used           
transmedia strategies to generate buzz around the issues of concern and ultimately            
advance their social or political causes.  
There are many classifications and taxonomies that help make sense of political            
transmedia campaigns, their audiences, structure, revenue models and so on. They do a             
great job describing different aspects of transmedia projects but lack a wider perspective             
which would take the external political space into account. The analytical approach this             
thesis is developing suggests that the destinies of political transmedia campaigns are            
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context-dependent. The question is how to conceptualise those external factors that form            
dynamic relationships with transmedia strategies of advancing a political cause. The           
next chapter will bring in the theories of resource mobilisation and opportunity            
structures. It will help reinterpret transmedia strategies as a mechanism to agglomerate            
valuable political resources and confront possible restraints of a given political space. 
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Chapter 3. Resource Mobilisation and Opportunity Structures 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The thesis argues that the analysis of transmedia campaigns in politics requires a foray              
into the scholarship on political mobilisation to better understand what the progress of             
grassroots campaigns depend on. The existing analytical approaches and classifications          
to analyse transmedia projects may overlook the complexity of the political context            
transmedia grassroots campaigns have to deal with. Transmedia campaigns do not           
unfold in a vacuum. There are multiple political actors whose agency can alter the              
destinies of political change initiatives. To deliver a more nuanced analytical approach            
to the study of political transmedia campaigns, this chapter will present a discussion on              
the role of active citizens, political organisers and political elites in how transmedia             
campaigns originate, progress and achieve their objectives. 
This chapter suggests that part of political agency to bring about political change             
belongs to the groups of organized citizens. They seek to influence political            
decision-making and promote political change by manifesting their grievances through          
various forms of grassroots activities, deliberation and protest. Transmedia storytelling          
can support those efforts. At the same time, political elites as political actors put their               
mark on the destinies of transmedia political change initiatives too. They are in a              
position to influence the political climate that grassroots campaigns and movements           
have to deal with. Between active citizens and in-polity actors, there are political             
organisers whose role is to facilitate citizens’ ability to bring about change, with             
Navalny's grassroots campaign being an example of such a political organisation.  
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This thesis also argues that transmedia storytelling as a method of organising            
grassroots campaigns exhibits some qualities that make political change action more           
probable. Within the analytical framework that I am outlining here, this means that             
transmedia storytelling can 1. help a campaign deal with external threats and generate             
external opportunities in accordance with the theory of ​political opportunity structure           
(Eisinger, 1973), and 2. increase the campaign’s capacity for accumulating valuable           
resources in the paradigm of ​resource mobilisation theory ​(Edwards and McCarthy,           
2007). This will constitute the theoretical foundation of the OSMR analytical approach            
which includes the analysis of both opportunity structures and mobilising resources.           
With this, the thesis will offer a locally-specific approach to the analysis of transmedia              
campaigns in politics as its contribution to transmedia storytelling scholarship. 
 
3.2 Citizens’ agency 
3.2.1 Movement and campaign-style grassroots initiatives 
Active citizens are the primary agents of any grassroots political change initiative. By             
the very definition of grassroots, it requires active citizenship. In Staples’ words,            
grassroots movements and campaigns are a ‘collective action by community members           
drawing on the strength of numbers, participatory processes, and indigenous leadership           
to decrease power disparities and achieve shared goals for social change’ (2004, pp.1-2). 
According to Kerstin Jacobsson (2015, pp. 171-172), grassroots can take the           
form of a ​campaign or a broader ​movement​. Sunflower Student Movement in Taiwan             
(Ho, 2018), the Tea Party Movement (Riordan, 2018) and Hong Kong’s Umbrella            
Movement (Tin-bor Hui, 2015) are among the most prominent examples of grassroots            
movements of the recent decade. Historically, there were social movements whose           
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reverberations keep on affecting the politics of today, like the American civil rights             
movement to end racial discrimination in the US. Spanned over many decades, it was a               
‘coalition of thousands of local efforts nationwide … hundreds of discrete groups, and             
all manner of strategies and tactics’ (McAdam, 2012). 
The way those movements tried to achieve their goals through grassroots           
participation supports the point by Doug McAdam (1982, p.26) who claimed that social             
movements have the power to challenge the ‘established structure of polity membership’            
by their willingness to ‘bypass institutionalized political channels’. As opposed to           
various sorts of political associations that long to achieve their goals through            
conventional mechanisms of representative democracy, social movements are capable of          
disrupting the polity by making political claims in circumvention of the established            
structures of decision-making. 
These days political campaigns rely heavily on grassroots enthusiasm (Osborn et           
al., 2010; Masket, 2009). Dubbed as a transmedia phenomenon, one of the most             
talked-about ​campaign-style grassroots endeavours was the 2008 presidential campaign         
of Barack Obama. The Obama campaign designed ‘MyBO’ space as a part of the              
official website. A self-management tool for volunteers, it empowered the candidate's           
supporters to create a ‘fundraising page, start a campaign blog, set up a political group               
and recruit members or simply email a prepared message out to their online social              
networks to advertise Obama’s policy positions’ (Gibson, 2009, p.292). 
Gibson also argues that campaign-related citizen activism has been on the rise in             
UK politics of the recent decades (Gibson, 2009, p.296). For instance, ​Cameron’s            
Conservatives and the Internet: Change, Culture and Cyber Toryism by Anthony           
Ridge-Newman (2014) takes stock of ‘Cyber Toryism’ and the evolution the           
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Conservatives came through in their adoption of online technologies. It started with            
WebCameron the Tory Leader’s video blog, ​MyConservatives and ​MERLIN ​(Managing          
Elector Relationships through Local Information Networks) centralised applications        
(2014, p.10). By 2010, the paradigm had changed as the use of Facebook ‘helped to               
make participation in Conservative activism a more fluid and decentralized process’           
(2014, p.53). 
The 2016 presidential campaign of Bernie Sanders is another example of this            
shift towards grassroots participation. Particularly popular among the younger         
generation, the United States Senator from Vermont capitalised on his base being active             
social media users. While Sanders’ organization built applications to transform          
supporters into a distribution network for his social media messaging, it was also             
‘complemented by “unofficial” grassroots networks that circulated more informal and          
culturally oriented appeals’, in Penney’s words (2017, p.1).  
As those and many other grassroots campaigns have demonstrated, grassroots          
activities can include campaigning in the street, door-to-door canvassing, phone          
banking, gathering signatures for petitions, raising money from small donors for           
political advertising or campaigns, organizing large demonstrations, asking individuals         
to submit opinions to media outlets and government officials, get-out-the-vote activities           
which includes the ‘practices of reminding people to vote and/or transporting them to             
polling places’ (Poggi, n.d.).  
Although such activities do not necessarily apply transmedia messaging, all of           
them require a great deal of citizen participation. This focus on participation creates a              
big overlap between grassroots politics and the way transmedia campaigns in politics            
unfold. A transmedia campaign tends to create a network of media platforms with             
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opportunities for people to interact with it and act within it. Therefore, grassroots             
movements and campaigns that mobilise people for social action can benefit from using             
the transmedia mode of messaging to facilitate their efforts. Navalny's campaign of 2013             
was an example of this transmedia approach which helped the candidate and his team              
use the power of a collective action in a more efficient manner. 
 
3.2.2 Grassroots political campaigns 
In the realm of institutional politics, grassroots campaigns mobilise individuals to turn            
out to vote (get-out-the-vote campaigning) or to vote a certain way (persuasion            
campaigning) in an election. The statistical analysis by Sinclair, McConnell and           
Michelson concluded that face-to-face get-out-the-vote visits by canvassers living in a           
voter’s local neighbourhood were more effective than visits by canvassers from other            
neighbourhoods in the US general election of 2006 (Sinclair et al., 2013). Nickerson and              
Feller (2008) argue that volunteers prefer to campaign in their own local communities,             
and voters are more likely to be influenced by campaigners from their communities also.  
In the 2004 presidential race, the Republican National Committee (RNC)          
organised what became known as the ​72-Hour Task Force to work with grassroots             
supporters of Bush-Cheney’04 ticket (Osborn et al., 2010). The results showed that            
‘knocking on doors, instead of merely leaving fliers, could be worth 2 to 3 percentage               
points in a tight election’ and also local volunteers managed to bring ‘almost 5 percent               
more people to the polls’ than professional telemarketing canvassers (Franke-Ruta,          
2004).  
The notion of ​ground game is closely related to grassroots political participation.            
The ground game paradigm suggests that political campaigns create networks of local            
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offices to mobilise supporters to canvas on behalf of the campaign. For instance,             
Democrat voter databases were ‘opened up to registered supporters to download           
coordinates for local area canvassing’ in 2008 (Gibson, 2009, p.292). In relation to the              
2008 Obama presidential bid, Seth Masket (2009, p.1023) concluded that ‘those counties            
in which the Obama campaign had established field offices during the general election             
saw a disproportionate increase in the Democratic vote share’. It even helped flip three              
battleground states to the Democrat candidate.  
On the other hand, during the 2016 election campaign, Donald Trump was            
widely criticised for the lack of proper ground game in contrast to Hillary Clinton who               
ran conventional ground game operations (Bump, 2016). The result of those elections            
might demonstrate that the ground game is not a panacea and there are other factors of                
mobilisation, for instance storytelling, ‘a good message and a great messenger’           
(“Conway on clash,” 2016), which will be discussed later. 
 
3.2.3 Role of Big Data 
When coupled with emerging political software solutions, web applications,         
multiplatform transmedia storytelling and social media, citizens’ agency becomes even          
more powerful in the scope of political campaigns. For instance, citizens’ political            
agency benefits from new developments in machine learning and recommendation          
systems in particular which has turned every Internet user into an influencer. Less             
sophisticated ​content-based recommendation engines are built around the attributes of          
given objects (genre, topic, language, length, any other hand-assigned or objective           
attributes). On the other hand, the machine-learning algorithms of ​collaborative          
recommender systems make suggestions looking at users with similar patterns of online            
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behaviour (Schafer et al., 2007). That means that with collaborative filtering, not only             
fans or volunteers but virtually every user becomes an unintentional ambassador of what             
they watch, play or like on the Internet. 
Collaborative recommendation engines also allow campaigns to target users with          
bespoke content without the need to categorise units of content by hand, saving time and               
money. They collect data on users’ preferences based on their behaviour on websites,             
use dimensionality reduction algorithms like alternate least squares to reduce the number            
of variables (Liao, 2018), make recommendations and analyse the users’ response to see             
if those recommendations work (Medvedev, 2019). The result is more personalised           
communication, customisation and cost-effectiveness for those who run political         
campaigns which brings us to the next topic – the function of political organisers in               
empowering grassroots supporters. 
 
3.3 Resource mobilisation 
3.3.1 Why mobilise resources? 
To support a political cause, citizens can invest their time, money, ‘moral and cultural              
resources’ (Edwards and McCarthy, 2007, p.124). But they do not tend to do it without               
weighing costs and benefits. At least that is what Mancur Olson's (1965) theory of              
rational choice on collective action suggests. This is especially relevant to the situation             
when a group member anticipates possible repercussions as a result of his or her political               
actions – which is surely the case with authoritarian regimes like Russia. Under those              
circumstances, the role of political organisers – like it was in the case of Navalny's               
transmedia campaign – is to mobilise resources and reduce the costs of political             
participation for the citizens (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, p.1214). The analysis of            
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resource mobilisation practices of a transmedia grassroots campaign will constitute one           
of the integral parts of the OSMR analytical approach this thesis outlines. 
Resource mobilisation theory suggests that social ‘grievances are relatively         
constant and pervasive’ among citizens (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977, p.266). Therefore,           
social discontent cannot fairly justify why political change initiatives find great support            
on the ground at some point. According to this approach, what makes a difference is ‘the                
amount of social resources available to unorganized but aggrieved groups, making it            
possible to launch an organized demand for change’ (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977, p.250).             
Thus, resource mobilisation theory states that the emergence and the destinies of            
political change initiatives have a lot to do with the organisational capacities and             
resources available to them (Edwards and McCarthy, 2007, p.116). 
Indeed, modern political campaigning experiences two tendencies which may         
seem contradictory on the surface but in fact complement each other very nicely. On the               
one hand, grassroots participation and self-initiative of local supporters have become an            
integral part of political campaigns nowadays. On the other hand, there is the process              
going on which Lilleker called the ‘professionalisation of party campaigning’ (2006,           
p.42) as political campaigns become more data-driven and centralised. For instance,           
Ridge-Newman concludes that by 2015 the organic use of Facebook by the Conservative             
Party’s young grassroots supporters had become less important in the UK context (2020,             
p.13). He relates this shift to the adoption of a ‘newly professionalised approach’ to              
campaigning by the Tories (Ridge-Newman, 2020, p.14) which falls in line with            
Lillaker’s observation about the ongoing professionalisation of political campaigning.  
The resource mobilisation theory brings the tendencies of grassroots mobilisation          
and professionalisation together and gives an explanation. McCarthy and Zald (1977)           
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suggest that the role of political organisers is to accumulate resources of different nature:              
money, labour, creative ideas, media attention, allies within elites and so on, and provide              
grassroots enthusiasts with those resources for more effective campaigning. For          
instance, the American civil rights movement benefited from the organizational          
capacities of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Congress          
of Racial Equality (CORE), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored            
People (NAACP), and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), among          
others (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, p.1219). In the same manner, the Moscow grassroots             
campaign of 2013 benefited from a well-structured organisation provided by Navalny's           
team. The campaign had internal capacities to empower grassroots enthusiasts with           
means of political participation, something that the movement lacked in the period of             
mass protests.  
It is also important to stipulate that there is a fine line between grassroots              
mobilisation and empowerment on the one hand, and ​astroturfing ​on the other.            
Astroturfed political actions ‘masquerade as grassroots efforts’ (Lee, 2010, p.73).          
According to Jacobs (2012, p.567), astroturfing suggests the ‘artificial advocacy of a            
product, service or political viewpoint, to give the appearance of a “grassroots”            
movement’. On the other hand, grassroots mobilisation provides the actual supporters on            
the ground with various resources that make their political participation easier, safer or             
more efficient. 
 
3.3.2 Classifying resources of mobilisation  
The typology of social mobilisation resources by Edwards and McCarthy (2007, p.126)            
specifies the resources of five types. Among them, there are moral resources            
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(legitimacy, solidary support, sympathetic support, and celebrity), cultural resources         
(conceptual tools, specialized knowledge, tactical repertoires, organisational templates,        
technical or strategic know-how including both mobilisation and production         
technologies about effective social action), and social-organisational resources        
(intentional social organisation that advance social movement goals and other          
organisational capacities that are created for non-movement purposes but open political           
actors access to other types of resources through it). Talking about organisational            
capacities, Osborn, McClurg and Knoll say that, for instance, the ‘Obama organization            
… created a national phone bank, stimulated local meet-ups, had an unprecedented            
individual level fundraising effort, and had an extensive ground organization for           
personal contacts’ (Osborn et al., 2010, p.212).  
Other resources of political mobilisation may include material (monetary         
resources, property, office space, equipment and supplies), and human ones (labour,           
experience, skills and expertise) (Edwards and McCarthy, 2007, p.126). McCarthy and           
Zald (1977, p.1220) specify such resources of mobilisation as money, facilities, labour            
and legitimacy, while Tilly (1977a, pp.1-12) distinguishes land, labour, capital and           
technical expertise ​as the main resources of social mobilisation. Charles Tilly also            
argued that social movements make ‘collective claims to power holders in the name of a               
population living under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of repeated             
public displays of that population's numbers, commitment, unity, and worthiness’ (2008,           
p.257), where numbers, commitment, unity and worthiness (WUNC) are among key           
resources defining social movements (Tilly, 2004, p.4).  
Jo Freeman (n.d.) places social mobilisation resources in two columns: tangible           
and intangible. The tangible resources are money, space and publicity. They can be             
59 
converted to each other so that the lack in one can be compensated by the others. Human                 
resources and different kinds of labour that political organisers depend on are the             
primary intangible resources. People help a movement with their specialised skills, time            
and commitment. Money is the most liquid of the resources that political organisers and              
SMOs operate with: it can be relatively easy to convert it into other resources, such as                
media attention, practical knowledge, some types of human resources, space and so on.  
In another taxonomy of mobilising resources, Charles Tilly distinguishes internal          
capacities of a social group from external opportunities. Among internal capacities he            
highlights the following: interests (‘the shared advantages or disadvantages’);         
organization (‘the extent of common identity and unifying structure among the set of             
people’) and mobilisation (‘the extent of resources under the collective control of the set              
of people’). The three factors are interrelated so that ‘shared interests promote            
organization, higher levels of organization promote increased mobilization, and         
mobilization facilitates collective action, but each element also varies in part           
independently of the others’ (Tilly, 1977b, p.12).  
 
3.3.3 Repertoire of contention 
Along with a message, the instruments of conveying the message, or the ‘means of              
publicizing the movement's existence and ideas’ in Jo Freeman’s words (n.d.), are a             
principal resource of social mobilisation. Social movements publicise their claims          
through what Charles Tilly (2004) coined as a social movement ​repertoire​, various            
forms of public display. Repertoire is also referred to as one of the resources of political                
mobilisation because they are not simply a means of promotion, a means of conveying              
messages to the public top down. They also are a means of bottom-up social action, a                
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self-sufficient element of active repertoire. Political organisers can launch online          
campaigns without bringing people out to the streets, urge people to sign online petitions              
to affect decision-making processes or launch a mobile app to simplify participation.            
Previously political campaigns used legacy media to convince people to act elsewhere            
offline in the streets. Now their supporters can act on the platforms of interactive media. 
According to Edwards and McCarthy, cultural resources of a political campaign           
or a social movement are the practical knowledge of the variety of forms of social action                
that they can use: from public rallies to different kinds of social media initiatives. They               
include Charles Tilly’s tactical repertoires, plus ‘technical or strategic know-how          
encompassing both mobilization and production technologies about effective social         
action’ (Edwards and McCarthy, 2007, p.126). The variety and also the efficient use of              
those technologies are pivotal as they are a practical means of mobilising supporters and              
making a political claim. For instance, Alexey Navalny’s mayoral campaign for           
Moscow included 32 extensions overall (Gambarato and Medvedev, 2015b, p.176). A           
great share of them were Internet-based and provided sympathisers with handy tools to             
participate in the campaign in different roles and different ways. Chapter 2 gave an              
account of some emerging technologies that transmedia campaigns in politics benefit           
from: microtargeting, machine learning and so on. If the role of political organisers is to               
reduce the cost of participation for their supporters, this ‘technical expertise’ as a             
mobilisation resource (Tilly, 1977a, pp.1-12) can make a difference. 
The resource of mobilisation and production technologies generates what Jo          
Freeman calls publicity of a social movement. The ability to spread a message about a               
political cause among potential supporters is crucial to increase the base behind a             
grassroots initiative. Freeman examines the progress of the younger branch of the            
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women’s movement and comes to the conclusion that the access to the network of              
underground newspapers and New Left conferences was responsible for its rapid           
growth. The road would be much harder to walk ‘had this branch of the movement               
emerged five years earlier (or later), when such resources were minimal’ (Freeman,            
n.d.).  
Concerning technical expertise as a way to expand the repertoire of contention,            
the Ted Cruz for President campaign, for instance, came up with a mobile application              
for grassroots volunteers to make their canvassing efforts more efficient. The volunteers            
could log into the app and – with a script and a customised survey displayed on the                 
screen – start calling contacts from the preloaded base of voters – right from their               
mobile phone wherever they were. The tablet version of the app was instrumental in              
door-to-door canvassing. It implemented conditional logic: when the interviewee         
answered a question, the app interpreted his answer in real time and displayed the next               
appropriate question for the volunteer to ask the interviewee. In the cases of both the               
mobile and the tablet apps, the volunteers returned responses back to the database             
instantaneously for future use by the campaign (Wilson and Polyansky, 2018). On the             
same point of technical expertise, in their canvassing operations the 2008 presidential            
campaign of Barack Obama ‘directed local staff to reach out to interested volunteers,             
test their capabilities, train them to use campaign software, and appoint them as             
“neighborhood team leaders”’ (Darr and Levendusky, 2014, p.542). 
Spatial resources of political mobilisation are also of importance for outdoor           
campaigning. In the systems that are based on the rule of law and liberal market, space is                 
a commodity and a subject to selling, letting, renting and purchasing. It is not always the                
case with illiberal democracies. The freedom to use public and even private spaces for              
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political purposes is a part of the opportunity structure that can be managed through state               
institutions. Restrictive political space limits the ability of citizens and political           
organisers to use public and private spaces for peaceful political gatherings.  
In the 2018 Russian presidential election, real estate owners in more than a dozen              
Russian provinces terminated their contracts with Alexey Navalny or refused to let the             
properties after agreeing initially. They did it under pressure from local authorities, the             
campaign claimed (Volkov, 2018). The solution was found in using private lands which             
were not regulated by the state acts on public gatherings. In Izhevsk city, people voted to                
give Navalny the surroundings of their apartment building for a rally. In Tambov, a rally               
was organized in the car park of a shopping mall (Feldman, 2017b). In Irkutsk city,               
Navalny held a rally on the territory of a furniture factory provided by a local               
businessman (Feldman, 2017a). In those examples, people’s agency and an innovative           
approach helped mitigate the negative attributes of the Russian political space. 
 
3.3.4 Storytelling as mobilisation resource 
The ability of transmedia campaigns to stick with their canon and produce a coherent              
storyworld of events, aesthetics, values and ideas through storytelling makes it           
instrumental in articulating social grievances, giving a particular perspective on social           
injustice and stimulating the emergence of political change initiatives. The architect of            
Barack Obama's grassroots campaign of 2008 Michael Ganz suggests that storytelling as            
a leadership strategy is also a resource of political mobilisation and a very important one               
– in the context of today’s grassroots politics. He elaborates saying that ‘movements do              
emerge from the efforts of purposeful actors (individuals, organizations) to assert new            
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public values, form relationships rooted in those values, and mobilize political,           
economic, and cultural power to translate these values into action’ (Ganz, 2009, p.4). 
Michael Ganz (2011, p.273) argues that social mobilisation does not happen           
simply as a result of the ‘convergence of resources and opportunities’. He suggests             
instead that storytelling as an instrument of leadership is a key to installing enthusiasm              
in potential supporters and activists of grassroots campaigns. From his experience of            
working for the Obama campaign of 2008, ‘[p]ublic narrative is a leadership practice of              
translating values into action’ (Ganz, 2011, p.274). The values are experienced           
emotionally and become ‘sources of ends worthy of action and the capacity for action.              
Narrative is the discursive means we use to access values that equip us with the courage                
to make choices under conditions of uncertainty, to exercise agency’ (Ganz, 2011,            
p.274). In the same manner, Zeiser (2015, p.357) suggests that ‘the key to transmedia              
social impact campaigns is to harness the power of media narratives to activate the              
audience's passion to act’.  
The Moscow protests of 2011-2012 demonstrate how a strong sense of injustice            
may provoke collective actions as an attempt to fix it. On that point, McCarthy and Zald                
(1977, p.1214) made a case for shared grievances and generalized beliefs as ‘important             
preconditions for the emergence of a social movement’. On the same point, Snow (2013,              
p.1) suggests that ‘mobilizing grievances … provide the primary motivational impetus           
for organizing social movement campaigns and for engaging in social movement           
activities’. 
While social grievances indicate the level of aggravation, generalized beliefs          
formulate the ideas of possible causes and means of ameliorating the grievances. Based             
on shared grievances, political change campaigns push a specific agenda on how to             
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reduce their grievances. McCarthy and Zald (1977, pp.1217-1218) emphasise the          
significance of generalized beliefs about political change as ‘a set of opinions and             
beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the             
social structure and/or reward distribution of a society’. Along with other scholars, Della             
Porta and Diani (2006) also highlight shared beliefs as one of the defining characteristics              
of social movements. That makes transmedia storytelling as a way to channel shared             
grievances and generalized beliefs through consistent messages an effective mobilising          
mechanism in the sense of resource mobilisation theory. 
 
3.3.5 Monetary resources 
Fundraising is another means of resource mobilisation that a transmedia approach can            
help with. The history of transmedia studies goes back to Marsha Kinder’s book on how               
merchandise production became an expansion strategy for some popular fictional stories           
(1991). While in politics merchandise helps campaigns promote their cause or           
candidacies, it also can generate a cash flow to the campaign. For instance, about three               
quarters of the funds Donald Trump for President campaign had raised by the end of               
2015 came from the sales of merchandise like ‘Make America Great Again’ hats             
(“Almost all the money,” 2016). 
The state, various kinds of organisations and citizens are engaged in the process             
of redistributing resources to social movements. The state can provide ‘monetary           
resources and technical assistance’ directly to organizations that meet specific criteria           
and agree to operate within government guidelines (Edwards and McCarthy, 2007,           
p.121). McAdams pinpoints that, for instance, ‘elite funding sources (foundations,          
government agencies, etc.) are willing, even aggressive, sponsors of social insurgency’           
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for the better or worse (1982, p.25) so that opportunities and costs are ‘structured by               
groups external to the movement’ in large measure (1982, p.23). For instance, in Russia              
officially registered political parties are eligible for getting state-sponsored funds, while           
under the circumstances the regime operates, it is virtually impossible for a political             
party to get an official status without consent from the government.  
At the same time, the opposition in Russia found grassroots support using online             
‘wallets’ as an anonymous way for the citizens to donate money to organise mass protest               
manifestations in 2011-2012 in Moscow. In the campaign of 2013, Navalny used the             
fundraising power of transmedia storytelling even more extensively, which made the           
campaign the biggest fundraising political event in Russian history to date (“Alexey            
Navalny,” 2013, p.71). 
 
3.4 Political elites and political change 
3.4.1 Definition of political elites 
The analytical approach of this thesis has incorporated the study of external political             
factors to put transmedia grassroots campaigns into perspective and expand transmedia           
storytelling scholarship with a more nuanced approach to the analysis of the use of              
transmedia storytelling in politics. In this part of the thesis, I will discuss how influential               
political actors can affect the destinies of transmedia grassroots campaigns through their            
political agency and the political climate they can shape. 
Robert Dahl (1961, p.90) defines elites as a ‘small stratum of individuals much             
more highly involved in political thought, discussion, and action than the rest of the              
population’. In the same manner, Robert Putnam (1971, p.651) says that elites are ‘those              
who in any society rank toward the top of the (presumably closely intercorrelated)             
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dimensions of interest, involvement, and influence in politics’. In Broadbent’s words,           
the elite part of society is ‘the polity’ which is conceived of ‘all those organizations               
which have routine, low-cost access to decision-making and its benefits’ (1985, p.5).            
John Higley (2010, p.163) defines elites as the ‘persons who, by virtue of their strategic               
locations in large or otherwise pivotal organizations and movements, are able to affect             
political outcomes regularly and substantially’. They are ‘principal decision makers in           
the largest or most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military,         
professional, communications, and cultural organisations and movements in society’         
(Burton et al., 1992, p.8). In their definition, Burton, Gunther and Higley stipulate that              
elites do not necessarily have to be institutionalized and embedded in the government             
because the leaders of various kinds of influential collectives and movements can also             
be part of elites. The term ​elite ​can be ascribed to counter-elites and the head of protest                 
movements as well, as Wasilewski (2010) suggests with the example of the ​Solidarity             
movement in communist Poland, for instance. The principal characteristic of elites,           
therefore, is their ability to exercise influence over various aspects of social life,             
including the realm of institutional politics. 
 
3.4.2 In-polity decision-makers and political change 
In 2013, Alexey Navalny took on democracy and active citizenship as both the key              
message of his campaign and the means of achieving them. Transmedia storytelling was             
instrumental in facilitating active citizenship through a network of media platforms with            
opportunities for participation. The declared objective of the campaign was to increase            
citizens’ role in political decision-making and liberalise Russian political life in general.            
Some studies of elites suggest, however, that the enthusiasm of grassroots supporters is             
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not always sufficient to bring about political change. As the authors of the ​World              
Development Report underpin, ‘important changes in history have been driven by           
coalitions between reforming elites and organized citizens that support reform initiatives           
and overcome the opposition of other elites’ (“Citizens as Agents,” 2017, p.225). The             
study highlights that although the game rules are negotiated within elites mainly,            
‘certain accountability institutions can perform new functions and create an enabling           
environment for citizen agency’ (“Citizens as Agents,” 2017, p.225).  
There are other voices supporting the proposition that the agency of political            
elites affects the destinies of grassroots initiatives. In his book ​Political Process and the              
Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970​, Doug McAdam examined the American          
Civil Rights Movement. He underlined the importance of ‘expanding political          
opportunities’ for ‘the emergence of widespread protest activity’ (McAdam, 1982, p.2).           
In ​Civil Rights Crossroads: Nation, Community, and the Black Freedom Struggle​, a            
historian Steven F. Lawson argues that the success of the Civil Rights Movement was              
due to national political developments in forms of legislation, lobbying and litigation. In             
particular, he says that combining “mass action, litigation, and lobbying, African           
Americans were defining their goals, mobilizing their communities around them, and           
drawing in national allies on their side” (Lawson, 2009, p.136). Jo Freeman illustrates             
the point with President Kennedy’s Commission on the Status of Women and the Equal              
Pay Act of 1963. She says that the commission ‘laid the groundwork for the future               
movement’ [for expanding and protecting women’s rights in the US] (Freeman, 1975,            
p.52).  
The influence can occur in the opposite direction as well: from grassroots            
activists to policymakers. For instance, Lee Ann Banaszak (2005, p.150) traces the            
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premises of the Women’s Bureau under President Kennedy back to the activist            
Women’s Trade Union League, which means the Bureau was ‘not just a political             
opening created by a separate state and distinct political allies external to the movement,              
but an outcome of the movement moulding its own opportunities as well’. On the same               
note, Keck (1992, p.58) stressed that a strong grassroots base is critical for political              
institutions to be fundamentally transformed. 
Broadbent (1985, p.2) channels a similar approach saying that ‘tracing the course            
of interaction between elites and social movements ... would provide a better            
understanding of how dominant structures reproduce themselves and change’. He          
describes elites and social movements as a dynamic system, ‘a pattern of influence             
relationships in dynamic interaction over time’ (Broadbent, 1985, p.2). If this           
interpretation is correct, a discussion about the relationships between grassroots          
initiatives and opportunity structures is essential to perform a more insightful analysis of             
political transmedia campaigns. 
It is even more important to consider the role of elites in grassroots campaigns              
because decision-makers can participate in them directly. In ​The Web of Power: Elites,             
Social Movements, and Structural Change​, Jeffrey P. Broadbent (1985, p.2) laments that            
‘dominant institutions and the movements are implicitly portrayed as the two extremes            
of a spectrum of institutionalization’ while this is not necessarily the case and social              
movements can have some presence in the polity, he argues. Soule and Olzak (2004,              
p.480) suggested that social groups can benefit from having elite allies saying that ‘the              
presence of influential allies encourages challengers to act collectively, as allies signal            
that repression may be unlikely or, at the very least, that there are “friends in court’’’. As                 
an example, Navalny’s campaign faced resistance from the Kremlin but the overall role             
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of political elites in this campaign was ambivalent. When Mayor Sobyanin called the             
snap elections, some interpreted it as an attempt to ‘tap into ​legitimacy ​as the new basis                
for political agency and self-promotion’ (Waller, 2013, p.6). In support of the            
explanation that the Mayor wanted to prop up his weakened legitimacy holding            
relatively fair elections says that the Moscow administration provided Alexey Navalny           
with formal approval of his candidacy from municipal legislators of Sobyanin’s party            
(Zheleznova and Raybman, 2013). As the government official party United Russia           
occupied the vast majority of the seats in local councils, it was arithmetically impossible              
for Navalny to get registered. The necessary number of city-council representatives from            
United Russia provided Navalny with their formal approval and thus walked him            
through the so-called ‘municipal filter’, a necessary formality to be registered as a             
candidate. It gave Navalny a chance to get registered as a candidate as the administration               
thought it was in the interest of the acting Mayor. On that matter, Sobyanin said: ‘We                
did all we could to have him [Navalny] registered so that Moscow citizens could make a                
choice among a greater number of candidates’ (Kochetkova, 2013). 
On a slightly more radical note, ​elite theory suggests that elite actions have a              
critical effect on ‘regime change, liberalization, stateness, secularization and many other           
political phenomena’ (Lopex, 2013, p.1). Under such circumstances, political change          
becomes primarily a top-down process. Arnold Toynbee explained this through his           
concept of ​mimesis​. Mimesis, or imitation, occurs when the majority follows the            
examples of elites as a civilizational vanguard of society. According to Toynbee (1987,             
p.579), mimesis is the prime mechanism for civilizations to evolve and ‘the only way in               
which the uncreative majority can follow the leadership of the creative leaders’. Social             
development stems from the majority learning the best-practice of those who have            
70 
achieved progress and higher status. The societal institutions such as schools,           
universities, law enforcement and so on are not deemed to be the battlefield of opposing               
classes and interests, but the instrument of cultural learning and vertical mobility. Thus,             
the role of elites cannot be diminished to merely representing and implementing the will              
of the people, the theory suggests. They are the trailblazers, or ‘pioneers’ (Toynbee,             
1988, p.85), with whom new ideas, practices and technologies begin. If accepted, this             
proposition is another reason why the discussion of Navalny's campaign in Moscow            
must take the agency of elites and opportunity structures into account. 
 
3.4.3 Historical evidence of elite-led political change 
‘Change Russia. Begin with Moscow’ slogan of Alexey Navalny suggested that the            
campaign was part of a greater endeavour to change the political regime in the country.               
But from the perspective of elite theory, it is political elites not citizens who might play                
a critical role in the evolution of political regimes and overall democratisation. For             
instance, Jacek Wasilewski (2010, p.272) suggests the importance of elites in the            
process of democratisation as he vests them with the status of ‘the main factor that               
decides the nature of a political regime’. According to elite theory, so-called ‘elite             
settlement’ or ‘elite pact’ is one of the mechanisms how a deliberated democratic system              
is established. During that process, competing elites come to an agreement on            
government institutions and ‘the codes and rules of political competition’ (Higley and            
Burton, 2006, p.98). John Higley traces the first instance of an elite settlement as far               
back as to England’s Glorious Revolution of 1688-1689, with the events of 1809 in              
Sweden that led to the adoption of ​The Instrument of Government as another example. In               
the case of Sweden, the document established a separation of powers and served as the               
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Constitution up until 1974. The Swiss Constitution of 1848 was adopted through            
settlement as well (Higley, n.d.). Thus, elite theory argues that such pro-democratic            
campaigns as the one of Alexey Navalny have their limitations and are only part of the                
story.  
The idea of political elites being the driving force of political change finds             
support in the history of communist regimes which was part of Russian experience in the               
20th century. In the Soviet Union, after Stalin’s detrimental reign that saw not only              
millions of ordinary people but also many elite members systematically annihilated in            
internal power struggles, elites introduced somewhat democratic changes – like in post            
Mao Zedong China as well – to protect themselves from coming through that dreadful              
experience again. Those acts of liberalisation happened without any vocal demand from            
the general population. Describing the democratic transition in post-communist         
Hungary, Wasilewski (2010, p.276) makes a point that the nature of elites defined that              
process, while the masses ‘remained immobilized, except for sporadic rallies and           
anti-government manifestations in Budapest’ during that period. As another example,          
Diana Janušauskienė (2011, p.7) emphasises that ‘political elites and their decisions           
were of key importance for the direction and content of the Lithuanian transformation’             
in the late-Soviet period and after the country restored its independence. Regime change             
through elite settlement also happened in Poland where ‘the reform-minded part of the             
communist elite were (together with the oppositional elite) the leading actors of regime             
change’ (Wasilewski, 2010, p.283). In such countries of the Soviet bloc as Bulgaria,             
Romania and Ukraine, ‘the nomenclature, divided into factions from liberal factions to            
orthodox ones, was the only real political force’ that secured democratic transition            
(Wasilewski, 2010, p.284). In the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, the leader of the             
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country, started the so-called ​Perestroika (‘rebuilding’) which triggered massive         
changes in the political regime (Tarrow, 1994, p.157). Thus, elite theory does have some              
historical evidence to show in support of its proposition that under certain circumstances             
political elites can be the critical force that introduces political change top-down. 
 
3.4.4 Role of media 
Arnold Toynbee (1987, p.579) argued that cultural learning is one of the primary             
mechanisms of social change. Mohan Dutta gives the media the status of the primary              
means of social learning within what he calls ‘development approach’ to social change.             
This approach originates with Albert Bandura (1977, p.39) whose social learning theory            
(“Cinema of Change,” 2017) emphasizes the influential role the mass media can play in              
‘shaping behavior and social attitudes’. In development campaigns, people are targeted           
by elites individually to change their ‘knowledge, attitude and behavior’ (Dutta, 2011,            
p.33). That seems to pertain to the situation in Russia where mass media are largely               
controlled by the government, which allows the latter to use the media as their              
messenger. One of the ways to describe how the state and its powerful actors can               
exercise control over the flows of information is through the concept of mediation             
opportunity structure (Cammaerts, 2012; McCammon, 2013). Mediation opportunity        
structure is one of the opportunity structures the next part of this chapter will discuss. 
 
3.5 Political opportunity structures 
3.5.1 Introducing political opportunity structures 
The OSMR analytical approach takes stock of the opportunity structures of a given             
society. Our analysis of Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow will discuss            
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those external political factors because they could cut or increase the cost associated             
with people’s participation in the campaign. The cost can be a crucial factor for those               
who make a decision whether they are ready to take a political action. This can take a                 
special turn in the context of illiberal political regimes like Russia. Those political             
systems have more freedom to affect a ​political space​, ‘the avenues, opportunities and             
entry points available for citizens to express their voice and influence political processes             
and outcomes’ (“A Matter of Political Space,” 2016), in a way that it becomes punitive               
for outside-of-the-polity political actors. 
In 1973, Peter Eisinger (1973, p.25) coined the term ‘political opportunity           
structure’ which he defined as ‘the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain                 
access to power and to manipulate the political system’. Soule and Olzak (2004) use the               
term ‘political climate’ as interchangeable with POS. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly           
interpret political opportunity structures as ‘features of regimes that affect the likely            
outcomes of actors’ possible claims’ (McAdam et al., 2009, p.263). Sarah Soule (2009,             
p.44) also highlights the role of elites in shaping political opportunity structures linking             
social movement mobilisation to the ‘level of elite receptivity to protesters, changes in             
elite ability and willingness to repress movements, and the presence of elite allies’. 
The configuration of a POS in a given society can help us understand the              
circumstances grassroots political campaigns operate under. Those ‘circumstances’ can         
be of very different nature. For instance, McCarthy and Zald (1977, p.1217) refer to              
POS as ‘infrastructure’ that include ‘communication media and expense, levels of           
affluence, degree of access to institutional centers, pre-existing networks, and          
occupational structure and growth’. According to McAdam et al. (2009, p.263), POS is             
defined by: 1. the multiplicity of independent centres of power within the regime; 2. the               
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regime’s openness to new actors; 3. instability of current political alignments; 4.            
availability of influential allies or supporters for challengers; 5. the extent to which the              
regime represses or facilitates collective claim making. Sidney Tarrow’s list of the most             
important political opportunities includes the opening of access to participation for new            
actors, evidence of political realignment within the polity, availability of influential           
allies and emerging splits within the elite (Tarrow, 1994, pp.164-165). Based on the             
study of the civil rights movement by McAdam et al. (1996), Goodwin (2002) identifies              
the four factors of political opportunity: 1. increasing popular access to the political             
system, 2. divisions within the elite, 3. the availability of elite allies, and 4. diminishing               
state repression. Van Dyke (2003) also regarded collective grievances as another           
element of political opportunity structures​.  
Political space or POS affect the cost associated with political participation of            
citizens. In his interpretation of political opportunity structure as the ‘consistent – but             
not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that            
provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their           
expectations for success or failure’, Tarrow (1994, p.85) refers to rational choice theory.             
In particular, he links political climate to the personal interpretations of the costs and              
benefits associated with making a political claim. McCarthy and Zald (1977, p.1216)            
echo this idea suggesting that ‘there is a sensitivity to the importance of costs and               
rewards in explaining individual and organizational involvement in social movement          
activity. Costs and rewards are centrally affected by the structure of society and the              
activities of authorities’. Charles Tilly’s classification of social mobilisation also          
highlights the role of inside-of-the-polity actors in creating external opportunities and           
threats (Tilly, 1977b) or ‘opportunities and costs’ in McAdam’s words (McAdam,           
75 
1982). The opportunities and threats can be encapsulated in terms of facilitation as ‘an              
action which lowers the group's cost of collective action’ and repression by which Tilly              
(1977a, p.81) understands ‘any action by another group which raises the contender's cost             
of collective action’. In ​Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization​, John            
S. Dryzek (1996, p.482) says that, for example, an actively exclusive state ‘attacks and              
undermines the conditions for public association in civil society’. Because of that, POS             
becomes a factor affecting grassroots enthusiasm and can be part of the analysis of              
transmedia campaigns in politics. 
POSs also affect those who organise grassroots movements and campaigns, the           
role that Navalny's campaign took on in 2013. According to Meyer and Minkoff (2004),              
political opportunities have an impact on protest mobilisation, organizational formation,          
and policy change. Those three processes can be associated with citizens, political            
organisers and the state respectively. Thus, POSs put an impact on both the access of               
political organisers to resources and citizens’ decisions about participation. 
The political opportunity structure concept also suggests that it is more           
cost-effective for the state to manage political opportunities than to suppress every given             
manifestation of an unauthorised opinion. In Tilly’s words, ‘the anti-mobilization          
strategy neutralizes the actor as well as the action’ (Tilly, 1977a, p.4). The methods of               
affecting political opportunities can vary: complicating mobilisation process through the          
system of punitive legal acts and executive orders, spreading propaganda or imposing            
media blackouts against political opponents, putting pressure upon challengers through          
the social institutions that the political decision-makers have direct or indirect control of             
such as schools, universities, churches and workplaces, exclusion from the labour           
market. Under such rules, the lack of grassroots enthusiasm may be an indicator of a               
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POS that incites fear and political apathy. 
 
3.5.2 Mediation opportunity structure 
Mediation opportunity structure (MOS) is a concept that refers to three aspects of             
communication practices of social movements and campaigns: ‘media opportunity         
structure’ which is ‘mainstream media representations of protest and movements’          
(Cammaerts, 2012, p.117), ‘discursive opportunities’ produced through the movement’s         
own media and designed to make its story more resonating with the audience             
(McCammon, 2013), and ‘networked opportunities’ facilitated by social media         
(Cammaerts, 2012, p.122). The definition suggests that grassroots initiatives can find           
themselves on both receiving and dispensing ends of MOS: they can become a target of               
the structure but also can use it as a political resource. Thus, MOS captures the access of                 
grassroots initiatives to the media as a means of campaigning and the representation of              
out-of-the-polity actors in the mediated sphere. 
One of the mechanisms available to the state in the scope of the media              
opportunity structure is to affect the public perception of grassroots movements and            
campaigns. Turner (1964) proposed a taxonomy of different perceptions of social           
movements. In particular, he describes the movements that are actively deprived by the             
state. They are deemed to be threatening and anti-social and therefore can recruit from              
alienated have-nothing-to-lose populations only. By marginalizing and stigmatizing        
unauthorised opinions, the state can infuse apathy into potential challengers and prevent            
them from expressing their opinions. Peculiar movements, another type of social           
movements, are perceived as deviant but not threatening. They are granted ‘limited            
access to legitimate means, and opposed only by ridicule’ (Turner, 1964, p.126).  
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Those two forms of perception are both negative but lead to different ‘costs for              
expression of preferences for movement leaders and followers’ (McCarthy and Zald,           
1977, 1218). As an example, Sean Roberts (2017) recalls the infamous ​Anatomy of a              
protest documentary aired on Russian NTV channel during the 2012 protests. It accused             
Navalny and other opposition figures of instigating mass disorder. With this regard, it is              
important that in authoritarian regimes, state propaganda and other mechanisms of social            
control can be used to craft and channel the negative image of challenging political              
actors. Arguably, the Russian regime perpetuates the second image of the opposition in             
Russia. Repressions against public manifestations of unauthorised views tend to be           
selective while the suppression of opposition organisations is systematic. This also           
suggests that the Russian regime believes in the power of organised opposition. 
 
3.5.3 Opportunity structures and transmedia campaigning 
The theories of POS, resource mobilisation and transmedia storytelling form the           
theoretical framework of this thesis. The following diagram shows the relations between            
the key theories behind the analytical approach this thesis is developing: 
 
Illustration 1. A graphical schema representation of the OSMR analytical approach. 
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The OSMR analytical approach suggests looking for the ways transmedia          
strategies of political campaigns serve to mobilise valuable resources or become           
political resources themselves reducing the costs of civic participation for supporters.           
Also such an approach allows bringing in those contextual factors that make difference             
for transmedia campaigns in the realm of politics. In doing so, the approach departs from               
the practice of analysing the transmedia aspects of political campaigns in isolation from             
the goals of the latter. On the one hand, a campaign and its transmedia practices can feel                 
pressure from or find opportunities in the external political space. On the other hand, the               
campaign can make use of transmedia strategies when it wants to mitigate some             
negative aspects of the political space or exploit its opportunities. Those dynamic            
relationships between transmedia strategies of the campaign, the mobilising resources          
the campaign converts its transmedia strategies into and the opportunity structures of a             




Political opportunity structures describe a set of formal and informal arrangements in the             
state that shape the ability of the people to demand political change. While those              
arrangements are a part of every state, authoritarian regimes tend to manage their             
political space in a way that would allow elites to stay largely unaccountable to civil               
society. Under those circumstances, the people have to look for ways to overcome the              
punitive political opportunity structure. 
Political organisers can find better ways of dealing with opportunity structures           
when using transmedia strategies. The latter can be helpful for agglomerating valuable            
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political resources and facilitating civic participation. Storytelling, crowdfunding,        
interactive web applications, technical expertise and other aspects of transmedia projects           
make them well-equipped to accommodate the needs of grassroots movements and           
campaigns. Thus, transmedia mode of messaging can reduce the costs of political action             
for grassroots enthusiasts which is of importance especially in the context of            
authoritarian regimes like Russia. 
Together, the resource mobilisation theory and the theory of opportunity          
structures will form the theoretical foundation of the OSMR analytical approach this            
thesis is developing. The classifications of mobilising resources and opportunity          
structures this chapter presented are a good starting point to analyse the role of              
transmedia strategies in political grassroots campaigns. 
The next chapter will expand on the methodological aspects of this thesis. That             
includes a discussion about the case study design this thesis will follow to try the OSMR                
analytical approach. The chapter will also provide a rationale for Alexey Navalny’s            
2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow as the case study subject, talk about the use and               





Chapter 4. Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The primary research problem of this political communication thesis is to develop an             
analytical approach to studying political transmedia campaigns as locally-specific. In the           
primary analysis, the thesis outlined the key parts of that approach. In particular, it              
proposed using the theories of political opportunity and resource mobilisation to           
interpret respectively the external and internal factors that affect the destinies of            
transmedia political campaigns. The thesis has also identified the key taxonomies of            
opportunity structures and mobilising resources to make use of them in the analytical             
approach the thesis has called the OSMR approach. 
As part of the process of developing a new analytical approach, the thesis will              
test it with a case study. This chapter will discuss the methodological aspects of case               
study: a rationale for using case study for the purposes of this thesis, the case study                
design this thesis will be following, the key sources of information to be used in the case                 
study, the treatment of those sources and the role of the author as the key interpreter of                 
the data. The chapter will also introduce the political campaign elected to be at the               
centre of the case study in the thesis and provide a rationale for making that choice. 
 
4.2 Case study design and rationale 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that ‘investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the             
“case”) in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries            
between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident’, according to Robert Yin             
(2014, p.16). Helen Simons proposes a similar definition saying that case study is ‘an              
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in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a            
particular project, policy, institution, program or system in a “real life” context’ (2009,             
p.21). Following Yin’s definition, Albert J. Mills, Gabrielle Durepos and Elden Wiebe            
also highlight the importance of contextual factors in case study research. In their words,              
there are three critical characteristics of case study as a research strategy: 1. ‘a focus on                
the interrelationships that constitute the context of a specific entity’, 2. ‘analysis of the              
relationship between the contextual factors and the entity being studied’, and 3. ‘the             
explicit purpose of using those insights (of the interactions between contextual           
relationships and the entity in question) to generate theory and/or contribute to extant             
theory’ (Mills et al., 2010, p.xxxii).  
The listed definitions suggest taking stock of external factors when writing a case             
study. Interestingly, the analysis of ‘real-world’ contexts is also a crucial aspect of the              
OSMR analytical approach this thesis has been developing. The analysis of opportunity            
structures as external factors will provide a real-world context for the case study. The              
case study will also discuss the internal attributes of the campaign, i.e. how the              
campaign used transmedia strategies to navigate through the political space. 
There is no single approach to conducting a case study. A case study can be done                
in many ways following very different research designs. This thesis adopts a ​holistic             
single case study design (Yin, 2014, p.55). There are two parts to that definition that               
require some explanation. A ​single ​case study design suggests there is one case at the               
centre of the analysis – as opposed to a multiple-case study. Following this design              
pattern, the thesis will elect one highly relevant case for the purpose of testing the new                
analytical approach it has been developing in the previous chapters. ​Holistic ​case studies             
‘investigate a unit as a single global phenomenon’ (DePoy and Gitlin, 2016, p.175). In              
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line with the holistic approach to studying cases, the transmedia theory itself considers             
transmedia campaigns to be more than just a sum of its parts. According to Jeoffrey               
Long, there is a synergy effect that gives transmedia users a single unified experience              
(2007, p.15). That is in contrast with an ‘embedded’ case study that extracts subunits of               
the case and analyses them individually. An example of an embedded design can be ‘an               
evaluation of a program consisting of multiple projects’ which may include ‘project            
characteristics as a subunit of analysis’ (Yin, 2014, p.55).  
In this thesis, the case study will be examined from a non-positivist perspective             
(Stahl, 2007, pp.115-142). The case study will draw upon qualitative data primarily            
which it will use to describe and give critical interpretation of the transmedia aspects of               
a political campaign. In particular, the case study will make use of the OSMR analytical               
approach to discuss how the transmedia strategies empowered the campaign to           
agglomerate resources against the opportunity structures the campaign had to deal with.            
Since the role of the case study in this thesis is to test the new analytical approach, there                  
is also no need to quantify its results to address the primary research problem of this                
thesis. 
According to Yin, a single case study can ‘represent a significant contribution to             
knowledge and theory building by confirming, challenging, or extending the theory’           
(2014, p.51). In the scope of this thesis, the case study will be a chance to test the OSMR                   
analytical approach and see if this approach provides valuable insights into the            
mobilising potential of transmedia strategies in political campaigning. On the higher           
theoretical level, the case study will synthesise the transmedia theory and the political             
studies scholarship for this political communication thesis. 
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In this thesis, the case study will produce the knowledge that will form the basis               
for what Payne and Williams (2005) call ‘​moderatum ​generalization’. Moderatum          
generalisation is based on ‘testable propositions that might be confirmed or refuted            
through further evidence’ (Payne and Williams, 2005, p.297). The thesis suggests it will             
be possible to apply the OSMR analytical approach to other instances of political             
transmedia campaigns. Those campaigns would have to 1. Be transmedia, 2. Actively try             
to achieve a political goal, 3. Be embedded in some political space. The analytical              
approach this thesis has been developing seeks to explore relationships between those            
three characteristics. The case study that will be conducted in this thesis will exemplify              
how that exploration can be done. The reason why the results should be generalised              
moderately in the scope of this thesis is that there are still some important limitations               
that should be considered while applying the OSMR analytical approach to other cases.             
This chapter will discuss those limitations at a later stage. 
 
4.3 Choice of a case and rationale 
To try the new analytical approach as outlined in the primary analysis and see its strong                
aspects as well as possible deficiencies, the thesis will write a case study of ​Alexey               
Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow​. The case study will discuss how            
Navalny’s campaign was affected by the Russian structures of political opportunity and            
utilised the transmedia mode of messaging to overcome the negative aspects of the             
Russian political space, agglomerate valuable political resources and reduce the cost of            
participation for citizens.  
Gary Thomas of University of Birmingham distinguishes between the subject          
and the object of the case study. According to his approach, the subject of the case study                 
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is the case itself and the object is ‘the analytical frame or theory through which the                
subject is viewed and which the subject explicates’ (2011, p.511). Following this            
interpretation, Navalny’s campaign will be the subject of the case study in this thesis and               
the object will be the OSMR analytical approach. The latter will be used to interpret the                
subject. 
This thesis chose ​Alexey Navalny mayoral campaign, 2013, to exemplify the           
application of the OSMR analytical approach for a number of reasons. First and             
foremost, Navalny’s campaign was a good fit for the thesis because of its transmedia              
nature. As Gambarato and Medvedev (2015b) argue, Alexey Navalny’s mayoral bid of            
2013 was an example of a transmedia approach to spreading the message and engaging              
with the audience in politics. The campaign developed an extensive network of web             
applications and websites to facilitate civic participation among Navalny’s supporters,          
recruit volunteers and spread the word about the candidate on the Internet and offline.              
The case study will examine how ​Alexey Navalny 2013 mayoral campaign used the             
approach which was transmedia in nature to agglomerate political resources and resist            
the negative aspects of Russian opportunity structures. Second, Navalny’s campaign in           
Moscow faced significant resistance from the Russian political space. As the repressive            
potential of Russian opportunity structures was on display during the elections, it will be              
possible to collect valuable information about Russian opportunity structures and feed it            
to the OSMR analytical approach. Finally, Alexey Navalny as the leader of Russian             
opposition exercises a great influence over the destinies of the Russian democratic            
movement. Considering that Navalny’s role in Russian politics has only increased since            
2013, his mayoral campaign of 2013 becomes of even greater interest as a case study               
subject. 
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As Yin theorises, there can be at least five rationales for the choice of a case for a                  
single case study research design. The elected case must be either ‘critical, unusual,             
common, revelatory, or longitudinal’ (Yin, 2014, p.51). A critical case must be of             
crucial importance to the underlying theory or theoretical propositions. With that regard,            
Yin says that ‘the single case then can be used to determine whether the propositions are                
correct or whether some alternative set of explanations might be more relevant’ (2014,             
p.51). The second rationale suggests that the chosen case ‘represents an extreme case or              
an unusual case, deviating from theoretical norms or even everyday occurrences’ (Yin,            
2014, p.52). ‘Unusual’ cases can be of use to such a discipline as clinical psychology for                
instance. In contrast, a common case can make a good object of a case study because it                 
is considered to be rather typical for a group of potentially relevant cases and therefore               
can provide lessons ‘about the social processes related to some theoretical interest’ (Yin,             
2014, p.52). A case can be called ‘revelatory’ when a researcher ‘has an opportunity to               
observe and analyze a phenomenon previously inaccessible to social science inquiry’           
(Yin, 2014, p.52). Then, a ‘longitudinal’ case study analyses ‘the same single case at              
two or more different points in time’ (Yin, 2014, p.53). 
From the perspective of the analytical approach being tested, ​Alexey Navalny's           
2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow can be described as ‘common’. In this case, to be               
common means to represent an instance of a political campaign which 1. applied             
canonical transmedia strategies to mobilise resources and simplify civic participation          
and 2. operated within opportunity structures that affected its resource mobilisation           
strategies. 
Alexey Navalny did use canonical transmedia methods of campaigning in          
Moscow, 2013. The idea that Alexey Navalny’s grassroots campaign of 2013 belongs to             
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the realm of transmedia campaigning was proposed by Gambarato and Medvedev           
(2015b, pp.165-192), for instance. The theory of transmedia storytelling has developed a            
number of taxonomies and characteristics to identify a campaign or a project as             
transmedia. Political transmedia campaigns rely heavily on civic participation and online           
means of communication, apply similar strategies to accommodate participants of          
varying willingness to engage with the campaign, and so on. The case study will              
interpret ​Alexey Navalny mayoral bid of 2013 through the lens of transmedia theory to              
highlight this relation between the campaign’s strategies and the typical transmedia           
ways of building a grassroots campaign as outlined in Chapter 2 of this thesis. Navalny’s               
campaign being as transmedia as other transmedia campaigns and using the same            
strategies justifies its choice as the object of the case study. 
From the perspective of external factors, Alexey Navalny’s campaign unfolded          
in the political space that shared similarities with other electoral authoritarian regimes            
(Schulmann, 2014). Choosing the external opportunity structures of such a regime as the             
context of the case study could help analyse political campaigns unfolding in the             
countries of similar political nature. Overall, Alexey Navalny and his mayoral bid in             
Moscow represented a highly interesting case that is very consequential in the scope of              
the Russian politics. Importantly for the purposes of generalisation, Navalny’s campaign           
belongs to the group of campaigns that demand democratic changes in authoritarian            
regimes and use online media and digital solutions to advance their cause. 
 
4.4 Use and scrutiny of sources 
The proper use and the reasonable diversity of sources is essential when writing a case               
study. This part of the chapter will discuss the key groups of sources the case study of                 
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Alexey Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow ​will build upon. It will also             
discuss how the thesis scrutinises its key sources of data to maintain academic rigour. 
In this thesis, the case study will be examined from a non-positivist perspective.             
It is because the case study will draw upon qualitative data primarily. It will use the data                 
to describe and give critical interpretation to the transmedia aspects of ​Alexey Navalny             
2013 mayoral campaig​n and how they contributed to agglomerating political resources           
against the hostile political climate of modern Russia.  
To collect data for the analysis, the case study will rely on a number of sources.                
Those will include official campaign reports, open-source interviews, the video          
recordings of Alexey Navalny’s rallies, the ‘auto retro-ethnographic’ information the          
author obtained in his personal experience with the campaign, the archives of the             
campaign’s platforms and other sources. Together, those sources will provide data to            
take stock of the transmedia practices of the campaign and their role in reducing the cost                
of political participation for Alexey Navalny’s supporters. 
Because ​Alexey Navalny's mayoral campaign for Moscow unfolded in 2013,          
most of the campaign’s online platforms had been taken down from the Internet by the               
time this thesis was being written. To access them, the case study will use the Wayback                
Machine digital archive available at https://archive.org/web/. The Wayback Machine         
keeps copies, or snapshots, of websites. It will give the case study an opportunity to               
examine the websites and web applications Navalny’s campaign used in 2013. Thanks to             
that, it will be possible to compare their functionality with that declared by the partisan               
official communication of the campaign, for instance. Among the platforms that the            
thesis accessed with the Wayback Machine tool are Campaign in Moscow (2013),            
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Mosvpiska (2013), Navalny to Every House (2013), Team.Navalny (2013) and          
V.Navalny (2013). 
Another important source of information about the campaign, especially its          
message, will be the video recordings of Alexey Navalny’s rallies in Moscow, 2013. The              
case study will make use of parts of Navalny’s speeches at rallies across Moscow              
including those at Aviamotornaya (Boris Felikson, 2013), Varshavskaya (Mojaghed,         
2013) and Kaluzhskaya (Kibirov, 2013) metro stations, and in Tyoply Stan (Tyoply            
Stan, 2013) and Yasenevo (Krasnoelena, 2013) districts.  
The post-campaign report of 80 pages (“Alexey Navalny,” 2013) Alexey          
Navalny posted in September 2013 gives a rather thorough account of the campaign’s             
media activities, get-out-the-vote initiatives, organisational structure, spendings and        
other aspects. The case study will refer to this detailed report to learn about the               
campaign and access the insider information that otherwise would not be available.            
Another source of insider data about the campaign will be the course of video lectures               
by Leonid Volkov, the campaign manager to Navalny (Volkov, 2013). The whole series             
of lectures was dedicated to the 2013 mayoral bid of Alexey Navalny and positioned as               
a crash course on how to run grassroots campaigns. 
Some quantitative data will be collected from the official reports and Leonid            
Volkov’s lectures, and then presented in the case study. That included participation            
rates, media reach and the breakdown of costs. Importantly, there is no goal to calculate               
the numeric contribution of the campaign’s transmedia practices to the overall campaign            
results. The aim of the case study is to try the OSMR analytical approach. Quantitative               
data will be presented in the case study to give a sense of the overall scale and                 
engagement priorities of the campaign. 
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There is a question if the post-campaign report and the lectures by Navalny’s             
campaign manager - which are partisan by definition - are trustworthy sources of             
information for the case study. The case study will make sure the data it refers to is                 
accurate by double-checking the information using multiple sources. In particular, it was            
possible to access and examine the functionality of the actual websites and web             
application of the campaign.  
The author of this thesis considers himself a key interpreter of the data used in               
the case study of Navalny’s campaign. He sourced valuable ​auto retro-ethnographic           
information from firsthand participant observation during the Alexey Navalny Moscow          
campaign of 2013. He was studying in Moscow during the protests of 2011-2012 in the               
capital of Russia and the 2013 mayoral elections in Moscow. In 2013, the author had a                
chance to familiarise himself with the campaign communicating with its supporters both            
in formal academic settings and the streets of Moscow. 
In 2013, he participated as an interviewer and data interpreter in the 2013 Civic              
Engagement in Moscow ethnographic study (Davydov, Logunova and Lytkina, 2016).          
The study was sponsored by the Higher School of Economics, one of the leading              
Russian universities, and centred around the aspects of civic participation in the 2013             
Moscow mayoral election. The study included interviews with 33 poll watchers           
including 9 people representing Alexey Navalny and shed light on the positive role some              
of his web applications played in recruiting volunteers. 
Together with Renira Gambarato of Jonkoping University, the author of this           
thesis published a book chapter analysing the 2013 mayoral campaign of Alexey            
Navalny in 2015 titled ‘Grassroots Political Campaign in Russia: Alexey Navalny and            
Transmedia Strategies for Democratic Development’ (Gambarato and Medvedev,        
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2015b, pp.165-192). The study applied the transmedia analytical model by Dr           
Gambarato to discuss how Navalny’s use of information and communication          
technologies contributed to the development of democratic practices in Russia and to            
conceptualise his transmedia storytelling strategies in the context of participatory          
politics. 
This first-hand knowledge of ​Alexey Navalny 2013 mayoral campaign puts the           
author in the position where he is well-informed about the campaign’s extensions and             
key messages, can locate the gathered data in the Russian political scenario and ensure              
that the most important aspects of Navalny’s campaign are addressed in the case study. 
 
4.5 Limitations of the study 
There may be some possible limitations in this case study. The primary limitation to the               
generalisation of its results is that the proposed analytical approach has been tried in the               
context of an authoritarian political space in the thesis. The Russian political space is              
very restrictive to out-of-the-polity actors, which can be different for other societies.            
Despite this, it is rather safe to say that the approach this thesis has outlined can be                 
useful to discuss transmedia grassroots campaigns whatever their political context is.           
Historically, studies employed POS theory to take stock of the political climate of quite              
different political systems including the US (McLaughlin and Khawaja, 2009), Taiwan           
(Ho, 2015), South Africa (Loudon, 2010), Netherlands (Kriesi, 1989), China (Chan and            
Zhou, 2014) and others. That demonstrates that our approach to the analysis of political              
transmedia campaigns is applicable to different contexts too, including those where the            
enabling potential of POSs is more pronounced than in the Russian case, like liberal              
democracies of the West. 
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Indeed, POS can pose not only a threat to grassroots political initiatives but offer              
opportunities as well. For instance, Anthony Giddens (1984, p.25) argued that ‘structure            
is not to be equated with constraint, but is always both constraining and enabling’. From               
his perspective, there is a ‘dialectic of control in social systems’ so that ‘all forms of                
dependence offer some resources’ (Giddens, 1984, pp.15-16). McAdams (1982, p.23)          
also pinpointed that groups external to the movement structure both opportunities and            
costs. That can seem less obvious when there is an illiberal political space under              
scrutiny. But when applied to some other campaigns, the presented analytical approach            
might have to dedicate more time to the other side of the opportunity structure in place. 
One more shortcoming of this thesis is that the presented case study was done              
retrospectively which limited the chances to do field work. Luckily, the main objective             
of the thesis was to develop a new approach which would not be specific to any                
campaign. Looking forward, further research could be a means of empirically           
developing what the thesis has started here with the example of a historical campaign.              
When applied to campaigns as they unfold, the proposed analytical approach could be             
tested further. 
Another possible limitation is that this thesis did not seek to develop any rigid              
structure for the analysis of political transmedia campaigns. There are a few reasons it              
did not, though. First, every grassroots campaign is unique and locally specific. As             
demonstrated, its destiny depends on many external factors, political opportunity          
structures of a given society, and so on. For instance, Navalny’s campaign unfolded in              
an authoritarian political context. When analysing a transmedia grassroots campaign in           
the context of a liberal democracy, one would inevitably adjust this approach to include              
opportunities and threats of other kinds. On the other hand, such an aspect of Russian               
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POS as the unique political and economic role of the country’s capital, for instance, is               
specific to Russia and likely would not be applicable to most other countries. 
Second, a structured model would require putting the interconnected aspects of           
the campaign into separate boxes as if they worked independently, which is not the case.               
Such aspects of the campaign as its platforms, structure, message, engagement strategies            
and target audiences are dependent on each other to the extent that it becomes virtually               
impossible to break the discussion into isolated blocks and talk about each of them              
individually without invoking others. 
There is another aspect of this study that can be seen as a limitation under some                
circumstances. The proposed approach to the analysis of transmedia grassroots          
campaigns does not claim to give an exhaustive account of the campaign. For instance,              
some aspects of Alexey Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow were ignored in             
the case study. The thesis left out the aesthetics of the campaign, did not give a thorough                 
description of its internal organisational structure and omitted the details on the            
campaign’s spendings, for instance. The reason was that the analytical approach the            
thesis was developing had a different goal. While all the facets of a political campaign               
can be of interest and importance to political organisers, the objective of the thesis was               
to point very specifically at those aspects of the campaign that contributed to its              
transmedia experience. The study argued that experience allows a campaign to mobilise            
resources and confront the negative characteristics of POSs.  
When it comes to external opportunities and threats, the aspects of political            
opportunity structures, the thesis also limited the scope of the analytical approach to             
those factors of political space that made a difference to the goals of the campaign. In                
our example, we took stock of the Russian media opportunity structure but did not pay               
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much attention to the publicity Alexey Navalny received abroad in 2013. The audience             
of the campaign were Russian citizens and an ability to reach out to them was of                
importance to the candidate. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has described a methodological approach to address the primary research            
problem of this thesis. In its previous chapters, this thesis developed a theoretical             
foundation to examine political transmedia campaigns with the use of the opportunity            
structures and the resource mobilisation theories. This thesis has called it the OSMR             
analytical approach.  
As the story of this methodological chapter told, the new analytical approach to             
study political transmedia campaigns will be tried with a case study of a highly relevant               
political campaign. The case study will adopt a ​holistic single case design (Yin, 2014)              
with the single case being Alexey Navalny’s grassroots campaign in Moscow, 2013.            
This grassroots campaign exemplified arguably the most prominent example of a           
political transmedia campaign in Russia (Gambarato and Medvedev, 2015b,         
pp.165-192). The lasting influence of Alexey Navalny as the Russian opposition leader            
makes this campaign even more important in the context of modern Russian politics. 
The case study approach that this thesis has taken will make ‘​moderatum            
generalization’ (Payne and Williams, 2005) possible. The OSMR analytical approach          
examines the transmedia strategies a political campaign uses to reduce the costs of civic              
participation for its supporters and navigate the opportunity structures in place. The            
chosen campaign both followed the approach that falls into the category of transmedia             
campaigning and used its transmedia characteristics to reduce the restrictive potential of            
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the Russian opportunity structures. With that regard, Alexey Navalny’s grassroots          
campaign in Moscow is well-suited to explore the potential of the OSMR analytical             
approach to advance our understanding of political transmedia campaigns. 
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Chapter 5. Case Study of Alexey Navalny’s 2013 Mayoral Campaign 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The primary goal of this thesis is to expand transmedia storytelling scholarship with a              
more nuanced analytical approach to the study of transmedia grassroots campaigns in            
politics. In previous chapters, the thesis outlined its theoretical framework and the            
methodology behind the application of the OSMR analytical approach. This chapter will            
apply this analytical approach in the case study of ​Alexey Navalny mayoral campaign,             
2013. 
The first part of this case study chapter will bring in the analysis of Russian               
opportunity structures. The analysis of opportunity structures of a given society is a             
distinctive part of the OSMR approach this thesis is outlining. As I argued in the               
previous chapter, both the new analytical approach in general and the case study of              
Alexey Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow in particular have to include the             
analysis of opportunity structures. That is because the transmedia strategies of political            
campaigns are context-dependent. Transmedia strategies can both experience pressure         
from the socio-political environment and make political campaigns less dependent on           
the political space. That is the reason why the case study of Navalny’s campaign starts               
with the discussion on Russian opportunity structures. 
Following the OSMR analytical approach, the first part of this chapter will take             
stock of those Russian opportunity structures that could have impacted the progress of             
Navalny's campaign​. Among those structures, the study distinguishes the legal          
opportunity structure (LOS), the mediation opportunity structure (MOS), institutions of          
representative democracy, grassroots traditions of civic participation in the society and           
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the importance of Moscow as a place where ​Navalny's campaign unfolded mostly. This             
discussion will help understand the context of ​Alexey Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign            
for Moscow​ which is part of the OSMR analytical approach. 
The second part of this case study chapter will give an account of Alexey              
Navalny’s 2013 mayoral campaign in Moscow. What the case study will be centred             
around is the transmedia strategies of the campaign. In particular, the case study will              
build upon the theories of resource mobilisation and opportunity structures to see what             
valuable resources the campaign agglomerated thanks to its transmedia strategies in           
2013. Also the case study will discuss how those resources dealt with the aspects of               
Russian opportunity structures reducing the cost of civic participation for Navalny’s           
supporters. Overall, the case study will analyse the dynamic relationships between           
transmedia strategies, resource mobilisation practices and opportunity structures in the          
context of Navalny’s campaign. 
As a result, this chapter will give an example of how to apply the OSMR               
analytical approach to studying political transmedia campaigns. We will see if the            
approach can provide valuable insights about the use of transmedia storytelling in            
politics. Also, it is possible that some deficiencies of this approach will get themselves              
revealed in the case study.  
 
5.2 Russian opportunity structures  
5.2.1 Institutions of representative democracy 
The character of political opportunity structures in a given society depends on the state              
of its institutions of political representation (Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010, pp.299-300).           
Vráblíková (2013, p.204) argues that ‘in addition to resources, motivations, and           
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mobilization, institutional opportunities also facilitate individual participation in        
nonelectoral politics’. Independent institutions of liberal democracy with the system of           
checks and balances make political decision-makers listen to the public opinion on the             
ground. There are more opportunities for nonelectoral participation (NEP) in liberal           
democracies too. Thus, functional institutions are important in both ways: they allow            
citizens to introduce change through elected representatives and make it harder for the             
state to suppress nonelectoral participation as a means of bringing about political            
change. 
The political system of modern Russia can be described as a hybrid regime,             
electoral authoritarianism or ‘illiberal democracy’ (Zakaria, 2007). As one of the           
characteristics of such regimes, the Russian political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann          
(2014) stresses the ‘decorative nature’ of their democratic institutions saying that           
‘hybrid regimes hold elections, but the government doesn’t change’. Schedler (2006,           
p.3) suggests that this type of regime violates the ‘liberal-democratic principles of            
freedom and fairness so profoundly and systematically as to render elections instruments            
of authoritarian rule rather than instruments of democracy’.  
The case of illiberal democracies highlights the idea that free elections cannot be             
reduced to a mere right to cast a vote in general elections. In Rose and Mishler’s words,                 
an election is a ‘process, not an event’ (2009, p.120). Robert Dahl’s concept of a               
polyarchy ​grasps the complexity of the concept of free elections. Among other things, in              
polyarchy citizens ‘have an effectively enforced right to freedom of expression,           
particularly political expression, including criticism of the officials’, they have ‘access           
to alternative sources of information that are not monopolized by the government or any              
other single group’ and they have ‘an effectively enforced right to form and join              
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autonomous associations, including political associations, such as political parties and          
interest groups, that attempt to influence the government by competing in elections and             
by other peaceful means’ (Dahl, 1956, p.84). According to Larry Diamond, elections are             
free when:  
The legal barriers to entry into the political arena are low, when there is              
substantial freedom for candidates and supporters of different political         
parties to campaign and solicit votes, and when voters experience little           
or no coercion in exercising their electoral choices. Freedom to          
campaign requires some considerable freedom of speech, movement,        
assembly, and association in political life, if not fully in civil society            
(2015, p.154). 
 
One of the features of the Russian electoral authoritarianism is a dominant party             
controlled by the Kremlin. ​United Russia was founded in 2001 and became one of the               
pillars of regime stability (Reutor, 2017, p.4). After the 2013 General Elections, United             
Russia held 223 out of 450 seats in the lower chamber of the Parliament, State Duma. It                 
secured a majority when dozens of representatives from other parties changed their party             
affiliation to increase the number of seats for United Russia to 304 (“Istorija             
Vserossijskoj,” 2012). From 2007 until 2011, it enjoyed a supermajority of 315 seats.             
The General elections of 2011 that led to mass street protests in Moscow showed that               
the popularity of the party was falling. But still it received 238 seats after the elections.                
In 2016, United Russia ended up with its best results in general elections so far, 343                
seats (“Edinaja Rossija,” 2016). 
The success of the party was partially attributed to many dark arts the regime              
used to manipulate the outcome of elections (DeBardeleben, 2008; Kynev, 2017). The            
fraudulent practices varied from ‘plain ballot stuffing to announcing of votes for            
competitors of United Russia as votes for United Russia at the stage of ballot counting,               
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and to changing the final protocol in a computer system’ including vote-buying            
(Enikolopov et al., 2012, p.3; Harvey, 2013). The reputation of Russian elections as             
fraudulent was a factor of public distrust when United Russia won 2011 legislative             
elections only narrowly and provoked a series of manifestations in Moscow and indeed             
across the country. 
In 2009, Alexey Navalny said in an interview that party-based politics became            
irrelevant for the Russian opposition movement (Galustyan, 2014). Nevertheless, the          
opposition leader and his associates made an attempt to register a political party             
People’s Alliance ​on April 10, 2013, just a few weeks before the 2013 mayoral race in                
Moscow began. The Justice Ministry refused to register the party citing errors in the              
legal documents the party submitted for registration (Nichol, 2014, p.66). In absence of             
parliamentary means of affecting state policies, the Russia opposition and Alexey           
Navalny as its informal leader tried to use other opportunities to make their voices heard               
– with the Moscow Mayor elections of 2013 being one of them.  
This part of Russian political opportunity structures has deeper roots. For           
instance, the phenomenon of United Russia as a single dominant party and the legal              
exclusion of competing political organisations can be traced back to the Communist            
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the one-party system that the country lived with               
in the Soviet period. As Igor Bunin puts it, ‘both United Russia and CPSU are               
government-centred parties, they did not emerge from the ground like the Labour Party             
in the UK, but were founded artificially from the top’ (“Politicheskie partii Rossii,”             
2008). Although United Russia’s role in state governance and level of hierarchical            
centralisation ‘pale in comparison to that of the CPSU’ (Reuter, 2010, p.295), they both              
became the face of pseudo-parliamentarism in the country.  
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As the dominant party becomes ‘a closed shop for political elites’ (Reuter and             
Remington, 2009, p.508), its members trade their loyalty to the political regime for all              
sorts of personal benefits (Reutor, 2017, p.5). Under such arrangements, the regime can             
be confident that the representatives who have nominal power in the Parliament are             
personally interested in keeping the regime stable. Thus, one of the roles of both United               
Russia and CPSU was to stuff the party nomenclature with the people the regime could               
trust. 
Because the political establishment secures their position in the state staying           
loyal to the Kremlin, not the voters, such a situation with party-politics in the country               
limits the citizens’ opportunities to bring about political change through the mechanisms            
of representative democracy. Dysfunctional institutions of political representation        
discourage civil society from relying on institutional mechanisms of political action.           
Abandoning party-politics suggests that the opposition gives up competing for          
institutionalised power within the existing constitutional system. Their refusal to          
participate in rigged elections means that the regime loses a legal and potentially             
peaceful exit strategy for itself within the system of opportunities it imposes on             
out-of-the-polity actors. 
Semenova (2014, p.139) says that in Russian political system, the president ​de            
facto has ‘superordinate power over the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of            
government’. The first Russian President Boris Yeltsin played a role in the destruction             
of checks and balances between different branches of the government and the eventual             
takeover of Russian politics by the executive branch. The super-presidential Russian           
Constitution of 1993 was born in a power struggle between Yeltsin and the Parliament.              
In 1993, after months of a conflict, the president disbanded the Parliament            
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‘extraconstitutionally’ and put a new constitution to a referendum that would weaken the             
role of the legislative branch significantly (Andrews, 2002, p.3).  
The lack of credible institutions with their strict rules and playbooks that would             
constrain state officials from making arbitrary actions make informal opportunity          
structures a more important factor of the Russian political space than its formal legal              
facade. Under those circumstances, Alexey Navalny 2013 mayoral campaign looked for           
ways to overcome the obstacles of the opportunity structure in place and used             
transmedia storytelling to mobilise citizens for participation in local Moscow elections           
as a means to influence politics on the federal level. 
 
5.2.2 Grassroots politics 
Grassroots enthusiasm is essential to mobilise citizens for transmedia campaigns in           
politics. Yet, the political climate in a given society can suppress the desire of ordinary               
people to exercise active citizenship. That can be even more true for authoritarian             
regimes like Russia. The poor state of the institutions of public representation makes             
hybrid regimes, illiberal democracies or electoral authoritarian states ‘fear any type of            
mobilization because they don't have the institutions to utilize active civilian           
participation’, Ekaterina Schulmann (2014) claims. That is one of the key differences            
between totalitarian and authoritarian states: while the former keeps their peoples ‘in a             
permanent state of mobilisation’, the latter tends to demobilise society to lower its             
resistance capacities (Sondrol, 1991, p.602).  
In Nadskakuła-Kaczmarczyk’s words, the Kremlin reinforces the so-called        
‘culture of non-participation’ in Russian society. This culture blocks the development of            
a grassroots civil society through various repressive mechanisms: laws which target           
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NGOs (non-government organisations) or potential disruptors, increasing control over         
mass media, safeguarding the political scene from new actors, and ‘by creating an             
‘official civil society’, in which a key role will be played by the Civic Chamber of the                 
Russian Federation’ (Nadskakuła-Kaczmarczyk, 2018, p.198). 
Despite such liabilities, the team of Alexey Navalny managed to mobilise an            
unprecedented number of volunteers who participated in his mayoral run. To understand            
the phenomenon of this campaign, one has to look at a greater ​social movement ​that               
originated in Russia in 2011. Following the 2011 Parliamentary elections, massive street            
protests shook Russian political life. On December 6, 2011, following the Russian State             
Parliament elections, thousands of protesters gathered near Chistye Prudy Boulevard to           
protest against the results of the elections which they believed were rigged (Zotova and              
Feldman, 2011; Karpukhin, 2011). After the rally at Chistye Prudy, Alexey Navalny was             
apprehended as he tried to lead hundreds of protesters to the Kremlin. This act of               
defiance ultimately paid off for Alexey Navalny personally as it gave him a lot of               
publicity and increased his popularity in the opposition movement. According to the            
public polls conducted by the ​Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM)​, the            
public perception of Navalny as the leader of the Russia opposition increased from 18              
per cent in February 2012 to 46 per cent in June 2012 among protesters (“Personalny               
portret,” 2012). 
In the following months, hundreds of thousands took part in mass protest            
manifestations on Sakharov prospect, Bolotnaya Square and elsewhere in Moscow and           
across the country. Inspired by the success of the Chistye Prudy rally, people started              
using social media to self-organise for the next one which eventually accommodated            
over 50,000 people. That rally targeted then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, his United             
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Russia ruling party and their policies, which was translated into chants ‘Putin is a thief!’,               
‘No to police state!’, ‘Russia without Putin!’, ‘Freedom to political prisoners!’, and            
‘This is our city!’ An even larger crowd of approximately 100,000 protested in the ​For               
Fair Elections rally on December 24, 2011 (“The Economist,” 2011). The aggravated            
citizens accused the federal government of rigging the elections and demanded the            
restoration of civil liberties that had been shrinking since the election of Vladimir Putin              
as the President in 2000. The movement was unprecedented for modern Russian history,             
as it was for the first time in Putin’s era that thousands of people participated in an                 
anti-government demonstration. In terms of its results, the protests forced the Kremlin to             
reintroduce the democratic elections of governors and Moscow mayor, which made           
Alexey Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow​ possible.  
The 2011–2012 protests in Moscow gave citizens a chance to practice street            
political action, gave the opposition some experience in using online technologies to            
mobilise people for civic participation and made Alexey Navalny de facto the leader of              
the Russia opposition (“Personalny portret,” 2012). Arguably, each of those factors           
made ​Alexey Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow possible. Active          
citizenship in the form of volunteering, sophisticated digital solutions to facilitate           
political participation and Alexey Navalny as a candidate – all those features of             
Navalny’s campaign were the logical extension of the movement of 2011-2012. 
McAdam and Tarrow (2010) claimed there is a diffusion of resources from social             
movements to institutional politics. Smith and Soboleva (2016, p.347) argue that ​Alexey            
Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow implemented ‘a model of electoral           
innovation based on ideational frames, resources, and tactics drawn from the protest            
movement’. As the editorial of ​Republic counted, ‘most of the 15 thousand volunteers             
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who campaigned with Navalny in 2013 were the participants of the 2011-2012 protests’             
(“Kak pobedit,” 2017). The study of Navalny’s campaign by Smith and Soboleva (2016,             
p.347) says, the campaign proved that ‘oppositions in authoritarian countries can           
challenge the autocratic state on multiple fronts by transferring resources from street            
protests to the electoral arena’. That is why one can say that Alexey Navalny transmedia               
campaign, 2013, related to both the ​movement ​and ​campaign ​interpretations of           
grassroots politics (Jacobsson, 2015, pp. 171-172). 
The reaction from the Kremlin to the protests was to tighten the POS. In 2012,               
before the Moscow mayoral election, the Kremlin-controlled Parliament passed several          
bills designed to curb the enthusiasm of the Russian civil society. On June 8, 2012,               
administrative fines for violating protest regulations were increased to the equivalent           
US$ 30,000 from the previous US$ 30. The same law prohibited protesters from             
covering their faces at rallies (“Rossiyskaya Gazeta,” 2012). In 2013, the Parliament: 1)             
ordered Russian, internationally financed NGOs to register as ‘foreign agents’; 2)           
introduced the anti-blasphemy law allowing prison sentences which has been used           
multiple times since then against social media users; 3) authorized the government to             
block websites believed to be extremist; and 4) banned the adoption of Russian orphans              
by US citizens as a retaliatory measure against the Magnitsky Act that sanctioned the              
corrupt members of the political elite (Barry, 2012).  
The laws were the reaction of the Kremlin to an unprecedented surge in protest              
activities the country experienced after the 2011 Russian parliamentary elections. The           
new punitive legislation and the infamous Bolotnaya Square trial made the opposition            
protest less popular. Also, many active citizens felt disheartened by the lack of quick and               
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profound changes as the result of their protest activities in 2011-2012. Some of them              
eventually chose to cut ties with the movement (Clément, 2015). 
Despite those negative tendencies, the study of ​the ​Center for Independent Social            
Research in Moscow shows that the protest enthusiasm of 2011-2012 may not have             
disappeared completely but rather morphed into other kinds of civic actions. For            
instance, some of the activists decided to form local groups to solve problems in their               
neighbourhoods – as a way to make their civic activities more practical. Those groups              
were committed to monitoring municipal authorities, informing residents and improving          
their cities and public spaces by ‘pushing projects through municipal governments,           
defending threatened squares and parks, and combating road expansion’ (“Apoliticism          
and Solidarity,” 2014).  
As unprecedented as it was, the protest movement of 2011-2012 relied on a base              
that was relatively small in the scope of the overall population, i.e. Moscow white collar               
private sector workers, intelligentsia and studentship (Dmitriev, 2015, p.224). The          
private-sector middle class was the backbone of the protest movement. As Bryn            
Rosenfeld (2017, p.7) concludes in his statistical analysis of the protesters: office            
professionals, managers and business owners added up to roughly 80 per cent of             
Moscow protesters in December 2011. With that regard, Jensen (2013) says that ‘after             
years of apathy, a new social force – the Russian middle class – seemed to be emerging,                 
with a message that included not only a political, but also a moral and emotional               
rejection of the corrupt authoritarian state that developed during the Putin era’. Those             
social strata are represented in Moscow in numbers bigger than in any other Russian              
city. That gives a possible explanation to why generally more prosperous Moscow            
became the centre of the protests. 
106 
With that being said, overall protest enthusiasm in Moscow before the 2011            
elections appeared to be lower than on average across the country. In the eve of the 2011                 
elections, only 15 per cent of Moscow and Saint Petersburg citizens said they would              
participate in protests if those occurred (“Protestnaya aktivnost,” 2013). On the federal            
level, 31 per cent were enthusiastic about the protests. Still, the opposition            
manifestations took place mostly in the capital. This seems to constitute a paradox but              
the explanation may lay in the demographics. According to a poll by ​VCIOM​, the most               
protest-oriented people were the supporters of left-wing parties and low-income citizens.           
Their main concern was the economy and jobs while the Moscow protests centred             
around the themes of democracy, fair elections, overall corruption in the state and so on               
(“Protestnaya aktivnost,” 2013).  
As a possible explanation, Russian periphery did not feel that enthusiastically           
about the democratic thrust of the Moscow protests because it was less affluent and did               
not experience what Dmitriev (2015, p.225) calls a ‘shift from a dominant            
survival-oriented value setting, towards self-expression values and human development         
priorities’. Thus, despite the Moscow protests, the overall political apathy of the Russian             
majority, ‘passive acceptance of the policies of the ruling elite and a general             
unwillingness to involve itself in the country’s socio-political affairs’, stayed intact           
(Nadskakuła-Kaczmarczyk, 2018, p.197). In the eve of 2011 legislative elections, 70 per            
cent of the population said they would not participate in protests if those occurred              
(“Protestnaya aktivnost,” 2013).  
In the words of Francesca Polletta (1999, p.69), culture affects the process of             
social mobilisation through ‘cultural traditions, ideological principles, institutional        
memories, and political taboos that create and limit political opportunities’. Not only the             
107 
state of democratic institutions, but also Russian political culture does not leave a lot of               
space for grassroots politics in the country. Regular mass rallies are unfamiliar to the              
Russian electoral tradition as well as canvassing, roll-calling, the use of volunteers in             
get-out-the-vote campaigns and other forms of interpersonal communication. Political         
campaigns unfold predominantly in the media with minimal face-to-face interaction          
between candidates and their electorate.  
The 2012 ride of the re-elected President Vladimir Putin to his inauguration            
ceremony in the Kremlin became notorious. Cameras showed him going through a            
completely locked down Moscow city centre with no person in sight (Taffa, 2012,             
p.126). In such regimes as modern Russia, there is always a demilitarised zone of empty               
public space between the elites and the people. The political class makes it clear to the                
people that the public space, streets and squares, is not a place where anything is going                
to be negotiated with them. Any street manifestations are pointless, therefore. 
In his 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow ​and beyond it, Navalny confronted            
both the poor tradition of public gatherings and the poor tradition of face-to-face             
interaction between the elite and the people. First, he bet on citizen participation as a               
driving force of his campaign in both the online and the outdoor dimensions. For the               
grassroots campaign of Alexey Navalny, the key objectives were to tap into the             
persisting democratic enthusiasm of Moscow citizens, mobilise them around a common           
cause, make them believe that their collective actions could make a difference and             
engage them with the campaign as volunteers by means of transmedia platforms – a very               
new thing for the Russian electoral tradition.  
Second, Navalny actively engaged with the public personally on the campaign           
trail and the Internet. Thus, one can suggest that the approach to political campaigning              
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that Navalny’s campaign chose challenged the historic patterns of the Russian political            
system when it decided to explore the opportunities of grassroots politics. With many             
online tools the campaign designed for its supporters, it made an attempt to overcome              
the public’s inertia and its distrust of collective actions. 
 
5.2.3 Role of Moscow 
Alexey Navalny 2013 mayoral campaign​ unfolded in the capital of Russia which has a 
special political and economic status in the country. Importantly, Moscow is the centre 
of power, the place where almost all the major government institutions are located. The 
president and his administration occupy the Moscow Kremlin. The prime-minister and 
the government reside in the White House on the bank of Moscow river. The Supreme 
Court of the Russian Federation, ministries, the Federal Security Service (ex-KGB) and 
the Investigative Committee are all situated in the capital. 
Major Russian corporations are registered in and pay their taxes to the federal             
budget even if their manufacturing facilities operate elsewhere. Almost four fifths of the             
500 largest Russian enterprises are registered in Moscow (“Rating RBC,” 2020). The            
federal centre collects most of the taxes and then redistributes the funds back to              
provinces subject to their loyalty as one of the factors (Larionov, 2019b). The practice              
can be a means of economic control over Russian territories by the federal government.              
Wages in Moscow are two to three times those in the country’s periphery (Larionov,              
2019a). That drains Russian territories out of the most talented people who use every              
opportunity to move to the capital. But to get hired in Moscow, a Russian citizen has to                 
be in possession of real estate in Moscow or obtain a permanent residency registration              
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from a landlord (not the same as a tenancy agreement). It effectively creates an internal               
visa system which is set to limit internal migration to the capital. 
The position of the Russian capital as an economic enclave is not new. For              
instance, the system of registration at the place of residence was introduced by the first               
Russian emperor Peter I to keep peasants attached to their owners. It was then upheld by                
communists with the introduction of Soviet passports that made internal labour           
migration a subject to household registration (Mikhailov, 2018). Even today, a Russian            
citizen who comes to the capital cannot stay there for more than 90 days without               
permanent registration in a local household. 
The special status of the city and its political significance raised the stakes and              
made the campaign important in the scope of top-level federal politics. That could be              
one of the reasons why thousands of volunteers from Russian territories joined the             
campaign (“Alexey Navalny,” 2013, p.41). At the same time, limited opportunities to            
come to the capital made it harder for Navalny’s supporters from other cities to              
participate in the campaign. As we will see, this explains why Navalny's campaign             
developed some of its digital solutions – such as a couchsurfing platform for             
non-residents and tools for campaigning online – which could help overcome those            
limitations. 
Arguably, Moscow citizens benefited from the regime that prioritised the          
development of the capital over other Russian territories. Nevertheless, in the 2013            
Moscow mayoral election, like during the protests of 2011-2012, many Moscow citizens            
decided to raise their voice against this system. Their demand was to end corruption,              
reinstate self-governance on local levels and delegate more democratic power to the            
people. One would argue that such policies, if implemented, would go against the             
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practical interests of Moscow – at least in the short run. Nevertheless, Navalny's             
message of democratisation resonated with some part of the Moscow population. One of             
the reasons could be that Moscow citizens were affluent enough to think beyond pure              
economic interests: the Moscow middle class ‘had been shifting towards a more modern             
individualistic and development-oriented system of values’ (Dmitriev, 2015, p.232). 
 
5.2.4 Legal opportunity structure  
The legal opportunity structure (LOS) concept examines those aspects of political           
climate that affect social movements and other grassroots initiatives from the judicial            
perspective. Justifying why legal space should be considered as part of opportunity            
structures, Andersen (2009, p.15) says that ‘litigation and legal decisions are best treated             
as creating ​moments of opportunity bounded by the specific legal and political contexts             
in which they occur’. In Vanhala’s words, LOS describes ‘stable and contingent factors             
that influence whether social movements are able and willing to pursue their goals             
through the court’ (2012, p.527). De Fazio (2012, p.6) specifies those factors of LOS as               
accessibility to courts, availability of justiciable rights and ‘receptivity of the judiciary            
toward a social movement’s claims’. 
As the Russian case of electoral authoritarianism exemplifies, formal legal           
opportunities do not always correspond to practical ones in the societies where law             
enforcement is selective and the rule of law is far from being absolute. In particular,               
Russian courts suffer from what became known in Russian political discourse as            
‘telephone law’, the practice that goes back to the Soviet era when ‘Communist Party              
officials communicated over the phone their preferences about the outcome of individual            
cases’ (Popova, 2012, p.131​; ​Ledeneva, 2008). In Handley’s words, ‘telephone law’ or            
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‘telephone justice’ is a practice by which ‘outcomes of cases allegedly come from orders              
issued over the phone by those with political power rather than through the application              
of law’ (2009, p.1). For instance, the Russian constitution upholds freedoms of speech             
and of the press but ‘government officials frequently use the country’s politicized and             
corrupt court system to harass the few journalists and bloggers who expose abuses by              
authorities’ (“Freedom of the Press,” 2017).  
The legal prosecution of Alexey Navalny during his mayoral campaign in 2013            
might be taken as an example of this. On July 18, 2013, when Navalny's campaign had                
been underway, Navalny was sentenced to five years in prison (Clover and Weaver,             
2013b). This was a part of the investigation against Alexey Navalny and his colleague              
Pyotr Ofitserov. Both were accused of embezzlement of the corporate property of the             
state-owned timber company ​Kirov Forests​. Navalny denied the accusations, claiming          
the whole process was an act of political repression against the opposition (Barry, 2012).              
On April 10, 2012, the charges were dismissed as the prosecutor failed to provide              
sufficient evidence that would prove any elements of crime. However, on May 29, 2012,              
the case was reopened by the personal decision of the head of Russia’s Investigative              
Committee, who was the subject of an anti-corruption investigation by Alexey Navalny            
(Kramer, 2012). In that situation, the public outrage and mass protests in Moscow city              
centre made a difference. On the next day after thousands of protesters gathered in front               
of the Russian State Parliament near the Kremlin, Navalny was released on bail which              
allowed him to resume his campaign. 
Under such conditions, grassroots activists and unauthorised politicians cannot         
rely on judicial independence to advance their causes. Moreover, the corruption of the             
court system curbs the enthusiasm of activists as they can become an easy target of show                
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trials as the infamous ​Bolotnaya Square case exemplifies. After the mass rally on             
Bolotnaya Square on May 6, 2012, 37 protesters were charged with mass riots and later               
sentenced to years in prison. That is despite the evidence that ‘violence and violations of               
public order were mainly caused by the actions of the authorities, mainly the police, both               
before and during the events’ (“May 6, 2012 events,” 2013, p.51). Georgy Satarov, a              
political scientist and former aide to the first Russian President, described the Bolotnaya             
case as ‘an attempt to use fear to stop the growth of the protest movement’ (Weiss, 2013,                 
p.78). 
The ​Pussy Riot trial became one of the most talked-about events of the Moscow              
protests of 2011-2012 both domestically and internationally (Herszenhorn, 2012). On          
February 21, 2012, three members of the punk band performed a ‘punk prayer’ at Christ               
the Savior Cathedral in Moscow. They sang and video-recorded ​Virgin Mary, Put Putin             
Away song which became a sound protest stunt in the midst of protests in the capital.                
The video of the gig went viral, the performers were arrested and sentenced to two years                
in prison each (Steinholt, 2013, p.120). 
The band’s performance resulted in the adoption of new anti-blasphemy          
legislation in Russia. It made the Russian LOS even more prohibitive for non-authorised             
voices. According to the report of ​Agora ​NGO, six people were found guilty of              
blasphemy in 2016 in Russia, ten in 2017 and eight in 2018. More than three quarters of                 
them were incriminated posting blasphemous pictures or comments online         
(“Liberalizatsiya po-russki,” 2019, p.3). 
After the wave of the mass protests of 2011-2012 new legislation on public             
assembly was introduced in Russia. Among other things, the new law introduced heavy             
fines on protesters (Bryanski, 2012). In 2014, a bill passed that set up the penalty of up                 
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to five years of forced labour or prison for attending unauthorised rallies (Demirjian,             
2014). This is an example of how the state managed the political opportunity structure to               
increase the cost of political participation for the people through changes to the system              
of laws – instead of fighting every given public manifestation of unwanted opinions. 
Another important aspect of the Russian LOS is the vulnerability of the Russian             
Constitutional Court (RCC), the highest court in the country. Trochev and Solomon            
(2018, p.201) argue that under President Putin RCC has ‘developed its own version of              
‘authoritarian constitutionalism’, which may serve as a model for constitutional judicial           
bodies in other authoritarian states’. In that ‘model’, RCC adapted to ‘satisfy the             
demands for loyalty and resilience from [the regime], which has tended to prevail over              
constitutionalism since the early 2000s’ (Trochev and Solomon, 2018, p.204), they           
argue. For instance, the court concluded that the amendments to the Russian            
Constitution that Vladimir Putin proposed in 2020 did not go against the supreme law of               
the country. That is despite those amendments ​de facto abolishing term limits for Putin              
as a President and being widely characterised as effectively a soft coup d’état             
(Kara-Murza, 2020). 
As a way out of this unfavourable LOS, Russian opposition, and many ordinary             
citizens, often appeal to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to seek justice.              
Data shows that Russia’s share of complaints to ECHR is bigger than that of any other                
country, which itself can be an indicator of the quality of Russian legal opportunity              
structure. In 2019, Russia accounted for ‘15,050 out of a total of 59,800 pending cases in                
the Strasbourg-based court, or one-quarter of all applications’ (“The Moscow Times,”           
2020). However, even this rather narrow window of opportunity has been shrinking            
recently. For example, in 2015 the State Duma granted Russia's Constitutional Court the             
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power to ‘review international human rights rulings to decide if they violate the Russian              
Constitution’ (Fleig-Goldstein, 2017, p.172). One of the amendments to the Constitution           
I have just mentioned also captured the supremacy of the rulings of domestic courts over               
international ones. 
 
5.2.5 Mediation opportunity structure 
Mediation opportunity structure refers to the opportunities and threats the media arena            
can pose to grassroots movements and campaigns. Among other aspects, it includes            
‘media opportunities’ provided by mainstream media and ‘networked opportunities’         
facilitated by social media (Cammaerts, 2012, p.122). Potentially both of them can make             
a big difference for a political change initiative becoming either a valuable resource to              
promote its cause or a serious constraint. 
In Putin’s Russia, media opportunity structure is characterised by pervasive state           
control over legacy media outlets including TV channels, print media and radio stations.             
For instance, there are three types of owners who control major TV networks in the               
country. Vladimir Putin’s friend Yury Kovalchuk controls ​Channel 1, Ren TV Channel            
and ​Channel 5 ​through his ​National Media Group​. ​NTV Channel is a part of the               
state-owned ​Gazprom Media holding. ​Russia 1 is under direct control of the state (“Kto              
Vladeet SMI,” 2014).  
The origins of the situation go back to the 1990s and the Presidential campaign              
of 1996 (Simons, 2001). In the 1990s, two Russian oligarchs Boris Berezovsky and             
Vladimir Gusinsky ‘controlled major television stations’ through their media empires          
and often used them in their political games (Treisman, 2002, p.69). Although under the              
first Russian President Russian television journalists were more autonomous from the           
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state and their bosses than in Putin’s years, independent journalism in the country was              
compromised in the 1990s. A major instance was the Presidential elections of 1996             
when media oligarchs abused the neutrality of their media assets to re-elect increasingly             
unpopular Yeltsin as Russian President and protect their businesses from a very probable             
victory of a Communist Party candidate (Belin, 1997). Yeltsin’s eventual win might            
have shown the Kremlin the power of the mass media and also the lack of principles on                 
their side. As Treisman (2002, p.70) puts it, ‘oligarchs’ brazen claims to have gotten              
Yeltsin re-elected in 1996 by manipulating coverage and their demands to be rewarded             
helped to discredit them in a way that simplified Putin’s task’ to take control of Russian                
political television in the 2000s. Kazun (2019, p.313) goes further saying that it is the               
legacy of the Soviet Union that has shaped ‘nondemocratic mass political media            
systems’ in modern Russia. 
In terms of ownership, many other legacy media also have direct or indirect             
affiliation with the Kremlin these days. Most popular in Russia political talk radio ​Echo              
of Moscow has been a part of Gazprom Media since 2001. Three out of Top-5 political                
and business newspapers in the country have some level of affiliation with the Kremlin              
as well. Putin’s old friend Yury Kovalchuk controls the most-read newspaper ​Izvestia            
(Artemyeva, 2007). Alisher Usmanov, a loyal to the Kremlin oligarch and Britain's            
wealthiest person, is the owner of ​Kommersant ​newspaper (Bryzgalova, 2015).          
Rossiyskaya Gazeta​ is the official newspaper of the Government.  
The independence of another influential newspaper ​Vedomosti ​was jeopardised         
too when the Kremlin passed a law ‘barring foreign control of Russian media’ and              
‘forced the FT and Dow Jones (the Wall Street Journal’s parent company) to sell their               
stakes’ in the newspaper. As ​The Economist speculates, that may have happened because             
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in 2013 ​Vedomosti ​published a letter from 35 businessmen who ‘openly supported            
Alexei Navalny, the leader of the protests, as he ran to be mayor of Moscow’ (“The                
Economist,” 2020). 
Talking about ​The Economist​, many popular American and European         
publications such as ​Financial Times​, ​The Telegraph​, ​The New York Times and others             
covered the mayoral bid of the opposition leader, the bogus trial of him and other               
developments of the Moscow elections. One should not overestimate the importance of            
that coverage to Navalny in terms of publicity. According to the studies by VCIOM and               
MediaStandard Foundation, the general public in Russia barely reads newspapers in           
English and only 1 to 3 per cent of Russians trust foreign media (“Inostranny yazyk,”               
2019; “Obraz zhurnalista,” 2018, p.10). With that being said, Navalny was doing well             
among the more affluent part of the population including businessmen to whom those             
publications could be more relevant. 
While the Russian segment of the Internet enjoys more freedom than legacy            
media in general, it is far from being politically neutral. As of 2013, Alisher Usmanov               
controlled major Russian internet resources such as ​Mail.ru search engine and its news             
aggregator (“Alisher Usmanov,” 2013). In the early 2010s, ​Lenta.ru was the most cited             
news website in Russia (Etling et al., 2010, p.29). In 2014, following the Kremlin’s              
criticism of Lenta’s coverage of the Crimea crisis, Russian oligarch Alexander Mamut            
fired the website’s Editor-in-Chief Galina Timchenko. As a result, 39 journalists of            
Lenta.ru left the website as they called the move an act of censorship and an attempt to                 
turn the website into the propaganda tool of the Kremlin (“Dorogim chitateljam,”​ ​2014). 
Yandex​, Russian-native search engine that has 55 per cent share of the market, is              
an independently owned company (Brigham, 2019). However, it also has been under            
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pressure from the government recently. To avoid complete governmental takeover, in           
2019 the biggest tech company in Russia agreed to ‘create a new Public Interest              
Foundation that will have the power to block transactions and temporarily remove            
Yandex’s management if it deems it in the national interest’ (Seddon, 2019). As an              
example of an increasing deterioration of the company’s positions as an independent            
provider of search engine services, in April 2020 Yandex launched a beta widget that              
showed only ‘overwhelmingly negative content when seeking information about         
opposition politician Alexey Navalny’ (“Yandex says its experimental,” 2020). When          
users noticed that, the company took down the widget and called the situation ‘an              
experiment’ and ‘product error’. 
Such a situation with the media opportunity structure made it harder for the             
Russia opposition to reach out to ordinary people with their message and promote the              
democratic cause. For instance, in his study of Russian media coverage of Alexey             
Navalny, Kazun (2019, p.317) concluded that state-controlled media ‘are walking a           
tightrope between trying to ignore Navalny and attempting to smear him as much as              
possible’. This also creates an uneven playing field for state-supported and           
out-of-the-system political actors. The former receive disproportionate and largely         
positive publicity in the media while their rivals often get smeared, ridiculed or ignored              
at best. For instance, in the 2013 Moscow mayoral election the Kremlin’s candidate             
received virtually all free time on federal and local TV channels while the other              
candidates, including Navalny, were ignored. The reach of the Sobyanin campaign on            
TV exceeded 250 million views, while all the other candidates got only 1.5 million              
views combined (“Analiz reklamnykh kampaniy,” 2013). 
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Networked opportunity structure is the space of opportunities to use the           
communication capacities of social media. Social media have a great proliferation in            
Russia and Facebook played a particularly important role in Moscow protests of            
2011-2012 as it helped protesters to self-organise (White and McAllister, 2013, p.78).            
That was reasonable as most of the protesters were white collar workers and students              
who are less likely to watch TV and more likely to be active internet users. 
The most popular social media platform in Russia is ​VK with its 190 million              
users (White and McAllister, 2013, p.77). The company did not survive for too long as               
an independent start-up. Under pressure from the Kremlin, Pavel Durov, the founder of             
the company, had to sell VK in 2013 and emigrate (Kiselyova, 2014). Since then,              
Alisher Usmanov has been in control of the social media giant. He also owns              
Odnoklassniki ​(‘Schoolmates’) popular social media platform (“Alisher Usmanov,”        
2013). The change in ownership had political implications. For instance, VK actively            
cooperates with the Investigative Committee to track ‘extremist’ speech including          
blasphemy on the platform. In 2017, the Investigative Committee found extremism in            
138 posts on VK which amounted to almost all the cases for the Russian segment of the                 
Internet (Zotova, 2018).  
As important as they are for political change campaigns, traditional and social            
media opportunities are only part of what the Internet has to offer to those who seek to                 
engage with online audiences. Transmedia projects often create platforms of their own            
to tell their stories. With the discussion on transmedia storytelling we followed in             
Chapter 2, we paid attention to some of the digital solutions and web applications              
grassroots campaigns in politics made use of. In a similar manner, Navalny's campaign             
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designed numerous websites and web applications to reach out to voters in            
circumvention of the restrictive MOS. 
Talking about the political opportunity structures of Russia as we know it today,             
it seems fair to say there is great restrictive potential that makes it harder for               
out-of-the-polity actors to exercise influence over political decision-making in the          
country. In the absence of fair elections, the institutions of electoral democracy do not              
serve their purposes to represent the people as the main concern of elected             
representatives becomes staying loyal to the Kremlin. The judicial branch is only            
formally independent from the government but in practice can be used to prosecute             
political opponents of the regime including activists and random protesters. That is part             
of the reason why Russian citizens – the ​audience ​of the campaign in Gambarato’s terms               
– are cautious about taking political action and the traditions of grassroots politics in the               
country stays rather weak as the Russian POSs suppress people’s political enthusiasm.            
Another reason could be that the opposition in Russia is smeared and ridiculed in the               
traditional media and the mediation opportunity structure reduces the chances to spread            
unofficial narratives. 
 
5.3 Alexey Navalny’s grassroots campaign 
According to Smith and Soboleva (2016, p.364), Alexey Navalny’s mayoral campaign           
for Moscow was an example of ‘an effective use of limited resources’ in politics. This               
thesis argues that transmedia strategies helped Navalny’s campaign to agglomerate          
resources for political action and encourage participation on the grassroots level. These            
qualities of transmedia storytelling were particularly helpful in Russian context where           
the tradition of grassroots politics is rather weak and the other parts of the POS – legal,                 
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institutional and so on – discourage active citizenship. Navalny's mayoral campaign of            
2013 exploited the principles of grassroots politics and transmedia storytelling to           
mobilise the base, organise volunteers in the mediated and offline spaces and overcome             
the obstacles of Russian political opportunity structures. To that end, the campaign            
implemented some of the key principles of transmedia storytelling by Henry Jenkins            
(see Illustration 2), such as spreadability, continuity, immersion and extractability,          
seriality, performance (2010). 
 
Illustration 2. Core principles of transmedia storytelling by Henry Jenkins (2010). 
 
Navalny’s mayoral bid emerged from the Moscow protest events of 2011-2012.           
The difference was that it was a campaign-style grassroots initiative in the sense that it               
unfolded within the boundaries of institutional politics (Navalny ran for a state office),             
had clear time boundaries and relied on the organisational capacities of the candidate’s             
team. What stayed intact was the great involvement of active citizens which was crucial              
for both the movement and the campaign. The campaign’s organisational resources           
made it possible for the candidate to provide citizens with an extensive network of              
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participatory extensions including web applications and make most of the enthusiasm of            
the 2011-2012 protest movement in Moscow.  
In line with the resource mobilisation paradigm, the campaign sought to           
accumulate resources of different kinds to reduce the costs of political participation for             
citizens. In the terminology of Vladimir Propp’s ​Morphology of the Folktale​, Navalny's            
campaign took on the archetype of a ​Helper ​or ​Donor ​who presents the ​Hero ​(the               
general population) with ​magic gifts ​(resources for political action) to help the ​Hero ​get              
through ​obstacles ​(Russian political space) and eventually win over the ​Villain           
(detached and reluctant elites) (Propp, 1958). 
 
5.3.1 Campaign message: Five issues. One story 
According to Henry Jenkins (2006, p.95-96), transmedia projects disseminate a single           
story, storyworld or ‘brandworld’ across many platforms. This idea is encapsulated in            
such transmedia qualities as continuity and seriality, for instance (Jenkins, 2010). In            
doing so, they ensure there is a consistent experience across platforms (Long, 2007,             
p.164). That makes a message an essential part of a transmedia campaign, including in              
the realm of politics. That also makes storytelling one of the resources available to              
political organisers (Ganz, 2009; 2011). Alexey Navalny’s mayoral campaign for          
Moscow is an example of how such a political resource can be used in a transmedia                
campaign.  
In a significant departure from the type of campaigning traditional to Russian            
political culture, Navalny reached out to the people of Moscow with a series of local               
rallies. The speeches were a chance for the candidate to expand on the key points of his                 








Navalny’s internal polling showed that Moscow citizens were most concerned          
with five social issues: labour migration to the city, affordable housing and the quality of               
house services, public transport and heavy traffic, healthcare, and the overall cost of             
living in the capital (“The platform of Alexey Navalny,” 2013). In line with the              
transmedia idea of message consistency or ‘canon’ (Long, 2007, p.164), the political            
platform and campaign communication of Alexey Navalny wrapped up those city issues            
in a single story about corruption, political accountability and active citizenship. First,            
the campaign portrayed Russian political elites as detached from, and unconcerned with,            
the public interest. In particular, the campaign claimed that Navalny’s opponent, Acting            
Mayor Sergey Sobyanin, and other members of the Kremlin circles, benefited           
enormously from kickback schemes and budget misappropriation (Kibirov, 2013).         
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Second, the candidate urged to increase the role of citizens in governance as a means of                
ensuring the accountability of elites. The empowerment of local communities and           
grassroots citizenship were the cross-cutting themes of Navalny’s mayoral platform, his           
public speeches and communications. The overall strategy of Alexey Navalny was to            
show that those in power in Russia and its capital put their personal interests over the                
interests of the population and that the solution to that would be to give more power to                 
citizens (Kibirov, 2013; Krasnoelena, 2013). 
Concerning healthcare, Navalny's platform promised to fight kickback schemes         
that made public purchases more expensive for the city budget and ultimately for the              
people. On housing services, Navalny proposed to introduce the mechanisms of citizen            
control over overhaul works expenses. As a part of the anti-corruption campaign,            
Navalny was going to bring utility providers under scrutiny to ensure pricing            
transparency and quality control. It was also suggested that undue expenses could be             
reduced if residents were empowered to make their own decision on what services they              
wanted to receive (Boris Felikson, 2013). 
The campaign portrayed illegal labour migration also as the problem of           
corruption foremost. According to Navalny, some utility service providers, including          
state-owned ones, hired illegal aliens to pay them less than their official wages and              
embezzle the difference. Thus, in Navalny’s opinion, immigration policies in Russia           
were deliberately designed to create opportunities for mass budget thefts. Navalny           
promised to make information on wages in housing services open to the public so that               
the citizens’ oversight could help end corrupt practices in that department (Tyoply Stan,             
2013). 
From Navalny’s perspective, the disproportionally high cost of living in the city            
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was partially due to so-called ‘bribe tax’ that businesses had to pay to bureaucrats and               
numerous controllers (Mojaghed, 2013). The campaign claimed that backhanders were          
another component of the problem of unreasonably high prices, including on the real             
estate market. Navalny’s methods of dealing with bribing would be to cut regulations for              
businesses, make the government more transparent and accountable, and ensure          
compliance with anti-bribery and anti-corruption requirements. With this approach, the          
campaign portrayed the cost of living as part of the same story about corruption and the                
accountability of political decision-makers. 
Transport policies were a big part of the candidate’s platform. Moscow is            
notorious for its bad traffic. It is not rare that people spend hours trying to get to the                  
place where they work and then back home every workday. That has a massive impact               
on the quality of life in the capital of Russia. In their transport policies, the Moscow                
government prioritised widening existing highways and building big new junctions.          
From Navalny’s perspective, that was because big multimillion projects can be easily            
corrupted. In 2013, the Moscow administration handed two thirds of its costly city             
contracts on building highways, road junctions and bridges to Gennady Timchenko,           
Arkady Rotenberg and Boris Rotenberg, who were known to be the members of Putin's              
inner circle (Lyauv, 2013). From Navalny’s point of view, the city administration            
preferred massive construction projects to more flexible solutions to hand out all the             
budget to a single management company (often affiliated with the Kremlin) and then             
embezzle part of it. Navalny argued that this kind of cronyism made solving transport              
problems impossible (Boris Felikson, 2013). 
Addressing the issues of public transport and city traffic, Navalny proposed to            
extend the networks of local roads instead (Tyoply Stan, 2013; Boris Felikson, 2013).             
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This idea was in line with Navalny’s general reliance on horizontal links and networks              
in social policies rather than vertical, unitarist and easy-to-control systems. Connecting           
small neighbourhoods with each other through the networks of local roads would            
strengthen horizontal links inside and between local communities. Such arrangements          
would also help local economic centres to emerge. Surrounded by relatively small            
populations, such centres would be easier for the people to control through their local              
representatives. They would also make people more economically independent from the           
city and more dependent on smaller economic areas that they could control as a              
community. 
With that regard, the problem of roads in Moscow was akin to a greater Russian               
situation with both transport and the system of authoritarian control. Flight connections            
in Russia are designed to lead traffic through the capital so that even large nearby cities                
often do not have direct flight between them or they are prohibitively costly (Arakelyan,              
2017). As a result, in 2013 the three Moscow airports had significantly more passengers              
than all the other Russian airports combined (“Obyomy Perevozok,” 2014). In the            
vicious circle, Moscow's special economic status hindered the economic developments          
of Russian territories. The poor economic situation outside the capital suppressed           
demand for flights between provinces and reinforced the all-roads-lead-to-Moscow         
situation. That even further jeopardised economic and cultural cooperation between          
territories and regional development. This could also be another federal mechanism of            
divide and rule control over territories. Both Moscow with its lack of local roads and the                
country at large with its aviation problems suffered from the unitarist approach of the              
state. 
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The transport issues also pertained to the process of democratisation and           
self-governance: transport routes and the intensity of movement between territories pull           
the nation together, installing both the sense of unity and practical unity with the              
networks of economic ties between provinces and neighbourhoods in circumvention of           
the power centre. In its turn, the system of authoritarian rule perpetuated disunity and              
unaccountability: deliberately through the politics of tax redistribution for instance and           
as an incidental consequence of corruption – like in the case of the transport policies that                
prioritised centralisation over horizontal links. 
On the one hand, the campaign suffered from such a disparity between the             
capital and the rest of the country. For instance, it was harder for the campaign to recruit                 
volunteers from across the country as it would make Navalny’s enthusiasts from outside             
Moscow bear the costs which could be quite sizable to them. On the other hand, the                
unique role of Moscow brought federal attention to its mayoral election and made those              
outside Moscow more probable to participate. On the level of messaging, the            
campaign’s key slogan ‘Change Russia. Begin with Moscow’ peddled this idea that the             
campaign had federal consequences increasing its chances with supporters from other           
Russian territories (Boris Felikson, 2013). The campaign also created a number of web             
applications to make it easier for people across Russia to volunteer, which we will              
discuss later. 
Importantly, the consistency of Navalny’s message was in line with the           
transmedia concepts such as continuity (Jenkins, 2010) and canon (Scolari, 2014) which            
suggest that the message across transmedia extensions must stay coherent and           
consistent. The key messages of civic control and accountability were the major talking             
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points of Navalny’s communications. They brought the different parts of Navalny’s           
platform together and made them easier to comprehend for the general public.  
Henry Jenkins’ concept of drillability (2010) is also applicable to the           
communications of Navalny’s mayoral campaign for Moscow. From simple slogans          
across communications to ​five.navalny.ru ​website with five key points of the platform            
presented in an accessible format to ​navalny.ru website with the full and detailed             
platform, the campaign made it possible for those interested to dig deeper and learn              
more about where Navalny stood politically. 
 
5.3.2 Message of active citizenship 
Navalny’s message of civic participation and active citizenship contributed to making           
his mayoral campaign transmedia. That is because participation is indispensable to           
transmedia projects (Jenkins, 2010; Pratten, 2015, p.2). The audiences of transmedia           
campaigns are complex and include not only mere consumers of political messages but             
also different sorts of ‘prosumers’ who contribute to the progress of the campaign             
(Scolari et al., 2014, p.3). In line with this transmedia paradigm, Navalny’s campaign             
created a network of extensions with varying opportunities for participation and also            
promoted participation through its political platform and messages. 
When Navalny praised self-governance on the campaign trail, he gave two           
meanings to it: 1. self-governance as the empowerment of local government bodies,            
downward delegation of power, including the redistribution of public budgets in favour            
of local bodies, and 2. self-governance as active citizenship that includes voting and             
volunteering (Krasnoelena, 2013; Mojaghed, 2013). Thus, the campaign proposed         
networked solutions and active citizenship as an answer to key city issues.  
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While calling self-governance a way to fight corruption and tackle key city            
issues, the campaign called for local legislative representatives to be vested with more             
power and budget to implement political decisions, to bring more decisions to the local              
level where elected representatives could step in, to elect sheriffs and make the police              
responsible before local authorities ​(Krasnoelena, 2013). This democratic message was          
repeated across rallies. For instance, Navalny brought it up many times in his rallies that               
the redistribution of city funds is a necessary measure to make the administrative system              
effective and accountable in Moscow. At the Kaluzhskaya rally he complained that            
people’s representatives lack resources to influence the situation on the local level:            
‘Thousands of local representatives control only 1 per cent of the city budget. Those are               
the people who deal with local problems directly on a daily basis… It will never work if                 
four or ten people control the whole Moscow budget. This centralisation only facilitates             
corruption and ineffectiveness’ (Kibirov, 2013). In Yasenevo, he made this point again            
that the local bodies of political representation manage only 1 per cent of the city               
budget: ‘Do you know how much of the Moscow 16 trillion budget is controlled on the                
local level by the representatives you elect who deal with local problems like hospitals              
and housing services? 1 per cent. Thousands of local representatives in 184 districts             
control just one per cent of the city budget and the rest is managed by some random                 
people who have not even been elected by anyone. We do not even know their names                
and cannot keep them accountable’ (Krasnoelena, 2013). 
In the discussion of Russian POSs, we talked about the special position of             
Moscow in terms of the economy and power to compare with the other territories in the                
country. In the same manner as the policies of the federal centre made it easier for them                 
to control territories from Moscow, on the scale of the capital the city administration              
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agglomerated most of the resources leaving local communities with no resources to            
self-govern. As a result, the local institutes of power that would be easier for the people                
to control played a very limited role in the system, while the real influence was               
concentrated on the higher levels of the state which are harder to keep accountable. In               
Navalny’s words, ‘Russia by now has turned into a unitary state. We need to start               
moving in the opposite direction – towards restoration of balance of authority between             
federal and regional powers and a significant expansion of the role of local governance              
as the basis of the entire system of popular rule’ (“Alexey Navalny’s Campaign             
Platform,” 2018).  
The campaign sought to increase the role of citizens from these three            
perspectives: put formal state institutions and elites under people’s control, encourage           
active citizenship in the realm of informal politics, and drive up political participation on              
the scale of one particular election campaign. To empower the citizens, the campaign             
designed a transmedia network of numerous online platforms and web applications to            
turn supporters into volunteers and to reduce the cost of political participation for             
Russian citizens (Gambarato and Medvedev, 2015b). 
The idea of bringing elites under citizens’ control was encapsulated in the            
platform’s catchy ‘People’s rule, not monarchy’ phrase and was in line with the             
grassroots turn that the capital experienced in 2011-2012 – as discussed in the analysis              
of Russian POSs. To bring about the needed change, the campaign urged Moscow             
citizens to start exercising control in the form of political participation, including            
volunteering and voting. The political change would require the people to engage in             
politics more actively, including within the scope of Navalny's campaign.  
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The active citizenship aspect of the message was to deal with the political             
nihilism of voters, which is part of Russian political space as discussed in the first part                
of this chapter. The message had to help recruit volunteers and encourage the people to               
back Navalny with their vote. It had some success as, for instance, the interviews with               
Navalny’s poll watchers show that the calls he made on social media to participate in the                
Moscow mayoral elections incentivised some of them to become election observers           
(Davydov, Loguniva and Lytkina, 2016, p.57). The democratic thrust of Navalny's           
campaign’s message was also in line with the focus on participation being the engine of               
transmedia projects. As we will discuss later, the methods of campaigning, the digital             
solutions Navalny’s team implemented to simplify volunteering, self-organisation of         
citizens and personal initiative were also consistent with this message. 
 
Illustration 4. Official logo of Alexey Navalny’s mayoral campaign of 2013 (reads as 
‘Change Russia. Begin with Moscow. Navalny’) (“Official logo,” 2020). 
 
The overall message of Navalny's mayoral campaign of 2013 in Moscow           
demonstrated a great deal of consistency. The campaign managed to use the strength of              
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Alexey Navalny as an anti-corruption activist to explain the city issues and the             
candidate’s platform with a single overarching story following what transmedia          
scholarship calls the ‘canon’ (Long, 2007, p.164), strengthening its transmedia          
consistency and using storytelling as a resource of political mobilisation. The campaign            
wrapped different city issues up with a story about corruption, accountability of elites             
and active citizenship.  
In line with the general reliance of transmedia projects on participation and            
‘knowledge communities’ (Jenkins, 2006, p.20), Navalny’s campaign promoted active         
citizenship as the means of bringing about political change and encouraged concerned            
citizens to join the campaign as volunteers. And it was not only the message. Navalny’s               
team chose to use the methods of campaigning related to that participation appeal which              
the next part of this chapter will cover. 
 
5.3.3 Confronting mediation opportunity structure 
Alexey Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign was a rare example of a grassroots campaign             
in modern Russian history. Not only the key messages of the campaign but also the               
network of interactive extensions it created encouraged Navalny’s supporters to act on            
behalf of the campaign. Normally political campaigns in Russia unfold almost           
exclusively in the media arena where people become mere objects of political messages.             
It was highly unusual when Navalny's campaign decided to make citizens its active             
agents and created a transmedia network of web applications to encourage civic            
participation. 
As the discussion of Russian opportunity structures concluded, the traditional          
media arena in Russia provided unauthorised voices with a very limited opportunity to             
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reach out to voters (Azhgikhina, 2011). In the mediated space, the campaign had to              
overcome the restraints of the Russian mediation opportunity structure, including          
informational blackouts and the campaigns of disinformation produced by         
state-controlled legacy media – to spread word about the movement among potential            
adherents (Jo Freeman, n.d.). 
The first alternative to legacy media was social media and websites. Transmedia            
storytelling, convergence culture and multi-screen consumption are defined by the ‘flow           
of content across multiple media platforms’ (Jenkins, 2006, p.2). The campaign           
launched a ​navalny.ru website with the candidate’s platform and regularly updated           
campaign news. ​Five.navalny.ru ​website presented the platform in an accessible form of            
five key issues. Navalny engaged with users on ​Facebook​, ​VK​, ​Twitter​, ​Odnoklassniki            
and ​Instagram ​social media platforms and filmed 24 online videos and teasers for             
Youtube​. The campaign also used ​Youtube ​as an advertising tool to post commercials.             
Weekly email sendouts contained campaign news and called for the subscribers to get             
involved in the campaign as volunteers or donate to it.  
More interesting was the second alternative. By following the transmedia          
playbook, the campaign created a number of online applications to reduce the costs of              
civic participation for the candidate’s supporters, to generate the flow of volunteers into             
the campaign and to make sure they work efficiently (Gambarato and Medvedev,            
2015b). Jo Freeman (n.d.) and others theorised that labour and all kinds of human              
resources are the primary intangible resources grassroots campaigns can rely on.           
According to Leonid Volkov, Navalny’s campaign manager, the campaign had          
employed 14,000 volunteers by August 2013, about a month before the election day. By              
the end of the campaign, more than 20,000 volunteers had joined Navalny's election             
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team (Bershidsky, 2013). To make those numbers possible, the campaign had to provide             
Moscow citizens with practical tools to make their voice heard. It was especially             
important to reduce the costs of participation for citizens as the Russian political climate              
discouraged grassroots enthusiasm. Considering that, the campaign prioritised building         
websites and web applications for bottom-up civic participation and volunteering. This           
approach was consistent with the democratic message of the campaign: one can say that              
empowering people was a key element of Navalny's platform and also the means of              
achieving the platform’s goals. 
To resist the unfavourable mediation opportunity structure, the campaign came          
up with a network of web applications and websites of their own, transmedia in its               
nature. Its repertoire of contention used a mix of digital and offline means of promotion               
including social media, online games, websites and blogs, print press, radio and street             
advertising, outdoor rallies, online videos. Most importantly, many of those media           
extensions were not designed to simply teach about the candidate but to empower             
grassroots enthusiasts to act on behalf of the campaign. 
 
5.3.4 Recruiting volunteers 
The campaign knew its biggest asset would be Navalny’s supporters. Bob Edwards and             
John D. McCarthy (2007), Charles Tilly (1977a), Jo Freeman (n.d.), John D. McCarthy             
and Mayer Zald (1977), all place labour or human resources among the main resources              
of political mobilisation. Jenkins et al. (2006, p.7) also define modern participatory            
culture as the one that has ‘relatively low barriers to artistic expression and civic              
engagement’ and ‘strong support for creating and sharing creations with others’.           
Navalny’s campaign needed to become as ‘volunteer-friendly’ as it could to           
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accommodate as many volunteers as possible. To that end, they had to reduce the cost of                
participation for citizens to make it easier for them to voice their frustrations and              
demands – as per the resource mobilisation theory. The solution was various web             
applications that would help people self-organise and act together as the campaign’s            
ambassadors. 
Investing in volunteering could prove to be a risky strategy considering the poor             
tradition of grassroots campaigning in the country. But the campaign was resolute to             
challenge the pattern – besides, it did not have a lot of other means of promotion but its                  
enthusiastic supporters. As a result, relying on grassroots participation became the           
campaign’s long-term strategy. From the very beginning, volunteers worked from the           
headquarters in the call-centre reaching out to local representatives to ask if they were              
ready to support the opposition candidate to overcome the so-called ‘municipal filter’            
and register Navalny as a candidate (Katz, 2013). 
Because of Moscow's special status, Alexey Navalny's mayoral campaign for          
Moscow drew interest not only from Muscovites but from across the country. The             
campaign’s slogan ‘Change Russia. Begin with Moscow’ suggested that the Moscow           
mayoral election is more than a city issue. Left to their own devices, people from other                
Russian territories could find it rather hard to participate in a grassroots campaign             
because it often requires volunteers to be physically present on the ground. As the              
discussion of the role of Moscow in the first part of this chapter highlighted, there were                
factors that complicated such mobility. 
Led by Volkov, the campaign designed a web application to recruit volunteers            
from outside the capital helping them find free accommodation in Moscow for the             
period of the campaign. They launched ​mosvpiska.navalny.ru website which was a           
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couchsurfing application for volunteers (“Mosvpiska,” 2013). The website connected         
Navalny’s supporters from outside Moscow with those Moscow residents who were           
willing to host them in their Moscow homes for the period of the campaign. According               
to Navalny’s post-campaign report, the website brought in 3,100 new volunteers from            
other cities of Russia (“Alexey Navalny,” 2013, p.41). Volkov (2013) downplayed that            
number saying that about 500-600 volunteers from other cities joined the campaign            
through ​Mosvpiska ​couchsurfing platform – which is still a considerable number on a             
scale of one city. 
‘Experience, skills and expertise’ are among the resources political organisers          
can provide grassroots activists with according to Edwards and McCarthy (2007, p.126).            
Transmedia storytelling scholarship echoes this idea when Jenkins et al. (2006, p.7) say             
that in participatory culture what is known by the most experienced is passed along to               
novices. This was another aspect of promoting active citizenship that Navalny’s           
campaign engaged with. The campaign started training citizens how to be effective in             
volunteering. There were regular master classes on how to deliver the campaign            
message effectively. They started on July 11th, 2013, the day after ​cube.navalny.ru            
website for street promotion was launched and lasted until the end of the campaign.              
Alexey Navalny's campaign also held 78 master classes for 800 volunteers who            
conducted opinion polls for the campaign (“Alexey Navalny,” 2013, p.64). In an            
election protection effort, the campaign trained poll watchers and developed a web            
application for election observers (“Alexey Navalny,” 2013, p.68). Alexey Navalny held           
regular meetings with volunteers, aimed to create horizontal connections (“Alexey          
Navalny,” 2013, pp.53-54). Those who campaigned on social media were provided with            
written instructions on how to communicate with people on behalf of the campaign. The              
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instructions were available on ​moskva.navalny.ru website (“Campaign in Moscow,”         
2013).  
Another aspect of participatory culture as defined by Jenkins et al. is members             
who believe that their contributions matter (2006, p.7). Leonid Volkov admitted that the             
campaign tried to hire paid promoters to distribute leaflets but quickly came to the              
conclusion that volunteers were much better motivated and effective – because they            
were personally interested in the cause and valued the time they were investing in              
promoting the candidate (Volkov, 2013). For the voters they communicated with, it            
made a case for the campaign: if people worked for the candidate for free, it had to say                  
something positive about the candidate. This is an additional illustration to the            
proposition that people who provide ​free labour (Terranova, 2000) in transmedia           
projects find meaning in their engagement and have motivations other than material            
compensation. This also adds to the findings of other studies that concluded that             
grassroots canvassing can be more effective than the use of professional promoters in             
political campaigns (Franke-Ruta, 2004). 
 
5.3.5 Empowering volunteers 
When thinking of maximising the productivity of volunteers, the first important factor to             
consider is that different people are ready to invest different amounts of time to help the                
cause. As Robert Pratten stresses in his ‘Getting Started in Transmedia Storytelling’, the             
audience commitment depends on the intensity of participation (2015, p.183). Akin to a             
sales funnel, a participation funnel suggests that the more demanding a platform is in              
terms of participation the less people will be ready to get involved (Clow, 2013).              
Therefore, the campaign needed to design online applications for different depths of            
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involvement. Following Mr. Volkov’s account of their volunteer-oriented projects, the          
following matrix can describe their approach: 
 
 
Illustration 5. Some of the campaign’s extensions charted based on the 
availability of volunteers. 
 
The four extensions and web applications – ​Cubes​, Navalny to Every House​,            
Mosvpiska ​and ​Campaign in Moscow ​– corresponded with varying needs and           
capabilities of volunteers. ​Cubes ​were the best option for those who lived in the capital               
and could spare a considerable amount of time for volunteering. They also required a              
measure of initiative and independent work on the side of a volunteer. The target              
audience of the ​Navalny to Every House web application were the Moscow residents             
who had less time to invest in the campaign. The ​Campaign in Moscow social media app                
enabled people from the whole country to act as the campaign’s ambassadors with very              
little effort. As discussed earlier, the ​Mosvpiska ​couchsurfing application made it easier            
for Navalny’s supporters from outside Moscow to take part in the campaign as full-time              
volunteers. 
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Invented by the head of Navalny's Moscow office Nikolay Lyaskin (Kozenko,           
2014), mobile outdoor ​cubes​, square tents with campaign slogans printed on the sides,             
became the primary points of campaigning in Moscow streets for Navalny's campaign            
during the election period. They were the places where volunteers, mostly young people,             
could talk to the Moscow citizens on behalf of the campaign. The ​cubes ​also were               
starting points for promotion in metro and traffic, places to store and handout             
newspapers. These activities at cubes provided the immersion transmedia experience for           
both volunteers and Muscovites who the campaign targeted. The handouts aligned with            
the extractability principle of transmedia storytelling as defined by Henry Jenkins           
(2010). The latter suggests it is always beneficial for a transmedia project if its fans get                
connected with the project through any physical or virtual items associated with it. 
 
 




The number of ​cubes active in the streets varied from 20 to 50 units from day to                 
day – it was up to the people to apply for and pick up a tent kit in the campaign office.                     
Another option was to go to ​cube.navalny.ru website where an up-to-date online map of              
the currently operating ​cubes ​was available, and to join one of them. Overall, volunteers              
organised 2,756 ​cubes ​for the campaign. Volkov suggested that ​cubes ​produced 50,000            
man-hours in total (Volkov, 2013). 
For those who preferred volunteering from home, the campaign came up with            
Navalny to Every House online interactive map on ​dom.navalny.ru​, which was a            
geo-targeted social network. On the website, citizens were asked to register their home             
address in Moscow. Immediately, the address was displayed on the online map of the              
website. As a result, the other users could see they had a lot of like-minded people in                 
their neighbourhood and beyond it, they are part of a movement. This            
community-building aspect of the web application was another reference to the           
principles of participatory culture and transmedia storytelling which intersect in this           
case. Henry Jenkins, for instance, argues that transmedia projects are dependent on the             
active participation of fan communities or ‘knowledge communities’ (2006, pp.20-21) as           
he calls them. The sense of belonging to a community encourages participation which is              
always beneficial to a transmedia campaign. 
Practically, the website assigned simple tasks to the registered users. For           
instance, they could report if the campaign newsletters had been delivered to their             
residential building (“Navalny to Every House,” 2013). The initial idea was to increase             
the depth of participation step-by-step by giving the users more and more advanced             
tasks every few days. But the production took too much time and eventually the project               
offered a checklist of available involvement types instead of progression scenarios.           
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Nevertheless, the result was 36,000 registered users in 20,000 apartment houses, half of             
those in Moscow (“Alexey Navalny,” 2013, p.41). 
 
Illustration 7. ​Navalny To Every House​ interactive map with registered 
users (“Navalny to Every House,” 2013). 
 
 
Campaign in Moscow web and mobile application was an online tool to make             
political participation possible with minimum involvement. The app made it easier for            
supporters, including those from outside Moscow, to volunteer online. Using a specially            
designed application on ​VK​, a popular Russian social media, any individual who had a              
profile on ​VK ​could contact another random user with an automatically generated            
message in support of the candidate. For a better appeal, the system was designed to               
pick a user of approximately the same age as the volunteer who was contacting them. By                
the end of the campaign, 9,500 users had sent more than 500,000 messages via the               
application (“Alexey Navalny,” 2013, p.41). 
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5.3.6 Applying technical expertise 
In his description of transmedia organisational frameworks, Robert Pratten highlights          
the importance of the technological side to transmedia projects (2015, pp.40-41). From            
the resource mobilisation perspective, technical knowledge falls into the column of           
cultural resources available to political organisers – in the taxonomy of resources by             
Edwards and McCarthy (2007, p.126). Charles Tilly (1977a, pp.1-12) also specified           
technical expertise as one of the main resources of social mobilisation. The technical             
expertise of Navalny’s team allowed the campaign to create its participatory component            
by producing multiple web applications. Those applications empowered Russian citizens          
to act on behalf of the campaign both online and offline. They made it possible to boost                 
the grassroots enthusiasm of Navalny’s supporters in circumvention of the oppressive           
opportunity structure of the Russian politics.  
This technical expertise did not come at once. The IT infrastructure of the             
campaign benefited from the period of mass protest in 2011-2012 when the opposition             
tested new technologies for political mobilisation. In a move to legitimise the leaders of              
the protest movement, the Protest Committee decided to hold the Russian Opposition            
Coordination Council elections in 2012. The Central Election Committee of the Russian            
opposition was created specifically for that purpose. First, voters had to register on the              
website of the Central Electoral Committee. Then they had to verify their identity with              
an ID number or a small e-payment. Verified users received voter identification numbers             
to their mobile phones. Those who could not vote online or preferred to see how the                
process is organised offline, had an opportunity to cast their votes at one of several               
locations in Moscow (Gessen, 2012). Leonid Volkov who was then invited by Navalny             
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to lead his Moscow mayoral campaign was the head of the Central Electoral Committee              
and creator of its online voting system. 
In September 2019, Navalny’s data-driven system of ​Smart Voting caused havoc           
in the Moscow City Parliamentary election. The online application gave its users advice             
on what candidates to vote for in every district in order to prevent the Moscow               
administration candidates from winning. Dozens of candidates supported by ​Smart          
Voting won and made the parliamentary arithmetic more problematic for the Moscow            
administration. Both Navalny's mayoral bid of 2013 and the Moscow City Parliamentary            
election of 2019 showed that sophisticated technological solutions can make a difference            
even in a relatively restrictive political space.  
 
5.3.7 Navigating the campaign 
Transmedia navigation is the term used by Jenkins et al. to describe ‘the ability to deal                
with the flow of stories and information across multiple modalities’ (2006, p.46). As             
Robert Pratten (2015, p.152) theorised, ‘frictions’, such as ‘increased cost, additional           
keystrokes, diverted attention, low bandwidth’, impede a smooth movement of users           
between platforms in transmedia projects. He also stresses that creating as many            
platforms as possible without making sure people feel comfortable navigating them is a             
bad transmedia strategy. This easily could become relevant to Navalny’s campaign           
which unfolded across a lot of online and offline extensions if the candidate’s team              
overlooked this important element. 
To help citizens navigate the campaign, ​v.navalny.ru website provided         
prospective and experienced volunteers with live information on day-to-day needs of the            
campaign. For instance, the website showed if the campaign needed people to man             
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cubes​, campaign in Moscow metro or act as research interviewers for the campaign’s             
internal opinion polls (“V.Navalny,” 2013). Registered users of ​v.navalny.ru were          
granted access to their personal calendar planner which they could use to manage their              
personal involvement in the campaign throughout the election period. While the people            
used the digital calendar to plan their involvement, the campaign used the data to plan in                
advance and allocate necessary resources on every given day. This was especially            
important because the campaign depended on the volunteers’ self-initiative a great deal            
and had to keep up with it.  
Another example of how the campaign helped people to navigate across its many             
websites and activities was ​team.navalny.ru website. It was an online hub for all the              
forms of participation the campaign made available to their supporters. The campaign            
designed it to help people of different interests and capabilities find their role in the               
campaign. They could choose to host volunteers from outside Moscow, distribute           
printed newspapers in the Moscow metro, change the Wi-Fi network name to ​Vote for              
Navalny​, campaign at ​cubes​, pick up and drive a car with campaign slogans on it, collect                
and put campaign stickers on their car or bicycle, distribute campaign newspapers in             
traffic jams of which there are always plenty in Moscow, hang out a Navalny banner on                
the balcony, try themselves as an interviewer, help organise a local rally, campaign on              
social media through the online application, support the campaign with the campaign            
sticker on the profile picture on social media, distribute newsletters, stickers and leaflets,             
get involved in ​Navalny to every house web application, or donate to the campaign              
(“Team.Navalny,” 2013). Also, the users could fill a questionnaire for the campaign to             
determine individually how the team could use the person’s talents in the most efficient              
manner. 
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On election day, the most important thing was to make sure people show up at               
the polling stations. ​Vote.navalny.ru website was a get-out-the-vote website with five           
reasons to vote in the Moscow mayoral election and simple directions on how to find the                
local polling station. That was the reasoning behind ​Navalny to Every House project             
also. The get-out-the-vote campaign was to mobilise those who had indicated their            




As Gambarato and Dabagian (2016, p.4) show, ‘gamified applications along with games            
are frequently incorporated in transmedia projects’. That was certainly the case with            
team.navalny.ru website that employed elements of ​gamification ​to encourage         
volunteers to get more involved. The total contribution of an individual to the campaign              
was illustrated with a progress bar on the website, which also incorporated a system of               
symbolic awards. In Robert Pratten’s taxonomy of transmedia users, ​achievers          
participate to level up and gain points, and ​killers ​enjoy competing with other users              
(Pratten, 2015, pp.78-79). Both can find gamification elements helpful to satisfy their            
needs. This gamification approach is also an example of Axel Bruns’ interpretation of             
produsage as a situation where ‘participants gain status within the community on the             
basis of their contributions’ (Bruns, 2016, p.3). The rankings and progress bars on             
team.navalny.ru website granted volunteers with an inside-group status allowing them to           
progress in the hierarchy of campaign contributors publicly. 
In another example of gamification, Navalny's campaign tried to make it fun to             
learn about the candidate’s platform. For that purpose, Alexey Navalny’s team designed            
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a simple online game on ​popilili.com ​website (translated from Russian, ​popilili ​means            
‘they embezzled’). On the graphic interface of the game, players were asked to find              
items associated with the city spending programs which, as Navalny’s Anti-corruption           
Foundation concluded, led to substantial budget misappropriation. While playing, users          
were learning more about Navalny’s platform and the problem of corruption in the city              
(Nik Berezovskiy, 2015). 
 
5.3.9 Crowdfunding 
Budget is the key resource that a political campaign starts with, as believed by Volkov               
(2013). At the end of the day, it was paid staff who developed all the web applications                 
for volunteers. The primary way to fund Navalny’s transmedia campaign was its            
crowdfunding initiatives. Robert Pratten believes crowdfunding is a natural part of the            
transmedia revenue model (2015, pp.191-196). Renira Gambarato also argues that          
crowdfunding is one of the legitimate business models for transmedia projects (2013,            
p.93). ​Crowdfunding and Transmedia Storytelling by Carlos Scolari and Antoni Roig           
Telo (2015) gives an account of the transmedia initiatives that incorporated           
crowdfunding into their business plans. One example is the get-out-the-vote effort of the             
Harry Potter Alliance in ​Wizard Rock the Vote 2016 campaign (“Wizard Rock,” 2016)             
when $52,000 was raised from 1,500 online users.  
Navalny's election campaign was the first of its kind in Russia to rely heavily on               
crowdfunding which was its main source of financing. More than that, the campaign             
broke a record for the amount of money raised for a political cause in Russia. To                
crowdfund the campaign, Navalny's team launched ​pd4.navalny.ru website. It attracted          
16,700 people who donated about $3,100,000 to the campaign (“Alexey Navalny,”           
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2013, p.76). It set up a new record for political fundraising in the country (“Alexey               
Navalny,” 2013, p.71). That is even more significant considering that small donations            
dominated: the median transaction in Moscow was $60 and it was $30 in the country               
overall. About 35 per cent of the donations came from outside the capital – another sign                
of the federal profile of the campaign (Volkov, 2013). Along with ​pd4.navalny.ru            
website, Navalny used the capacities of his social media platforms to promote            
fundraising. As Navalny's campaign report showed, donations jumped up every time           
Navalny called to support him with donations in his blog (Volkov, 2013). 
After the election, the campaign stayed true to its transparency and democratic            
communication style with the people and produced a report on campaign spending.            
According to the report, 40 per cent of the budget was spent to produce promotional               
items such as free newspapers, leaflets, stickers and ​cube ​stands for the campaign. About              
27 per cent was spent on paid advertising including online ads (13.55 per cent) and radio                
adverts (12.48 per cent). Another 26 per cent was spent on street campaigning, including              
rallies, advert distribution, logistics, and so on. Among other expenses, there were            
internal polling (about 0.5 per cent) and office-related expenses (just above 2 per cent)              
(“Alexey Navalny,” 2013, p.75). 
The $3,100,000 that Navalny managed to raise was just under the budget of the              
rival Sobyanin campaign. The incumbent Mayor spent $3,240,000. To translate it into            
votes, Navalny spent $4.9 per vote (632,697 votes all together), and Sobyanin spent             
much less, only $2.7 per vote (1,193,178 votes in total) (“Rezultaty Vyborov,” 2013).             
These numbers seem not to be in favour of Navalny. But to look at this from a different                  
perspective, Navalny entered the race in July 2013 with popularity well below 10 points              
according to all the pollsters. Over the course of his campaign, he managed to increase               
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that number to 27 per cent when the votes were counted on September 9. On the other                 
hand, about 45-50 per cent were ready to vote for Sobyanin at the start of the election                 
campaign and he won the election with only 51.5 per cent. Thus, Sobyanin’s campaign              
only yielded a negligible increase in support. That makes Navalny's campaign           
significantly more effective in transforming investments into new supporters. The other           
parameter that also has to be taken into account is the free time that the ruling party                 
candidate received from the major government-controlled news outlets during the three           
months of the campaign. Its effect on the total votes Sobyanin got is hard to compute,                
but to put it into perspective, the reach of the Sobyanin campaign on TV exceeded 250                
million interactions with citizens, while all the other candidates got only 1.5 million             
contacts combined (“Analiz reklamnykh kampaniy,” 2013). 
From the Western point of view, political fundraising is a routine way of             
bringing money into candidates’ campaigns. From the smallest individual donations, to           
fundraising dinners with selected invitees, to large Super-PACs (political action          
committees), as they are known in the United States, money for election campaigns is              
raised from the public. In the Russian context, this was not common and promised to be                
problematic for various reasons. As we highlighted before, the Russian political space is             
not particularly open to collective actions. And fundraising, of course, is a collective             
endeavour set to fight for a common cause. On top of that, the legal opportunity               
structure practices selective repressions against those who support the opposition. Under           
such circumstances, it might not be easy for a politician, even the one in opposition, to                
convince people to donate their money for his or her campaign. Despite the liability of               
‘Russia’s pervasive political cynicism’ (Lipman, 2013), Navalny managed to lead the           
first major political campaign paid for by ordinary people. 
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While crowdfunding was the way transmedia strategies helped the campaign          
mobilise material resources, there was a legal opportunity structure opposing this. The            
crowdfunding operations of the campaign experienced resistance from the bureaucracy          
and law enforcement offices. In May 2014, the Moscow City Elections Commission            
launched an investigation into ​Yandex ​company, which is one of the largest IT             
companies in the country. The campaign used ​Yandex.Money ​to collect donations. The            
campaign was accused of using ​Yandex.Money ‘to receive illegal funds from abroad’            
(Brennan, 2014). No irregularities were proven later. The year following the election,            
the ​Yandex ​offices and the homes of the members of the opposition were searched. They               
were suspected of ‘pocketing funds designated for opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s           
Mayoral campaign last year’ (Brennan, 2014). Navalny suggested these activities were           
run to make it harder for independent political figures to raise money on the Internet and                
to discredit the opposition in the eyes of their supporters. 
 
5.3.10 Results of the campaign 
On September 14, 2013, after 3 months of intense campaigning, Navalny got 27 per cent               
of the votes. His rival candidate Sergey Sobyanin won the first ballot round with 51.5               
per cent. On election night, Sobyanin’s numbers stayed just shy of the 50 per cent               
threshold necessary to win outright in the first round. The second round would give a               
huge blow to the official candidate and cause a major crack in the super-controlling              
system of the Russian electoral authoritarianism, which never allows independent          
candidates to come so close to a success. The surprise outcome could energise a protest               
vote and, if it was big enough for Navalny to win, the key federal institutions, Kremlin                
and the Russian Parliament, could find themselves in the city managed by the enemy of               
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the regime. Eventually, Sobyanin somehow managed to close just above the 50 per cent              
he needed. But considering the government’s bad reputation and past electoral frauds,            
nobody could say for sure now if it was due to the votes varying in different                
constituencies or it was the fear of the second round that forced the Mayor to rig the                 
same very election he tried hard to make look legitimate. If the snap election was called                
to find legitimacy (Waller, 2013, p.6), arguably that goal was not achieved that night. 
The immediate goal of the campaign was to elect Navalny as mayor of Moscow.              
It was clear, however, that it would be an uphill battle and there were very little chances                 
the candidate would achieve that goal in the scope of one campaign considering the              
super-controlling nature of the Russian regime. Besides, Navalny never positioned          
himself as a Moscow politician, his ambitions have always been to influence federal             
politics and ‘Change Russia. Begin with Moscow’ slogan of his mayoral campaign            
proves that. One can say that a more realistic goal of Navalny's mayoral bid was to 1.                 
strengthen the position of Navalny as a sole leader of the opposition with a strong               
election result, 2. spread a word about Navalny and widen his base with new supporters,               
3. keep up with and reinforce the protest enthusiasm of the 2011-2012, 4. give citizens a                
lesson of active citizenship and train volunteers for future campaigns, and 5. hurt the              
regime as much as possible within the very limited opportunities the opposition had. 
Arguably, the campaign made gains on all those fronts, bigger or smaller. The             
less impressive than expected performance of the ruling party candidate on the election             
day was attributed to a low turnout among his base, while Navalny supporters showed              
up in big numbers, bigger than anyone projected. In the closing week of the campaign,               
major pollsters gave Navalny 18-20 per cent of support (against actual 27 per cent) and               
58-60 per cent to Sobyanin (Makutina, 2013). The overall turnout was expected to be              
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just above 50 per cent while in fact it was only 33 per cent on the day of election.                   
Apparently, Navalny outperformed in getting out the vote and Sobyanin underperformed           
which made a difference for the final results and almost cost Sobyanin the first-round              
win (Clover and Weaver, 2013a). 
Navalny did show a strong result, definitely much stronger than was expected.            
The ambiguous result of the first ballot demonstrated there are opportunities to make a              
difference even when elections are rigged and proved that the regime is not all              
invincible. Navalny also had a chance to reach out to thousands of new voters with               
dozens of rallies in residential areas and mobilise thousands of volunteers for the first of               
its kind massive grassroots campaign in Russia. 
The declared mission of the campaign was to bring political decision-makers           
under citizens’ control and empower local communities. Citizens’ oversight over public           
spendings, elected sheriffs, redistribution of budgets in favour of local authorities,           
connecting neighbourhoods through the networks of local roads, those policies were           
among the main points of Navalny’s platform and communications.  
Active citizenship was not only a declared goal of the campaign but also the              
means of achieving it. The campaign practiced what it preached. With thousands of             
volunteers campaigning offline and online and the greatest in the history of Russia             
politics crowdfunding organisation, Navalny's campaign of 2013 relied on civic          
engagement and grassroots enthusiasm in its methods. To reduce the costs of            
participation for the citizens of Moscow and beyond it, the campaign turned itself into a               
transmedia network of digital solutions with a range of engagement mechanics. The            
campaign was structured to accommodate as many volunteers as possible. There were            
websites for the engagement of varying intensity. 
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Illustration 8. The diagram of Alexey Navalny’s campaign in Moscow. 
 
Navalny’s campaign applied many of the transmedia principles of running          
campaigns. Spreadability and drillability by Henry Jenkins (2010), consistent experience          
across platforms or ‘canon’ (Long, 2007, p.164), the use of transmedia storytelling as a              
leadership practice (Ganz, 2009; 2011), helping supporters navigate the complicated          
transmedia structure of extensions, web applications and so on (Jenkins et al., 2006,             
p.46; Pratten, 2015, p.152), gamification (Gambarato and Dabagian, 2016, p.4), focus on            
participation (Jenkins et al., 2006, p.7; Pratten, 2015, p.2), making sure there are             
opportunities for participation of varying intensities to accommodate different people          
(Pratten, 2015, p.183), employing the principles of participatory culture including          
community-building and collaborative support (Jenkins et al., 2006, p.7), technological          
sophistication (Pratten, 2015, pp.40-41), crowdfunding (Scolari and Telo, 2015;         
Gambarato, 2013, p.93) and other transmedia strategies all found reflection in Alexey            
Navalny’s 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow. 
To conceptualise the participatory nature of Navalny's campaign, the chapter          
employed resource mobilisation theory and moved on from the idea of citizens’ agency             
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to the concept of SMOs and political organisers to understand better how to facilitate              
grassroots initiatives. On the one hand, the campaign leveraged the resources it            
mobilised from the protest movement. The case study made a point that Navalny's             
mayoral bid of 2013 as a campaign-style grassroots initiative was a logical extension of              
the opposition movement of 2011-2012 in Moscow. The protests in the capital made             
Navalny's transmedia grassroots campaign more probable at least in three ways. First,            
they gave citizens a chance to practice grassroots political action which had not been a               
big part of Russian political tradition. That experience will be of use for those who               
would volunteer for Alexey Navalny’s campaign in 2013. The persistent protest           
enthusiasm made it easier for the campaign to mobilise volunteers of which the             
campaign recruited thousands. Many if not most of them (“Kak pobedit,” 2017) came             
from the protests. Second, similarly to the movements of the Arab Spring, the Russia              
opposition learnt to use social media to mobilise people for civic action and even              
developed some software for political participation of their own. The online elections to             
the Russian Opposition Coordination Council in 2012 was an example of the latter.             
Third, the protests solidified the perception of Alexey Navalny as effectively the leader             
of the Russia opposition which helped him mobilise citizens for his Moscow campaign             
in less than a year after the protests (“Personalny portret,” 2012).  
On the other hand, the campaign gave citizens something they did not have             
during the Free and Fair Elections protest of 2011-2012. Considering that one of the              
goals of the campaign was to revitalise the protest movement, it created the kind of an                
organisational structure that provided the movement with valuable resources for more           
efficient political action with some real results. Thus, the protests of 2011-2012 and             
Navalny's campaign of 2013 demonstrated there can be a diffusion of resources between             
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movements and electoral politics which McAdam and Tarrow (2010) claimed to be true. 
The internal polling showed that by the end of the campaign 60 per cent of               
Muscovites saw ​cubes ​and leaflets, 35 per cent of them knew of local meetings in their                
neighbourhood, 30 per cent had newspapers in their post boxes, 30 per cent listened to               
the advertisement on the radio, 17 per cent of Moscow residents saw Navalny’s adverts              
on the Internet (Volkov, 2013). True to Leonid Volkov (2013), the campaign found             
correlation between simple exposure to the candidate’s ads and a positive opinion about             
him. In numbers, those who had ever come across with anything produced by the              
campaign were 12-15 per cent more likely to vote for Navalny.  
Over 40,000 voters in total attended 89 local meetings according to the campaign             
post-election report (“Alexey Navalny,” 2013, p.13). The meetings with the candidate           
usually attracted from 100 to 700 people (“Pri Luzhkove takogo ne bylo,” 2013). The              
most populous rally had 1600 people and the average turnout was 400 people (Volkov,              
2013). There were three meetings a day to accommodate different audiences: three local             
rallies a day Monday-Friday and five rallies a day on weekends. After every meeting,              
the campaign published a newspaper with highlights from the rally and other            
information about the candidate to distribute them locally (“Alexey Navalny,” 2013,           
pp.15-16). Volkov (2013) suggested that the rallies gave the campaign 30,000 new            
contacts with people and resulted in 60,000 new votes. 
The results of the campaign in numbers were (“Alexey Navalny,” 2013) 2,756            
cubes with 4-5,000 volunteers in total, 18-20,000 volunteers including those who           
volunteered on the Internet, 90 rallies held by Alexey Navalny, 20 press briefings, 10              
meetings with professional communities, 30 videos and 10 audio clips for the Internet,             
60 million interactions with people on the Internet overall, 6 million views on Youtube,              
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40,000 new followers on social media, 500,000 direct messages sent on social media by              
volunteers on behalf of the candidate, 40,000 people from 18,000 houses registered on             
Navalny to Every House website, 23 million printed papers (14 issues), leaflets (4             
issues) and local newspapers (4 issues), 700 volunteers who did opinion polls, 8,000 exit              
polls with 8,000 poll watchers. 
The websites and web applications the campaign designed encouraged         
collaboration among Russian citizens, made them feel part of a movement united by             
shared interests and made it easier for Navalny’s supporters to act together for the sake               
of a common good. This approach was an attempt to tap into the grassroots enthusiasm               
that the capital showed in 2011-2012. The campaign’s couchsurfing platform          
empowered people to collaborate across the country. ​Navalny to Every House web app             
allowed citizens to comprehend themselves as part of a bigger movement – the sense              
that the regime was trying to suppress through media blackouts and the campaigns of              
ridiculing Navalny’s supporters as marginals. The same effect had ​cubes ​that allowed an             
average Moscow citizen to see the real face of Navalny’s supporters. Despite being the              
first grassroots transmedia campaign of its kind in the country, Navalny's mayoral bid             
came up with many innovative ideas on how to overcome the negative aspects of the               
Russian political opportunity structure and let people exercise their political agency           
through cooperation. That required a change in a paradigm of political campaigning            
which included a new role of a candidate as the one who leads a live dialogue with                 
voters. Importantly, the pluralist mechanics of the campaign corresponded nicely with           
the platform of the candidate which placed utmost importance on decentralisation of the             
Russian state and active citizenship as the most effective form of governing capable of              
bringing elites under people’s control. 
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Volunteering with fellow citizens is important for building and strengthening ties           
between people and learning to take responsibility for the country. Alexis de Toqueville             
even argued that volunteering was critical for democracy to succeed in the United States              
in the first place (Tocqueville, 2012, pp.895-897). From that point of view, the practice              
of civil cooperation that the transmedia approach of Navalny's campaign offered to the             
people of Russia arguably contributed to preparing the society for democratic changes. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
The case study of Alexey Navalny’s 2013 mayoral campaign applied the OSMR            
analytical approach. With this approach, it took stock of the transmedia strategies of             
Navalny’s campaign. In particular, it discussed how those transmedia strategies allowed           
to recruit more volunteers and reduce the efforts needed to volunteer on behalf of the               
campaign. The campaign became an extensive network of web applications, websites,           
legacy media formats and offline points of promotion. Those platforms offered a great             
deal of participation opportunities to Navalny’s supporters. Storytelling as a resource of            
political leadership was also a factor in this campaign. The message of political             
accountability through civic engagement aligned nicely with the participatory         
transmedia approach the campaign practiced. 
The transmedia strategies of the campaign made labour/human, material and          
production resources more easily available to Navalny’s campaign. Technical expertise          
was important to develop the many applications the campaign took advantage of. It             
became easier to recruit volunteers and do fundraising because of the web applications             
the campaign developed. The transmedia structure of the campaign formed a diverse            
repertoire of contention to promote the cause.  
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Navalny’s transmedia strategies helped mobilise resources and mitigate some         
negative aspects of Russian opportunity structures for the campaign. The mediated           
opportunity structure of Russia was rather hostile to Navalny’s campaign, especially           
with regard to the legacy media largely controlled by the government and affiliated             
individuals. The repertoire of contention the transmedia approach activated made use of            
the media, communication and IT opportunities still open to the opposition movement in             
Russia. The special role of Moscow in the economic and political realities of the country               
made it harder for those living outside Moscow to participate but increased their interest              
in the election which had federal implications. Navalny’s campaign tapped into that            
enthusiasm and made it easier for supporters across the country to raise their voice. For               
example, the campaign developed a couchsurfing web application to bring those people            
to the capital and a web application to send messages on behalf of the campaign on                
social media. With those and other transmedia strategies, Alexey Navalny 2013 mayoral            
campaign found ways around the political space of Russia to promote the cause more              





Chapter 6. Critical Interpretation of the OSMR Analytical Approach 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The OSMR analytical approach is a valuable contribution to transmedia scholarship. It            
allows taking stock of political transmedia campaigns with focus on those transmedia            
strategies that make a difference for the campaign in a given political context. In the               
previous chapter, the case study of Alexey Navalny 2013 mayoral campaign           
demonstrated that valuable insights about a political transmedia campaign can be           
generated using this analytical approach.  
This chapter will discuss the OSMR analytical approach apart from the case            
study of Navalny's campaign of 2013. In particular, the chapter will give theoretical             
instructions about how to apply this analytical approach. The chapter will include            
diagrams with taxonomies identified in previous chapters and schemas outlining          
essential elements of the OSMR analytical approach. Once more, the chapter will            
explore the key parts of the resources-mobilisation analytical approach, i.e. transmedia           
scholarship, resource mobilisations and opportunity structure theories, to highlight their          
role in the analysis of political transmedia campaigns. 
 
6.2 New analytical approach 
6.2.1 Reinterpreting transmedia strategies 
There are many transmedia taxonomies and analytical approaches helpful to interpret           
political transmedia campaigns. They take stock of a wide range of transmedia features             
such as spreadability, continuity, immersion and other qualities of transmedia content           
(Jenkins, 2010), psychographics of transmedia users (Pratten, 2015, pp.78-79), users’          
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consumption strategies (Murray, 1997), premise and purpose, narrative, media platforms          
and the audience of transmedia projects (Gambarato and Medvedev, 2015b) and others I             
have had a chance to discuss in the thesis. 
Those classifications describe transmedia projects and campaigns from different         
angles but were not designed to take stock of political transmedia campaigns specifically             
and do not consider the complexity of the political realm transmedia grassroots            
campaigns interact with or those powerful local factors affecting them. To introduce the             
analytical approach that would welcome local factors to the discussion on transmedia            
campaigns in politics, the thesis married transmedia storytelling theory with social           
movement and grassroots campaigning scholarships in the OSMR analytical approach.          
Particularly, it employed the theories of political opportunity structures and resource           
mobilisation to understand the role political decision-makers and political organisers can           
play in the progress of transmedia grassroots campaigns. 
The reasoning behind incorporating both resource mobilisation and political         
opportunity theories in the analysis of transmedia grassroots campaigns is as follows.            
The OSMR analytical approach suggests that there must be a dynamic process going on              
between opportunity structures of a given society and resource mobilisation strategies of            
political organisers. A political space produces challenges and opportunities for          
transmedia grassroots campaigns. Consequently, political organisers either mobilise        
resources to overcome the obstacles created by POSs or use the external opportunities to              
agglomerate more political resources. In both scenarios, the ultimate goal is to reduce             
the cost of political participation for citizens – regardless of how welcoming or hostile a               
given political space is to out-of-the-polity actors. The analytical approach this thesis            
has developed investigates the ability of transmedia strategies to reduce the cost of             
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grassroots participation and make it more efficient. 
The advantage of the new approach is that now we can interpret the many              
aspects of transmedia grassroots campaigns in terms of their direct contribution to the             
political goals of a campaign. In doing so, we take a step forward from talking about the                 
campaign’s platforms, engagement strategies and messages formally and descriptively.         
Instead, the facets of the campaign get conceptualised to demonstrate how each of them              
contributed specifically to mobilise political resources and produce better results in           
given POSs. The OSMR analytical approach suggests that all the aspects of the             
campaign can serve one goal which is to reduce the costs of participation for citizens               
and that is the perspective which the approach examines them from. The following             




Illustration 9. Graphical schema representation of the OSMR analytical approach. 
 
According to the analytical approach, the transmedia strategies of a political           
campaign are interrelated with the opportunity structures of a given society. For            
instance, a local political space can affect the campaign communication strategy in a             
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positive or negative way. At the same time, transmedia strategies become resources to             
affect opportunity structures by reducing the cost of civic participation for its supporters             
in a given political space. 
 
6.2.2 Resource mobilisation 
Resource mobilisation theory is another critical part of the analytical approach this thesis             
chose to follow. The thesis has brought together the many classifications of political             
resources produced by different researchers to see if transmedia grassroots campaigns           
can contribute to mobilising at least some of them. Consequently, we made use of              
Navalny's campaign case study to draw parallels between the transmedia characteristics           
of the campaign and mobilising resources such as the repertoire of contention, technical             
expertise, monetary resources, labour and others. The analysis of Navalny's campaign           
has shown that transmedia strategies can facilitate the resource mobilisation efforts of            
political organisers and reduce the cost of non-electoral political participation. 
 
 
Illustration 10. Transmedia strategies as a resource mobilisation tool. 
 
The model grasps the complexity behind political campaigns abandoning the          
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media effects orthodoxy. Morozov famously wrote a book in which he made a             
compelling argument about the media having a limited effect on the process of             
democratisation in East Germany, for instance (2011, p.63). As another example,           
Facebook facilitated the Arab Spring uprisings but the so-called ‘youth bulge’ in the             
Middle East and North Africa and the high levels of unemployment made a difference              
for the ultimate outcome of the protest movements in the region as well (Hamanaka,              
2017; Jagietto and Van der Heijden, 2011). In other words, social and economic             
characteristics of a given society along with all sorts of demographics can be a factor of                
great importance which a media-centred analytical approach would not take into           
account. 
The thesis tried to mitigate this original bias of a media-centred analysis of             
political transmedia campaigns by incorporating ideas from other disciplines. It did not            
just argue that transmedia strategies can make a difference when it comes to grassroots              
campaigning but also sought to take stock of the political space transmedia campaigns             
interact with and introduce new ideas to the transmedia scholarship. The approach this             
thesis has developed allowed it to explore the political dimension of transmedia            
grassroots campaigns with the toolkits of relevant political theories. With the application            
of POS and resource mobilisation theories, transmedia practices started making sense as            
serving specific political goals of reducing the cost of participation for active citizens             




Illustration 11. Classifications of mobilising resources. 
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The OSMR analytical approach is non-rigid. It does not recommend studying all            
the political transmedia campaigns against the same set of mobilising resources, or            
opportunity structures for that matter. One has to acknowledge that every campaign is             
unique as unique is the political context of a given campaign. Instead, the analytical              
approach this thesis has developed offers a menu of possible resources to choose from.              
In doing so, it makes it possible to relate transmedia strategies to particular aspects of               
opportunity structures those strategies were designed to overcome or benefit from. 
Illustration 11 summarises some of the taxonomies describing the resources of           
political mobilisation particularly those proposed by Charles Tilly (2004; 2008), Jo           
Freeman (1975), Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy (2007) and Michael Ganz (2009;             
2011). Although the list is hardly exhaustive, it does cover the wide range of most               
probable resources of mobilisation such as technical know-how, human resources,          
monetary resources, land, solidarity, sympathetic support, repertoires of contention,         
storytelling, equipment, supplies and others. 
While bringing in new ideas from resource mobilisation and opportunity          
structures scholarships, the new approach stayed true to its transmedia roots and drew             
insights from them to reinterpret phenomena from the realm of political communication.            
In particular, this thesis applied the key concepts of the transmedia studies to make sense               
of the many political activities of Navalny's campaign. For instance, the ideas of ‘free              
labour’, transmedia crowdfunding, transmedia messaging and others were brought in to           
take stock of the candidate’s political campaign. 
It is important to stipulate that the OSMR analytical approach does not claim to              
connect transmedia practices with the greater effectiveness of grassroots campaigns in           
achieving their political goals. Instead, it takes stock of the ability of transmedia             
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campaigns to empower people in their non-electoral political actions. While the thesis            
examines the ability of transmedia campaigns to provide active citizens with tools or             
resources to make their political participation easier, it must be acknowledged that there             
are many other factors in play – some are easier some are harder to predict – which                 
determine to which extent a particular grassroots transmedia campaign will be effective. 
 
6.2.3 Opportunity structures 
POS theory is another pillar of the OSMR analytical approach. The thesis suggested that              




Illustration 12. Dynamic relationships between transmedia strategies and opportunity 
structures. 
 
Mediation opportunity structure refers to all the ways in which grassroots           
campaigns can use the power of mediated communication in a given political space and              
how the mediated sphere affects the campaign. The opportunities of the mediated space             
take the central stage in the repertoire of contention of modern political campaigns and,              
therefore, are of crucial importance to grassroots campaigns of nowadays. ​Media           
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opportunity structure ​reflects ‘mainstream media representations of protest and         
movements’ (Cammaerts, 2012, p.117). Discursive opportunities are produced through         
the movement’s own media and designed to make its story more resonating with the              
audience (McCammon, 2013). Networked opportunities ​are facilitated by social media          
(Cammaerts, 2012, p.122).  
 
Illustration 13. Classifications of opportunity structures. 
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Other structures of opportunity, e.g. legal opportunity structure, the traditions of           
grassroots participation and the situation with representative democracy, can affect          
citizens’ political enthusiasm, something that transmedia grassroots campaigns rely on          
to achieve their objectives. Illustration 13 has some of the classifications of opportunity             
structures which this thesis identified and which can be of use for the analysis of other                
political transmedia campaigns. 
While this thesis has highlighted some of the structures of opportunity and took             
stock of them in relation to the Russian context, the thesis has to acknowledge that it                
would be up to a particular case study to decide what kinds of political opportunities are                
most relevant to it. That should not constitute a problem since the flexibility of the               
OSMR analytical approach makes it possible to take into account very different aspects             
of the political space. By no means they are limited to those that this thesis has referred                 
to in the case study of Navalny's campaign. For instance, various cultural phenomena or              
the psychological dimension could prove to be revealing for the analysis of certain             
campaigns. 
The example of Navalny's campaign has demonstrated that the structures of           
opportunity is a workable way to conceptualise the factors affecting the resource            
mobilisation practices of political organisers and the destinies of grassroots campaigns.           
That is because at any given time there are formal or informal arrangements about              
different aspects of a given society that put their mark on the probability and the               
direction of political change. They are not just isolated factors of political, cultural, legal              
and other nature but structural arrangements. They are interconnected and have some            
power to sustain themselves over time affecting the arrangements of tomorrow. 
The thesis argues that the theories of POS and mobilising resources are the             
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supreme theoretical foundation to understand the mechanisms that guide political change           
– to compare with the theories that contemplate direct political agency. One of the              
reasons is that the acts of voluntary agency are hard to predict and they are prone to                 
many possible influences such as a group interest, an immediate personal interest, the             
individual psychology of a political actor and so on. Even though the structures of              
opportunity are not set in stone for a given political space, the concept is still capable of                 
producing results and helping to draw insights about possible destinies of grassroots            
campaigns. That was the reason why the thesis started discussing the scholarship on             
politics and political communication with the analysis of the agency of elites and the              
greater population and then moved on to introduce the theories of political opportunity             
structures and resource mobilisation in political campaigning as a step forward from            
talking about political change as solely the product of competing agents. 
 
6.2.4 Synergy of the scholarships 
There are two sides to the analysis of the political aspects of transmedia campaigns in               
the approach this thesis has proposed – the analytical approach appreciated the dynamic             
relationships between the internal capacities of political organisations to recruit          
resources (resource mobilisation theory) and the external locally-specific factors that          
affect grassroots campaigns (POS theory). The character of the political space has an             
impact on the assortment of resources available to political transmedia campaigns. In            
their turn, political organisers can use transmedia tools as resources reacting to and             
trying to mitigate very specific obstacles of a particular political space.  
POS and resource mobilisation are the two theories to analyse the political            
meaning of transmedia strategies. They help the OSMR analytical approach make sense            
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of the communication practices of transmedia campaigns, to understand why and to            
what purpose political grassroots campaigns come up with this or that transmedia            
extension. In its turn, the theory of transmedia storytelling helps conceptualise and bring             
together the diverse political activities of grassroots campaigns, describing them as           
systems of interrelated messages, extensions and platforms. 
The idea to analyse political transmedia campaigns from the standpoint of           
resource mobilisation and political opportunities was inspired by SWOT (Strengths,          
Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis, a business technique that takes into          
account internal strengths and weaknesses of an organisation and external opportunities           
and threats (Pickton and Wright, 1998). The SWOT technique takes stock of internal             
strengths and weaknesses of an enterprise and external opportunities and threats that            
affect its performance. Likewise, resource mobilisation theory focuses on internal          
capacities of political organisations to mobilise political resources of different kinds and            
provide them to grassroots activists. The theory of POS deals with external factors that              
are in a position to improve or hinder the prospects of transmedia grassroots campaigns              
in politics. Thus, the outlined analytical approach, on the one hand, is innovative and              
new to transmedia studies but, on the other hand, is well-known and has proven to be                
workable in the scope of some other disciplines. 
With the political science theories of resource mobilisation and opportunity          
structures used as a basis for the OSMR analytical approach, this political            
communication thesis made an important contribution to transmedia storytelling         
scholarship. First and foremost, the thesis has developed and tried a new approach to the               
analysis of political transmedia campaigns drawing insights from other branches of           
science, which made possible a more nuanced analysis of political transmedia           
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campaigns. Besides, the thesis has introduced the theory of transmedia storytelling to a             
wider realm of political scholarship which is of importance since transmedia storytelling            
has suffered from being a niche theory. The thesis also opened the door for more               
borrowings and interpretations in the future. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
The OSMR analytical approach makes a valuable contribution to transmedia storytelling           
scholarship. It draws insights from the theories of resource mobilisations and           
opportunity structures to make sense of transmedia strategies in political campaigning.           
In particular, the analytical approach that this thesis has developed conducts the analysis             
of the dynamic relationships between transmedia strategies, mobilising resources and          
opportunity structures. The OSMR approach juxtaposes the elements of transmedia          
strategies, mobilising resources and opportunity structures to see how transmedia          
strategies become valuable political resources for campaigns and how those resources           
correspond to the aspects of opportunity structures.  
The OSMR analytical approach makes use of many classifications available in           
literature. This chapter summarised some of those classifications and taxonomies in           
diagrams to make the OSMR analytical approach easier to apply in the future. The              
diagram of mobilising resources included multiple classifications from the works of           
Charles Tilly, Jo Freeman, Michael Ganz, Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy to show              
the resources transmedia strategies can mobilise. The opportunity structures diagram          
listed the aspects of political, mediation and legal opportunity structure. To make the             
application of the OSMR analytical approach more straightforward, one can use those            
classifications to examine the internal capacities of political campaigns and their           
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political contexts. With that being said, every campaign is unique in the same way as               
there are no two identical political contexts. That is why the OSMR analytical approach              
was designed to be flexible and able to incorporate the taxonomies not listed in the               
theoretical part of this thesis.  
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
 
7.1 The OSMR analytical approach 
The main research problem of this political communication thesis was to develop an             
analytical approach to studying political transmedia campaigns as locally-specific. The          
analytical approach this thesis has developed, the OSMR analytical approach, examines           
the opportunities and threats of a given political space to see how local specificities              
affect the destinies of transmedia grassroots initiatives. With the example of Russia, the             
thesis discussed the implications of mediation and legal opportunity structures, the           
situation with the institutions of representative democracy, the traditions of grassroots           
participation in the society and other aspects of the Russian political space. 
The thesis also brought in the theory of resource mobilisation. It served as part of               
the OSMR approach to show how political organisers can mobilise grassroots supporters            
and reduce the costs of political participation for them. The resources that political             
campaigns agglomerate are technical expertise, labour, monetary resources, space and          
tactical repertoires, among others. The classifications of mobilising resources helped          
take stock of Navalny's grassroots campaign.  
The thesis has demonstrated that transmedia storytelling can be instrumental in           
mobilising political resources, reducing the cost of political participation for active           
citizens and mitigating some negative aspects of opportunity structures. It was done with             
the case study of Alexey Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow. Among other             
things, the campaign relied on its technological expertise to develop a transmedia            
network of websites and web services that simplified political action for thousands of             
volunteers. For instance, a couchsurfing web service made it easier for the residents             
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from outside Moscow to come and campaign in the capital of Russia defying economic              
and legal restrictions. A crowdfunding initiative allowed to collect monetary resources           
in the situation where the LOS tried to prevent citizens from donating to Navalny's              
campaign. 
That ability of transmedia campaigns to confront the negatives of POSs is of             
special importance in the context of electoral authoritarian regimes like modern Russia            
where grassroots enthusiasm of citizens is being suppressed through a range of            
opportunity structures in the mediation, legal, political and other realms. A thorough            
discussion on the structures of political opportunity in modern Russia portrayed a picture             
of many restrictions that civil society and the opposition face when pursuing the cause of               
democracy. 
What was not part of the initial plan, the thesis also found support for the               
proposition that there can be a diffusion of resources between social movements and             
political campaigns. As the study concluded, ​Alexey Navalny's 2013 grassroots          
campaign ​in Moscow was a part of a greater protest movement that overtook the capital               
of Russia in 2011-2012. On the one hand, Navalny's campaign drew grassroots            
enthusiasm from the protest base for its electoral purposes. On the other hand, it gave               
the social movement something it was missing during the protests, i.e. political            
organisation with its technical expertise and a network of websites and web applications             
to make their voices louder. 
The job done in the thesis is of importance to transmedia storytelling scholarship.             
The problem that the thesis identified at the very beginning is the deficit of analytical               
considerations on the study of transmedia campaigns in politics. Political campaigns are            
very context-dependent and require a special approach to their analysis. The study has             
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contributed to filling that gap. It referred to the scholarship on political mobilisation to              
better understand the factors that affect the progress of transmedia grassroots campaigns            
in politics.  
The next diagram outlines the relationships between the three key parts of the             
OSMR analytical approach: 
 
 
Illustration 14. Graphical schema representation of the OSMR analytical approach. 
 
The OSMR analytical approach reinterpreted the whole transmedia experience         
through the lens of resource mobilisation and political opportunities but also           
incorporated the findings of known transmedia analytical approaches and taxonomies.          
The thesis has connected Henry Jenkins’ (2010) principles of transmedia storytelling,           
such as spreadability, drillability, immersion and others, to resource mobilisation          
practices of political transmedia campaigns. In the same manner, the thesis made use of              
the transmedia ideas of ‘canon’ (Long, 2007, p.164), storytelling as a leadership practice             
(Ganz, 2009; 2011), navigational transparency (Jenkins et al., 2006, p.46; Pratten, 2015,            
p.152), gamification (Gambarato and Dabagian, 2016, p.4), participatory culture         
(Jenkins et al., 2006, p.7; Pratten, 2015, p.2), many degrees of participation (Pratten,             
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2015, p.183), community-building and collaborative support (Jenkins et al., 2006, p.7),           
technological sophistication (Pratten, 2015, pp.40-41), crowdfunding (Scolari and Telo,         
2015; Gambarato, 2013, p.93) and other transmedia strategies. In doing so, the thesis             
both expanded the transmedia storytelling scholarship with insights from other          
disciplines and came to a very specific result in the form of a new approach to the                 
analysis of transmedia grassroots campaigns in politics. 
The OSMR analytical approach is non-rigid. It does not advise studying all the             
political transmedia campaigns against the same set of mobilising resources, or           
opportunity structures for that matter. Instead, the analytical approach offers a menu of             
possible resources to choose from. In doing so, it makes it possible to relate transmedia               
strategies to particular aspects of opportunity structures those strategies were designed to            
overcome or benefit from. For instance, this thesis discussed the resource mobilisation            
taxonomies by Charles Tilly (2004; 2008), Jo Freeman (1975), Bob Edwards and John             
D. McCarthy (2007) and Michael Ganz (2009; 2011) citing the most common resources             
of mobilisation such as technical know-how, human resources, monetary resources,          
land, solidarity, sympathetic support, repertoires of contention, storytelling, equipment,         
supplies, among others. As the case study of Alexey Navalany’s 2013 mayoral campaign             
for Moscow demonstrated, transmedia strategies can be converted to those mobilising           
resources and therefore help political campaigns adapt to particular political contexts. 
The thesis also gave an account of possible opportunity structures to make it             
easier to interpret different aspects of a given political context with the OSMR analytical              
approach. Among other things, there was a discussion about mediation, legal and            
political opportunity structures. The case study of Navalny's campaign also took stock of             
some cultural factors such as the traditions of grassroots politics in the country, the              
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special position of Moscow in Russian economic and political life, and the situation with              
the institutions of political representation. The example of Navalny's campaign          
demonstrated that the structures of opportunity is a workable way to conceptualise the             
factors affecting the resource mobilisation practices of political organisers and the           
destinies of grassroots campaigns.  
The OSMR analytical approach is flexible. While it made sense in the scope of              
this thesis to take stock of the most common opportunity structures, the thesis             
acknowledges that it would be up to a particular case study to decide what kinds of                
political opportunities are most relevant to it. There is no need for them to be limited to                 
those that the case study of Navalny's campaign referred to.  
All in all, this political communication thesis made an important contribution to            
transmedia storytelling scholarship with the political science theories of resource          
mobilisation and opportunity structures used as a basis for the OSMR analytical            
approach. First and foremost, the thesis has developed and tried a new approach to              
analysing political transmedia campaigns. Besides, the thesis has introduced the theory           
of transmedia storytelling to a wider realm of political scholarship and opened the door              
for more borrowings and interpretations in the future. 
 
7.2 Further developments 
There are possible developments of this thesis that have fallen beyond the framework of              
the current project. The presented analytical approach could be tested further to discuss             
political transmedia campaigns. As one of potential follow ups, there is a space to see               
how the outlined analytical and theoretical approach works in more liberal political            
settings. This analytical approach that employs the theory of political opportunities and            
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resources to discuss political transmedia campaigns is flexible enough to accommodate           
different campaigns and a variety of political contexts. But it is also probable that the               
approach would benefit from some modifications when applied to the campaigns           
expanding in less restrictive political space. That would be one of the routes to progress               
on the findings of this thesis. 
Indeed, under curtain political contexts, opportunity structures can be more open           
to out-of-the-polity actors than what the example of Alexey Navalny shows. When            
applied to some other campaigns, the presented analytical approach might have to            
dedicate more time to the enabling side of the opportunity structure in place. It would               
add another dimension to the OSMR analytical approach and explore another side to the              
application of transmedia strategies in politics. 
On a different note, one can argue that transmedia scholarship as a field would              
benefit from taking stock of local specificity even when it comes to non-political             
campaigns. Although it may seem less likely that transmedia projects in entertainment            
and marketing would suffer from the limitations of external political opportunity           
structures, it does not mean they are context-independent. Indeed, cultural frames affect            
transmedia advertising campaigns and entertainment production. The legal opportunity         
structure is also very much relevant to what transmedia projects in marketing and             
entertainment can or cannot do in a given social context. Although those effects could be               
less consequential than the impact of POSs on political grassroots campaigns they are             
worth paying attention to. 
Coming back to the case of Alexey Navalny, the story of his 2013 campaign still               
reverberates through Russian politics. At the time of writing, the leading figure of             
Russian democratic opposition stays imprisoned following the same bogus charges he           
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faced during his mayoral run in 2013. Yet, even with Navalny under arrest, his              
foundation has managed to produce ‘Putin's Palace. History of World's Largest Bribe’ a             
very thorough investigation into Vladimir Putin’s secret palace. It has a multimedia            
website of its own at palace.navalny.com, been viewed more than 112 million times on              
YouTube as of February 2021 and provoked a series of protest manifestations across the              
country. Navalny’s ​Smart Voting ​data-driven recommendation system which caused         
havoc in the Moscow City Parliamentary election in 2019 and spoiled Kremlin’s game             
to advance its most loyal candidates is getting ready to have the same effect over the                
parliamentary election in September 2021. While the long-term consequences of Alexey           
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